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MSBIP, Midland States Bancorp Inc.
Our banking subsidiary, Midland States Bank, an Illinois state-chartered bank formed in 1881, has branches across Illinois and in Missouri, and provides a full range of commercial and consumer banking products and services, merchant credit card services, trust and investment management, insurance and financial planning services.
We deliver a comprehensive range of banking products and services to individuals, businesses, municipalities and other entities within our market areas, which include Illinois and the St.
Louis metropolitan area, where we operated 53 full-service banking offices as of December 31, 2025.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~37 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 7%, above 12% in only 2 of 10 years). The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| $177M | $189M | $252M | $265M | $260M | $278M | $407M | $364M | $375M | $325M | RevenueRevenue |
| $121M | $153M | $223M | $250M | $245M | $238M | $313M | $417M | $426M | $388M | Interest incomeInt. inc. |
| $16M | $23M | $43M | $60M | $46M | $30M | $56M | $168M | $190M | $151M | Interest expenseInt. exp. |
| $105M | $130M | $180M | $190M | $199M | $208M | $257M | $249M | $236M | $237M | Net interest incomeNet int. |
| $72M | $59M | $72M | $75M | $61M | $70M | $150M | $115M | $139M | $88M | Noninterest incomeFee inc. |
| $6M | $10M | $9M | $17M | $44M | $3M | $77M | $83M | $120M | $60M | Credit-loss provisionProvision |
| $50M | $26M | $51M | $72M | $32M | $99M | $131M | $88M | $47M | ($115M) | Pretax incomePretax |
| $32M | $16M | $39M | $56M | $23M | $81M | $100M | $61M | $38M | ($124M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 37% | 39% | 22% | 23% | 30% | 18% | 24% | 30% | 19% | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| 1.0% | 0.4% | 0.7% | 0.9% | 0.3% | 1.1% | 1.3% | 0.8% | 0.5% | -1.9% | Return on assetsROA |
| 10% | 4% | 6% | 8% | 4% | 14% | 14% | 9% | 5% | -22% | Return on equityROE |
| 7% | 0% | 3% | 5% | −0% | 9% | 11% | 5% | 2% | −27% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| 12% | 5% | 10% | 12% | 5% | 20% | 20% | 11% | 7% | -23% | Return on tangible equityROTCE |
| 68% | 81% | 76% | 66% | 71% | 63% | 49% | 53% | 55% | — | Efficiency ratioEffic. |
| $10M | $14M | $20M | $24M | $25M | $25M | $26M | $27M | $27M | $28M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | $0 | $4M | $40M | $12M | $1M | $18M | $5M | $10M | BuybacksBuybacks |
| ($359M) | ($235M) | ($7M) | ($365M) | ($1.3B) | ($478M) | ($1.1B) | ($75M) | $137M | $749M | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $313M | $189M | ($92M) | $7M | $760M | $483M | $332M | ($104M) | ($334M) | ($862M) | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| ($22M) | $24M | ($2M) | $181M | ($53M) | $339M | ($520M) | ($26M) | ($20M) | $13M | Change in cashΔ cash |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| $2.3B | $3.2B | $4.1B | $4.4B | $5.1B | $5.2B | $6.3B | $6.1B | $5.2B | $4.4B | Loans held for investmentLoans |
| $15M | $16M | $21M | $28M | $60M | $51M | $61M | $69M | $111M | $69M | Credit-loss allowanceAllowance |
| $3.2B | $4.4B | $5.6B | $6.1B | $6.9B | $7.4B | $7.9B | $7.8B | $7.5B | $6.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| $2.4B | $3.1B | $4.1B | $4.5B | $5.1B | $6.1B | $6.4B | $6.3B | $6.2B | $5.4B | DepositsDeposits |
| $49M | $99M | $165M | $172M | $162M | $162M | $162M | $162M | $162M | $8M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $2.9B | $4.0B | $5.0B | $5.4B | $6.2B | $6.8B | $7.1B | $7.1B | $6.8B | $5.9B | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| $322M | $450M | $609M | $662M | $621M | $600M | $696M | $715M | $711M | $565M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 14.4M | 18.3M | 23.5M | 24.5M | 23.3M | 22.5M | 22.4M | 22.1M | 21.7M | 21.8M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $2.19 | $0.88 | $1.67 | $2.28 | $0.97 | $3.61 | $4.48 | $2.76 | $1.75 | $-5.69 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.68 | $0.77 | $0.85 | $0.96 | $1.07 | $1.12 | $1.16 | $1.20 | $1.25 | $1.27 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $22.30 | $24.59 | $25.84 | $27.02 | $26.62 | $26.62 | $31.08 | $32.32 | $32.70 | $25.90 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| $18.42 | $18.27 | $17.26 | $18.59 | $18.47 | $18.36 | $22.92 | $24.28 | $24.70 | $25.13 | Tangible book / shareTBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +2.2%/yr | +5.9%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +15.4%/yr | −23.7%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +7.1%/yr | +3.5%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +5.5%/yr | +17.2%/yr |
| Book value / share | +1.7%/yr | −0.5%/yr |
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“As a result, we have concluded the material weaknesses previously identified have been resolved at December 31, 2025.”
“In addition, we restated our consolidated financial statements as of and for the year ended December 31, 2023, and for the year ended December 31, 2022, as well as the interim quarterly periods in 2024 and 2023.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity -22%Loss on equityNet income ($124M) ÷ equity $565MIndustry peers: median 11%
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- LossNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $8M − intangibles $9M)Industry peers: median 12%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 63%
What this means
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 8.7%AdequateEquity $565M ÷ assets $6.5B
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 83%Deposit-fundedDeposits $5.4B ÷ assets $6.5B
What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 25%ElevatedProvision for credit losses $60M ÷ net interest income $237M
What this means
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
The franchise and the credit cycle
- Solid core depositsNoninterest-bearing deposits $1.0B ÷ deposits $5.4B · pays 2.61% on the interest-bearing rest (avg of year-ends)
What this means
The share of deposits the bank pays nothing for — checking accounts that stay through rate cycles. This is the deposit moat in one number: a high share means cheap, sticky raw material for lending; a low share means the funding reprices with every rate move. Buffett's Wells letter is built on exactly this economics.
- Net charge-offs 2.15%Heavy lossesCharge-offs net of recoveries $103M ÷ loans $4.8B (avg of year-ends) · worst year on record 3.24% · allowance held at 1.59% of loans
What this means
Loans actually written off, net of what was later recovered — the realized truth the provisions were guessing at. Graham's rule applies doubly here: the worst year in the record, not the average, is the read, because a loan book's sins are committed in the good years and confessed in the bad ones.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$154M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Beside that spending sits $54M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2014 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time. The cash figure above counts only cash consideration: goodwill of $8M against it says much of the buying was paid for in stock, which never passes through the cash-flow statement.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Ludwig | $1.6M | $1.8M | $332M |
| 2022 | Mr. Ludwig | $1.8M | $1.9M | $282M |
| 2023 | Mr. Ludwig | $1.6M | $1.7M | $149M |
| 2024 | Mr. Ludwig | $1.5M | $1.2M | $172M |
| 2025 | Mr. Ludwig | $1.5M | $1.5M | $120M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership8.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Credit & receivables as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers
Midland States Bancorp Inc. is listed here as a claim on a business rather than as the business itself — a preferred series, a bond or a warrant, filed under the same registrant as the common stock. A comparative table lines businesses up against one another, so there is none here. The business behind it is Midland States Bancorp Inc. (MSBI), where the record, the scorecard and the peer bench are.
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookA bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Midland States Bancorp Inc.’s record justifies.
Tangible book / share, delivered7%/yr’20→’25
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $549M on 21M shares, a 11% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Manual order: ← MSBI its page in the Manual MSCI →
Industry order: ← MSBI the Banks chapter MTB →