SAF · Safran SA
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read from Safran SA’s ESEF annual report, in EUR. The narrative — what the business does, its risks, what changed this year — is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. The filed annual report →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the ESEF filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| €25.1B | €16.6B | €15.1B | €19.5B | €23.7B | €28.2B | €31.7B | RevenueRevenue |
| €3.8B | €927M | €864M | €2.0B | €2.8B | €4.2B | €4.3B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 15.3% | 5.6% | 5.7% | 10.5% | 11.8% | 14.9% | 13.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| €2.4B | €352M | €43M | (€2.5B) | €3.4B | (€667M) | €7.2B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 28% | 34% | — | — | 26% | — | 29% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| €3.1B | €1.9B | €2.4B | €3.5B | €4.3B | €4.7B | €5.7B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| €698M | €1.5B | €2.4B | €6.0B | €826M | €5.4B | (€1.5B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| €785M | €0 | €183M | €213M | €564M | €911M | €1.2B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| 28% | 7% | 5% | 39% | 38% | 90% | 38% | ROICROIC |
| 20% | 3% | 0% | -23% | 28% | -7% | 48% | Return on equityROE |
| 13% | 3% | −1% | −25% | 24% | −16% | 40% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| €2.6B | €3.7B | €5.2B | €6.7B | €6.7B | €6.5B | €6.8B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| €7.6B | €5.8B | €6.5B | €7.9B | €9.4B | €10.6B | €14.2B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| €6.3B | €5.2B | €5.1B | €6.4B | €7.9B | €9.5B | €10.3B | InventoryInvent. |
| €14.0B | €11.0B | €11.6B | €14.3B | €17.3B | €20.1B | €24.5B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| €20.1B | €18.2B | €20.6B | — | €29.2B | €31.5B | — | Current assetsCur. assets |
| €22.9B | €19.0B | €19.8B | — | €30.8B | €37.4B | — | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.9× | 1.0× | 1.0× | — | 0.9× | 0.8× | — | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| €4.4B | €4.1B | €3.9B | €3.8B | €4.1B | €4.6B | €5.4B | Net PP&ENet PP&E |
| €5.2B | €5.1B | €5.1B | €5.0B | €4.7B | €4.9B | €5.8B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| €42.8B | €39.5B | €41.7B | €46.8B | €50.5B | €55.0B | €61.8B | Total assetsAssets |
| (€2.6B) | (€3.7B) | (€5.2B) | (€6.7B) | (€6.7B) | (€6.5B) | (€6.8B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| €12.4B | €12.8B | €13.3B | €10.9B | €12.1B | €10.2B | €14.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||
| 430M | 424M | 430M | 427M | 418M | 417M | 418M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| €58.36 | €39.22 | €35.19 | €45.73 | €56.59 | €67.54 | €75.73 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| €5.69 | €0.83 | €0.10 | €-5.76 | €8.24 | €-1.60 | €17.17 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| €1.83 | €0.00 | €0.43 | €0.50 | €1.35 | €2.19 | €2.91 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| €28.77 | €30.16 | €30.86 | €25.45 | €28.92 | €24.41 | €35.50 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +4.4%/yr | +14.1%/yr |
| EPS | +20.2%/yr | +83.3%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +8.1%/yr | — |
| Book value / share | +3.6%/yr | +3.3%/yr |
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in the reporting currency.
Peers, Aerospace & Defense
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BABoeing Company (The) | $89.5B | 6% | -1.8% | -8% | 1% |
| RTXRTX Corporation | $88.6B | 48%2y | 8.2% | 5% | 8% |
| AIRAirbus SE | $85.5B | 15% | 9.4% | — | — |
| GDGeneral Dynamics Corporation | $52.5B | 19%4y | 10.9% | 14% | 8% |
| HONHoneywell International Inc. | $37.4B | 35% | 21.5% | 23% | 14% |
| SAFSafran SA | $36.9B | — | 11.8% | 38% | — |
| RRRolls-Royce Holdings plc | $28.8B | 21% | 9.0% | — | 11% |
| TXTTextron | $14.8B | 17% | 7.9% | 17%3y | 5% |
| Group median | — | — | 9.2% | 15% | — |
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash €6.8B − debt €0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by €6.8B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Mostly cash-backedCash from ops €5.7B ÷ net income €7.2B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · €31.7B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 6 of 7 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +250%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are €7.94/share (latest year €17.17), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is €35.50/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 5 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin 9% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 9% early to 13% lately, median 12% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Worst year 2020 · 5.6% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −0.5%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above. You bring the price, in the reporting currency.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFSafran SA is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered16%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.