Owner Scorecard


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XIFR, XPLR Infrastructure LP Common

Electric Utilities capital-intensive Regulated utilityCapital build-outCyclical

A regulated utility, earning a set return on the capital it sinks into its network.

XPLR's portfolio is diversified across generation technologies including wind, solar and battery storage projects.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
XIFR · XPLR Infrastructure LP Common
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.2B
−3.4% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.2B 5-yr avg $1.0B
Operating margin 0.0% 5-yr avg −8.4%
ROIC 0% 5-yr avg −1%
Owner-earnings margin 20% 5-yr avg 40%
Free cash flow margin −34% 5-yr avg −1%

Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~37 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 81% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 18% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −37% and 57% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 36% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 35% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Modest returns here are the design, not a verdict: a regulated utility's prices are set by commission, so the questions are the return the regulator allows, how fast the invested base it earns that return on is growing, and the health of the relationship with the commissions that decide both — all of which live in the 10-K, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$772M$807M$771M$855M$917M$722M$969M$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2BRevenueRevenue
$302M$312M$443M$233M$253M$64M$44M($28M)($459M)($186M)$0Operating incomeOp. inc.
39.1%38.7%57.5%27.3%27.6%8.9%4.5%−2.6%−37.3%−15.7%0.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
$440M$281M$273M($430M)($257M)$303M$1.1B($279M)($454M)($477M)Pretax incomePretax
$83M($64M)$167M($88M)($55M)$137M$477M$200M($23M)($28M)$62MNet incomeNet inc.
13%59%2%12%14%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$415M$413M$362M$346M$665M$677M$776M$731M$800M$739M$645MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$213M$204M$199M$236M$247M$242M$378M$504M$531M$544MDepreciationDeprec.
$119M$273M($4M)$198M$473M$298M($79M)$27M$292M$223M$583MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$861M$349M$25M$93M$334M$113M$1.4B$1.3B$241M$958M$1.1BCapexCapex
111.5%43.2%3.2%10.9%36.4%15.7%139.4%117.7%19.6%80.6%87.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$202M$209M$337M$253M$418M$564M$398M$227M$559M$195M$242MOwner earningsOwner earn.
26.2%25.9%43.7%29.6%45.6%78.1%41.1%21.1%45.4%16.4%20.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($446M)$64M$337M$253M$331M$564M($575M)($538M)$559M($219M)($409M)Free cash flowFCF
−57.8%7.9%43.7%29.6%36.1%78.1%−59.3%−49.9%45.4%−18.4%−34.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
($1.7B)($1.4B)($763M)($2.3B)($681M)($2.3B)($1.2B)($194M)$1.2B$630MInvesting cash flowInv. cash
$1.3B$959M$371M$2.0B($4M)$1.7B$551M($527M)($2.0B)($674M)Financing cash flowFin. cash
$4M$3M($2M)$0$0Exchange-rate effectFX
$5M$7M($32M)($34M)($20M)$39M$133M$10M$34M$695MChange in cashΔ cash
3%3%8%3%4%1%0%-0%-4%-2%0%ROICROIC
5%-4%9%-4%-2%5%14%6%-1%-1%1%Return on equityROE
Balance sheet
$150M$154M$147M$128M$108M$147M$226M$274M$283M$960M$500MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$87M$85M$63M$79M$83M$112M$117M$114M$105M$102M$162MReceivablesReceiv.
$20M$24M$41M$49M$82M$108M$103M$111MInventoryInvent.
$331M$26M$10M$122M$143M$982M$867M$72M$65M$58MAccounts payablePayables
($244M)$59M$53M($23M)($36M)($829M)($701M)$124M$148M$147M$273MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$367M$398M$340M$433M$414M$1.4B$1.9B$2.2B$860M$1.4B$1.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$818M$276M$859M$301M$350M$1.3B$1.3B$1.7B$1.1B$1.6B$835MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.4×1.4×0.4×1.4×1.2×1.1×1.4×1.3×0.8×0.9×1.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$6.3B$6.2B$6.8B$7.0B$7.2B$11.4B$14.2B$14.8B$14.6B$15.4BNet PP&ENet PP&E
$628M$628M$584M$609M$609M$891M$812M$833M$253M$0$0GoodwillGoodwill
$8.7B$8.4B$9.4B$12.3B$12.6B$19.0B$23.1B$22.5B$20.3B$19.6B$19.0BTotal assetsAssets
$3.6B$4.3B$3.4B$4.1B$3.4B$5.3B$5.3B$6.3B$5.3B$6.2B$6.0BTotal debtDebt
$3.4B$4.2B$3.3B$4.0B$3.3B$5.2B$5.1B$6.0B$5.0B$5.2B$5.5BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
2.0×1.6×1.8×0.3×0.4×0.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$6.1B$6.2B$3.9B$5.2B$4.9B$7.8B$8.3B$8.5B$7.4B$8.7BTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$0$321M$101MRedeemable interestsRedeemable
$1.7B$1.6B$1.8B$2.0B$2.4B$3.0B$3.3B$3.6B$3.2B$3.2B$10.6BPartners' capitalCapital
$44M$575M$253MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
43.8M54.2M74.6M58.8M68.4M77.4M84.9M91.6M93.5M93.9M94.3MShares out (diluted)Shares
$17.63$14.89$10.34$14.54$13.41$9.33$11.41$11.77$13.16$12.65$12.75Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.89$-1.18$2.24$-1.50$-0.80$1.77$5.62$2.18$-0.25$-0.30$0.66EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.61$3.86$4.52$4.30$6.11$7.29$4.69$2.48$5.98$2.08$2.57Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-10.18$1.18$4.52$4.30$4.84$7.29$-6.77$-5.87$5.98$-2.33$-4.34Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$19.66$6.44$0.34$1.58$4.88$1.46$15.91$13.85$2.58$10.20$11.18Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$39.86$30.28$24.18$34.15$34.53$38.57$39.25$39.04$34.45$34.03$112.51Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−3.6%/yr−1.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share−8.5%/yr−19.4%/yr
Capital spending / share−7.0%/yr+15.9%/yr
Book value / share−1.7%/yr−0.3%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $195M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $544M it takes just to hold its position. It put $414M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($219M).

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($28M)($23M)$200M$477M$137M
Depreciationnon-cash charge added back+$544M+$531M+$504M+$378M+$242M
Amortization of intangible assetsnon-cash charge added back; the purchase price of past acquisitions, expensed over time+$83M+$82M+$82M+$143M+$117M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$140M+$210M−$55M−$222M+$181M
Cash from operations$739M$800M$731M$776M$677M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$544M−$241M−$504M−$378M−$113M
Owner earnings$195M$559M$227M$398M$564M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$414M−$765M−$973M
Free cash flow($219M)$559M($538M)($575M)$564M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue16%45%21%41%78%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $544M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $414M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $960M − debt $6.2B
    What this means

    Netting $960M of cash and short-term investments against $6.2B of debt leaves $5.2B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -4%–8%; -2% latest = NOPAT ($147M) ÷ invested capital $8.4B
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 16%–78%; latest $195M = operating cash $739M − maintenance capex $544M
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 16% of revenue this year, a 35% median across 10 years. It chose to put $414M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($219M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($28M) · cash from operations $739M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.76×
    Expanding
    Capex $958M ÷ property depreciation $544M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity
    Current ratio ≥ 2× (waived for utilities) · exempt
    What this means

    Graham exempted public utilities from this test: their working capital “takes care of itself” through the continuous bond-and-share financing of growth, so a thin current ratio is the industry's structure, not a warning. His substitute test — debt no more than twice book equity — is the next line.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ 2× equity (Graham's utility test) · $6.2B vs $3.2B equity
    What this means

    Graham's own substitution for public utilities: debt not exceeding twice the stock equity at book value, in place of the working-capital tests an industrial faces. A utility finances its plant with bonds by design; the question is whether the borrowing stays inside the equity behind it.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record
    Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −20%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.53/share (latest year $-0.30), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $33.89/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 5 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 45% → −19% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 45% early to −19% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −13%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +7%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · −37.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$500M
  • Receivables$162M
  • Inventory$111M
  • Other current assets$289M
Current liabilities$835M
  • Debt due within a year$120M
  • Accounts payable$44M
  • Other current liabilities$671M
Current ratio1.27×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.14×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.60×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$227Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$120M due · $500M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Jun 30, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+6.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.0× → 1.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$9.0Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($7.3B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$6.0Bno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $5.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$5.6B · 94%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$330M · 6%
  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $2.4B and cash and short-term investments rose $350M.

  • Net change in share count115.3%

    The diluted count rose from 44M to 94M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained10%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($806M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $78M, so each retained $1 added about 0.10 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$00% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $5.6B of capital spent building over the 10-year record

$872M written down across 3 years (2018, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers

XPLR Infrastructure LP Common is a separately listed vehicle whose results are consolidated inside another filer's own accounts — the assets and earnings behind this ticker are already counted, whole, in that company's figures. A comparative table lines whole businesses up against one another, so seating both rows would count the same dollars twice. The business behind it is NextEra Energy Inc. (NEE), where the record, the scorecard and the peer bench are.

IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what XPLR Infrastructure LP Common has delivered.

XPLR Infrastructure LP Common’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, XPLR Infrastructure LP Common earns about $420M on its 35.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 16.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.65% 10-year Treasury (Aug 19, 2026) + 4.35 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−6%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+7%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.65%, as of Aug 19, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($409M) on 94M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-30; net debt $5.5B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.1B) runs well above depreciation (—), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $101M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "XPLR Infrastructure LP Common (XIFR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/XIFR, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← XHR its page in the Manual XMAX →

Industry order: ← WAVE the Electric Utilities chapter