Owner Scorecard


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OPENW, Opendoor Technologies Inc Series K

A property business, read on funds from operations and net asset value rather than reported earnings.

We are a leading e-commerce platform for residential real estate transactions and the largest U.S. iBuyer.

By leveraging artificial intelligence, data science and purpose-built software, we enable consumers to transact directly with Opendoor, eliminating traditional friction and intermediaries.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
OPENW · Opendoor Technologies Inc Series K
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$4.4B
−15.2% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.3B 5-yr avg $8.0B
Gross margin 9% 5-yr avg 7%
Operating margin −16.0% 5-yr avg −6.3%
ROIC −38% 5-yr avg −19%
Owner-earnings margin −15% 5-yr avg −5%
Free cash flow margin −15% 5-yr avg −5%

Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~37 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −6.4% through the cycle on a 7.6% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −20%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$1.8B$4.7B$2.6B$8.0B$15.6B$6.9B$5.2B$4.4B$3.3BRevenueRevenue
($241M)($341M)($253M)($662M)($1.4B)($275M)($392M)($1.3B)($1.5B)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$5M$15M$22M$27M$37M$38M$33M$31M$26MDepreciation & amortizationD&A
($1.2B)($272M)$682M($5.8B)$730M$2.3B($595M)$1.0B($459M)Cash from operationsOp. cash
($7M)($95M)($22M)($476M)$234M$44M$28M($12M)Investing cash flowInv. cash
$1.5B$646M$161M$7.3B($1.8B)($2.6B)($210M)($499M)Financing cash flowFin. cash
$309M$279M$821M$1.1B($787M)($251M)($777M)$538MChange in cashΔ cash
Balance sheet
$2.2B$2.2B$9.5B$6.6B$3.6B$3.1B$2.4B$3.0BTotal assetsAssets
48%20%60%48%36%Debt / assetsDebt/assets
$1.1B$482M$1.9B$3.0B$2.1B$1.5B$1.1B$1.1BTotal debtDebt
$669M($979M)($353M)$1.7B$1.1B$813M$106M$175MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$60M$110M$68M$143M$385M$211M$133M$131M$114MInterest expenseInt. exp.
-2.7×-2.3×-2.7×-4.0×-2.4×-1.8×-2.4×-2.2×-4.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.6B$623M$7.3B$5.5B$2.6B$2.4B$1.4BTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
($414M)($733M)$1.6B$2.2B$1.1B$967M$713M$1.0B$914MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
78.6M80.0M109M593M627M657M699M767M963MShares out (diluted)Shares
$-5.27$-9.17$14.21$3.79$1.73$1.47$1.02$1.31$0.95Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×5.42 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
7-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−18.3%/yr−24.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share−26.0%/yr
Capital spending / share−32.9%/yr−36.8%/yr
Book value / share−37.9%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue-15.2%
    “Revenue Revenue decreased by $782 million, or 15%, for the year ended December 31, 2025 compared to the year ended December 31, 2024. The decrease in revenue was primarily attributable to lower sales volumes during the year ended December 31, 2025.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($287M) ÷ interest expense $131M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $962M − debt $1.1B
    What this means

    Netting $962M of cash and short-term investments against $1.1B of debt leaves $106M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    6-yr median, range -25%–-15%; -20% latest = NOPAT ($227M) ÷ invested capital $1.1B
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran -20% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Positive this year, negative across the cycle
    latest $1.0B = operating cash $1.0B − maintenance capex $12M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (8-yr median -1%)
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 24% of revenue this year, a -1% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $159M of SBC) leaves $878M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($1.3B) · cash from operations $1.0B
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.39×
    Harvesting
    Capex $12M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $31M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Sells itself
    Selling and marketing $310M ÷ revenue $4.4B
    What this means

    Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 3.6%
    The count is rising
    Stock compensation $159M (fiscal 2025), 3.6% of revenue · no repurchases · diluted shares +22.2% since 2022
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 7.03×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.1B vs $2.0B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (8-yr record) · 8 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record
    Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.68/share (latest year $-1.34), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.03/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 0 of 8
    What this means

    Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −7% → −6% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about −7% early, −6% lately, median −7%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2018 · −8.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.9B
  • Cash & short-term investments$896M
  • Other current assets$2.0B
Current liabilities$968M
  • Other current liabilities$968M
Current ratio2.94×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.94×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.93×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.9Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway1.9 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−43.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters4.5× → 2.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$911Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$803MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$8M$8M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$3M0% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$81Mover 7 years since fiscal 2018 buying other businesses, against $209M of capital spent building over the 8-year record

$60M written down across 1 year (2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 74% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Beside that spending sits $32M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2018 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio7,581:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$159M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 3.6% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers

Opendoor Technologies Inc Series K is listed here as a claim on a business rather than as the business itself — a preferred series, a bond or a warrant, filed under the same registrant as the common stock. A comparative table lines businesses up against one another, so there is none here. The business behind it is Opendoor Technologies Inc (OPEN), where the record, the scorecard and the peer bench are.

IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Opendoor Technologies Inc Series K has delivered.

Opendoor Technologies Inc Series K’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($474M) on 971M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-07-28; net debt $175M. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($15M) runs well above depreciation ($26M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($471M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Opendoor Technologies Inc Series K (OPENW), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/OPENW, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← OPEN its page in the Manual OPI →

Industry order: ← OPEN the Real Estate Development & Services chapter OPI →