ALH, Alliance Laundry Holdings Inc.

Will it survive?

• Can it pay its interest? 2.1×
  Adequate
  Operating income $317M ÷ interest expense $151M
  What this means

  Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

• How heavy is the debt, net of cash? —
  Debt under-captured — leverage unknown, not low
  What this means

  This company pays far more interest than its tagged debt implies (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so its net cash or net debt cannot be read honestly: the gap is unknown, not zero, and 'net cash' here would be exactly the fiction the figure is meant to prevent. Judge it on the record and owner earnings instead.

• How long is cash tied up? —
  Not enough data
  What this means

  The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

• Return on invested capital —
  Debt under-captured
  Industry peers: median 10%
  What this means

  This company's interest bill implies far more debt than its filings tag at the consolidated level (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so invested capital, and the return on it, cannot be read honestly. Judge this one on Owner Earnings and the record instead.

• Owner-earnings margin 9%
  Solid through the cycle
  3-yr median margin, range 7%–13%; latest $158M = operating cash $212M − maintenance capex $54M
  Industry peers: median 12%
  What this means

  What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 3 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $20M of SBC) leaves $138M.

• Are earnings backed by cash? 2.08×
  Cash-backed
  Cash from ops $212M ÷ net income $102M

  In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

  What this means

  How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

• Where do the earnings go? 4%
  Reinvests most of it
  Dividends + buybacks $6M ÷ Owner Earnings $158M — this fiscal year
  What this means

  Of $158M Owner Earnings, $6M (4%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $6M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($20M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

• Investing or harvesting? 0.57×
  Harvesting
  Capex $54M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $94M
  What this means

  Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

• Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 1.1%
  Stock pay, share count unread
  Stock compensation $20M (fiscal 2025), 1.1% of revenue · repurchases $6M · the share count is not comparable across these years (a split or a first listing sits in the record), so the drift is withheld
  What this means

  Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 2 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

• Adequate size Near
  Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.7B
  What this means

  Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

• Strong liquidity Miss
  Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.40×
  What this means

  Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

• Conservative debt —
  Debt ≤ working capital · —
  What this means

  The filings tag only a fraction of the debt this company's interest bill implies (much of it sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so this test can't be run honestly.

• Moderate price —
  P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
  What this means

  Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.48/share (latest year $0.51), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.97/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.