Owner Scorecard
An independent research publication · records as of August 17, 2026

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ACNB, ACNB Corporation

Banks financial

A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.

The Corporation purchased its insurance subsidiary, ACNB Insurance Services (formerly Russell Insurance Group, Inc.) in 2005.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
ACNB · ACNB Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$192M
+45.1% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $201M 5-yr avg $128M
Return on equity 13% 5-yr avg 11%
Return on tangible equity 16% 5-yr avg 14%
Efficiency ratio 81% 5-yr avg 61%
Equity / assets 12.8% 5-yr avg 11.3%

Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~38 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on equity has hovered around the cost of equity (median 10%, above 12% in 3 of 10 years). It runs at a 81% efficiency ratio, on the heavy side. The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$50M$61M$73M$78M$93M$94M$109M$115M$132M$192M$201MRevenueRevenue
$41M$52M$64M$70M$85M$78M$87M$97M$107M$163M—Interest incomeInt. inc.
$4M$5M$7M$10M$12M$7M$4M$8M$24M$40M—Interest expenseInt. exp.
$37M$46M$57M$59M$73M$71M$83M$88M——$85MNet interest incomeNet int.
$13M$14M$16M$18M$20M$23M$22M$18M$25M$29M$30MNoninterest incomeFee inc.
$0$0$2M$600K$9M$50K$0$860K($2M)$5M$0Credit-loss provisionProvision
————$23M$35M$45M$40M$40M$46M—Pretax incomePretax
$11M$10M$22M$24M$18M$28M$36M$32M$32M$37M$55MNet incomeNet inc.
———————20%21%20%15%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
0.9%0.6%1.3%1.4%0.7%1.0%1.4%1.3%1.3%1.1%1.6%Return on assetsROA
9%6%13%13%7%10%15%11%11%9%13%Return on equityROE
5%3%9%9%4%7%11%8%7%5%9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
10%7%15%14%9%12%19%14%13%11%16%Return on tangible equityROTCE
71%73%61%61%66%63%57%62%——81%Efficiency ratioEffic.
$5M$5M$6M$7M$9M$9M$9M$10M$11M$14M$14MDividends paidDiv. paid
————$0$2M$7M$2M$249K$11M—BuybacksBuybacks
($59M)($52M)($54M)$8M($115M)$61M($332M)$15M$2M$65M—Investing cash flowInv. cash
$47M$50M$31M$40M$374M$208M($249M)($158M)($61M)($100M)—Financing cash flowFin. cash
$174K$16M$6M$73M$285M$311M($542M)($102M)($19M)$18M—Change in cashΔ cash
Balance sheet
————$1.6B$1.5B$1.5B$1.6B$1.7B$2.3B—Loans held for investmentLoans
$14M$14M$14M$14M$20M$19M$18M$20M$17M$24M—Credit-loss allowanceAllowance
$1.2B$1.6B$1.6B$1.7B$2.6B$2.8B$2.5B$2.4B$2.4B$3.2B$3.3BTotal assetsAssets
$968M$1.3B$1.3B$1.4B$2.2B$2.4B$2.2B$1.9B$1.8B$2.5B$2.5BDepositsDeposits
$6M$20M$20M$20M$42M$42M$44M$44M$44M$64M$64MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.1B$1.4B$1.5B$1.5B$2.3B$2.5B$2.3B$2.1B$2.1B$2.8B—Total liabilitiesTotal liab.
$120M$154M$168M$190M$258M$272M$245M$277M$303M$420M$423MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
6.1M6.5M7.0M7.1M8.6M8.7M8.6M8.5M8.5M10.3M10.3MShares out (diluted)Shares
$1.80$1.50$3.09$3.36$2.13$3.19$4.15$3.71$3.73$3.60$5.31EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.80$0.80$0.89$0.98$1.01$1.03$1.06$1.14$1.25$1.40$1.40Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$19.84$23.53$23.90$26.84$29.86$31.22$28.42$32.50$35.52$40.81$41.14Book value / shareBVPS
$18.68$20.14$20.49$23.44$24.15$25.69$22.09$26.26$29.43$32.37$32.90Tangible book / shareTBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+9.5%/yr+11.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share+13.0%/yr+12.6%/yr
EPS+8.0%/yr+11.1%/yr
Dividends / share+6.4%/yr+6.8%/yr
Capital spending / share−13.5%/yr−2.9%/yr
Book value / share+8.3%/yr+6.4%/yr
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Return on equity 9%
    Below the cost of equity
    Net income $37M ÷ equity $420M
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Return on tangible equity 11%
    Modest
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $64M − intangibles $22M)
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • Efficiency ratio —
    Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 66%
    What this means

    Noninterest expense or revenue missing.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 13.0%
    Well capitalized
    Equity $420M ÷ assets $3.2B
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Deposit funding 76%
    Deposit-funded
    Deposits $2.5B ÷ assets $3.2B
    What this means

    Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

  • Credit cost —
    Not enough data
    What this means

    Provision or net interest income missing.

The franchise and the credit cycle

  • Deposit franchise 23%
    Solid core deposits
    Noninterest-bearing deposits $554M ÷ deposits $2.5B
    What this means

    The share of deposits the bank pays nothing for — checking accounts that stay through rate cycles. This is the deposit moat in one number: a high share means cheap, sticky raw material for lending; a low share means the funding reprices with every rate move. Buffett's Wells letter is built on exactly this economics.

  • Net charge-offs 0.08% · FY2022
    Last reported FY2022
    FY2022, the most recent year reported: charge-offs $1M ÷ loans $1.5B · worst year on record 0.17%
    What this means

    The latest fiscal year's charge-offs are not yet tagged in the structured data, so this reads the most recent year that is — named, never passed off as current. Loans actually written off net of recoveries; the worst year in the record, not the average, is Graham's read, because a loan book's sins are committed in the good years and confessed in the bad ones.

  • Held-to-maturity marks 2%
    Marks are small
    Pre-tax, as filed for FY2025: HTM at cost $63M − fair value $58M = $6M, against tangible common equity $333M · widest on record FY2024: $8M (25% accreted back since)
    What this means

    Bonds held to maturity are carried at cost, so rate rises open a gap that only shows in this disclosure. Stated equity already carries every available-for-sale mark through accumulated other comprehensive income; the held-to-maturity book's gap sits outside equity, which is why it is read here. The figure is pre-tax as the filer states it — the true after-tax dent depends on a deferred-tax position the record does not carry. The gap never hits earnings if the bank can hold on, which is precisely why the reader checks whether it could be forced to sell: the 2023 bank failures were this number meeting deposit flight. The record carries no stated uninsured figure for this filer; its franchise leg: noninterest-bearing deposits, 23% of the base.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021James P. Helt$696k$730k$41M
2022James P. Helt$971k$1.0M$37M
2023James P. Helt$1.6M$1.7M$39M
2024James P. Helt$1.6M$1.6M$39M
2025James P. Helt$1.8M$1.9M$53M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3.7%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

Peers, Banks

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDROEmedian over the recordROTCEmedian over the recordEfficiencymedian over the recordNII / assetsmedian over the recordNoninterest-bearing sharelatest FY
FRSTPrimis Financial Corp.$224M7%9%66%2.8%16%
SPFISouth Plains Financial Inc.$212M13%14%66%3.4%26%
ACNBACNB Corporation$192M10%13%62%3.2%23%
TRSTTrustCo Bank Corp NY$188M10%10%56%2.9%—
CIVBCivista Bancshares Inc.$173M10%13%66%3.2%20%
FBIZFirst Business Financial Services Inc.$169M12%13%65%3.3%—
MVBFMVB Financial Corp.$168M8%9%80%3.0%—
FCBCFirst Community Bankshares Inc. (VA)$168M10%14%58%3.6%33%
Group median—10%13%65%3.2%23%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what ACNB Corporation’s record justifies.

$
The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered6%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book—
Justified by the return—
Normalized return on tangible equity13%
Price / book—
Earnings yield—
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)—
Graham’s price gate—

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $338M on 10M shares, a 13% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Weigh ACNB against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "ACNB Corporation (ACNB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ACNB, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← ACN its page in the Manual ACOG →

Industry order: ← ABCB the Banks chapter ALRS →