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AESI, Atlas Energy Solutions Inc.
Atlas Energy Solutions Inc. is a leading proppant producer, logistics, and distributed power solutions provider, primarily serving the Permian Basin of West Texas and New Mexico.
Bud" Brigham, our Executive Chairman, and are led by an entrepreneurial team with a history of constructive disruption bringing significant and complementary experience to this enterprise, including the perspective of longtime E&P operators, which provides for an elevated understanding of the end users of our products and services.
We operate 14 proppant production facilities across the Permian Basin including both large-scale in-basin facilities and smaller distributed mining units.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report Est. 11/2–11/6 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~36 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Sand & Logistics (95%) and Power (5%).
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 37% and operating margin about 27% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −1.0% and 48% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 19% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 9%). By owner earnings: roughly 15% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Sand & Logistics is 95% of revenue, so this is largely a single-segment business.
- Sand & Logistics95%$1.0B
- Power5%$59M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2021–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| $172M | $483M | $614M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| $64M | $256M | $314M | $232M | $151M | — | Gross profitGross prof. |
| 37% | 53% | 51% | 22% | 14% | — | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 10% | 5% | 8% | 10% | 13% | 14% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $47M | $232M | $265M | $114M | ($11M) | ($88M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 27.3% | 48.1% | 43.2% | 10.8% | −1.0% | −8.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $5M | $219M | $258M | $76M | ($68M) | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| $4M | $217M | $105M | $60M | ($50M) | ($118M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 16% | 1% | 12% | 21% | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| $21M | $206M | $299M | $256M | $117M | $55M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $24M | $27M | $40M | $99M | $160M | $174M | Depreciation & amortizationD&A |
| ($7M) | ($39M) | $146M | $75M | ($26M) | ($36M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $19M | $90M | $365M | $374M | $148M | $239M | CapexCapex |
| 11.2% | 18.6% | 59.5% | 35.4% | 13.5% | 22.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $2M | $179M | $259M | $158M | ($31M) | ($119M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 1.2% | 37.0% | 42.2% | 14.9% | −2.8% | −11.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $2M | $116M | ($66M) | ($118M) | ($31M) | ($184M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 1.2% | 24.1% | −10.8% | −11.1% | −2.8% | −17.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | $0 | $0 | $153M | $204M | $23M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | $0 | $0 | $200K | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| ($19M) | ($90M) | ($365M) | ($513M) | ($345M) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $2M | ($75M) | $195M | $118M | $196M | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| $4M | $42M | $128M | ($138M) | ($31M) | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| 12% | 35% | — | 6% | -0% | -3% | ROICROIC |
| 1% | 42% | 12% | 6% | -4% | -11% | Return on equityROE |
| 1% | 42% | 12% | 6% | −4% | −11% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| — | $73M | $71M | $166M | $181M | $218M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $6M | $6M | $17M | $14M | $13M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $32M | $61M | $119M | $69M | $84M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $47M | $17M | $64M | $125M | $146M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $179M | $319M | $289M | $308M | $479M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $89M | $93M | $243M | $211M | $263M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.0× | 3.4× | 1.2× | 1.5× | 1.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $542M | $935M | $1.5B | $1.5B | — | Net PP&ENet PP&E |
| — | — | $0 | $69M | $153M | $153M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $751M | $1.3B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $147M | $173M | $511M | $579M | $967M | Total debtDebt |
| — | $147M | $173M | $511M | $579M | $967M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 1.1× | 14.7× | 34.5× | — | — | -3.1× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| — | $240M | $394M | $936M | $1.0B | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| — | $0 | $0 | $0 | — | — | Redeemable interestsRedeemable |
| $339M | $511M | $868M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.1% | 0.1% | 1.2% | 2.1% | 3.0% | 3.3% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||
| — | 0K | 71.0M | 109M | 122M | 125M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| — | — | $8.64 | $9.67 | $8.95 | $8.56 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| — | — | $1.48 | $0.55 | $-0.41 | $-0.95 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | — | $3.65 | $1.44 | $-0.25 | $-0.96 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | — | $-0.94 | $-1.08 | $-0.25 | $-1.48 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | $5.15 | $3.43 | $1.21 | $1.91 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| — | — | $12.22 | $9.49 | $9.87 | $8.92 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.54 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 4-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +1.7%/yr (2-yr) | +1.7%/yr (2-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −51.5%/yr (2-yr) | −51.5%/yr (2-yr) |
| Book value / share | −10.1%/yr (2-yr) | −10.1%/yr (2-yr) |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Services+3.4%
“Services revenue, which includes freight for last-mile logistics services, increased by $18.3 million to $558.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, as compared to $540.5 million for the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase in logistics revenue was due to higher sales volumes shipped to last-mile logistics customers.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $50M loss into ($31M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($50M) | $60M | $105M | $217M | $4M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$160M | +$99M | +$40M | +$27M | +$24M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$33M | +$22M | +$7M | +$678K | +$129K |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$26M | +$75M | +$146M | −$39M | −$7M |
| Cash from operations | $117M | $256M | $299M | $206M | $21M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$148M | −$99M | −$40M | −$27M | −$19M |
| Owner earnings | ($31M) | $158M | $259M | $179M | $2M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | −$275M | −$326M | −$62M | — |
| Free cash flow | ($31M) | ($118M) | ($66M) | $116M | $2M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -3% | 15% | 42% | 37% | 1% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $33M), owner earnings is nearer ($64M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $0 − debt $579M
What this means
Netting $0 of cash and short-term investments against $579M of debt leaves $579M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle4-yr median, range -0%–35%; -0% latest = NOPAT ($9M) ÷ invested capital $1.8BIndustry peers: median 0%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran -0% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle5-yr median margin, range -3%–42%; latest ($31M) = operating cash $117M − maintenance capex $148MIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -3% of revenue this year, a 15% median across 5 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $33M of SBC) leaves ($64M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($50M) · cash from operations $117M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.93×MaintainingCapex $148M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $160M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
The promise and the pay packet
- Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 3.0%Stock pay, share count unreadStock compensation $33M (fiscal 2025), 3.0% of revenue · repurchases $200K · the share count is not comparable across these years (a split or a first listing sits in the record), so the drift is withheld
What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.46×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $579M vs $96M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (5-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record —Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.31/share (latest year $-0.40), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $9.67/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2021–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 5
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 4 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 38% → 5% (2-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 38% early to 5% lately, median 27% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −17%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Owner earnings growth −8%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 8% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · −1.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Receivables$218M
- Inventory$13M
- Other current assets$249M
- Debt due within a year$53M
- Accounts payable$84M
- Other current liabilities$126M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2021–2025
Over the record, the business generated $900M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$997M · 111%
- Buybacks$200K · 0%
- Returned to owners$200K
0% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $200K as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$97M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $97M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $200K over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count75.7%
The diluted count rose from 71M to 125M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained−5%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($336M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $18M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.05 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 5-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Beside that spending sits $36M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2024 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 5-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | $6.1M | $6.7M | $259M |
| 2024 | $6.8M | $10.1M | $158M |
| 2024 | $5.9M | $6.4M | $158M |
| 2025 | $5.5M | −$2.8M | ($31M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership16.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio60:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$33M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 3.0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Depletion & DD&A, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Oilfield Services & Equipment
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WTTRSelect Water Solutions | $1.4B | 12% | 1.9% | -0% | 6% |
| NESRNational Energy Services Reunited Corp | $1.3B | 13% | 7.4% | 8% | 9% |
| HLXHelix Energy Solutions Group Inc. | $1.3B | 12% | 3.3% | 1% | 9% |
| PUMPProPetro Holding Corp. | $1.3B | — | 0.1% | 0% | 7% |
| AESIAtlas Energy Solutions Inc. | $1.1B | 37% | 27.3% | 9% | 15% |
| SDRLSeadrill Limited | $1.1B | — | 28.5% | 12%2y | -7% |
| BORRBorr Drilling Limited | $1.0B | — | -29.5% | -4% | -25% |
| TTITetra Technologies Inc. | $631M | 15%4y | 8.6% | 13% | -1% |
| Group median | — | 13% | 5.4% | 4% | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Atlas Energy Solutions Inc. has delivered.
Atlas Energy Solutions Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Atlas Energy Solutions Inc. earns about $164M on its 14.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −2.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ($184M) on 125M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-07-30; net debt $967M. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($239M) runs well above depreciation ($174M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($94M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← AES its page in the Manual AEVA →
Industry order: ← ACDC the Oilfield Services & Equipment chapter AROC →