Owner Scorecard


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ASYS, Amtech Systems Inc.

Semiconductor Equipment capital-intensive Cyclical

We provide equipment, consumables and services for semiconductor device packaging, wafer production and device fabrication.

Our products are used to fabricate and package semiconductor devices, such as graphic processing units (GPU's) used in AI applications, silicon carbide (SiC) and silicon (Si) power devices and other optical, analog and digital devices.

We sell these products to semiconductor device packaging, electronic assembly and device fabrication companies worldwide.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
ASYS · Amtech Systems Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$79M
−21.6% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $82M 5-yr avg $97M
Gross margin 47% 5-yr avg 37%
Operating margin 8.1% 5-yr avg −7.0%
ROIC 12% 5-yr avg −10%
Owner-earnings margin 11% 5-yr avg −0%
Free cash flow margin 11% 5-yr avg −0%

Next report By 12/28 · the annual report (10-K) for the fiscal year ended late September · due within 90 days of period end · has filed ~73 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 37% and operating margin about 1.8% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −36% and 16% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 24% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the capital-goods cycle and the aftermarket. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 1%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

43% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States57%$45M
  • China39%$31M
  • Other4%$3M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$120M$83M$100M$85M$65M$85M$106M$113M$101M$79M$82MRevenueRevenue
$34M$31M$37M$33M$24M$35M$40M$36M$27M$38MGross profitGross prof.
28%37%37%39%37%41%37%37%34%47%Gross marginGross mgn
28%30%26%29%33%29%27%37%33%36%35%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
8%4%3%4%6%7%6%8%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($8M)$4M$6M$5M($485K)$4M$17M($15M)($7M)($28M)$7MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−6.6%4.4%6.1%5.8%−0.7%4.4%16.3%−13.2%−6.6%−35.9%8.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
($5M)$4M$10M$6M($3M)$3M$19M($15M)($8M)($28M)Pretax incomePretax
($7M)$9M$5M($5M)($16M)$2M$17M($13M)($8M)($30M)$4MNet incomeNet inc.
39%33%46%56%8%39%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($10M)$34M($14M)$173K($2M)($6M)$5M($8M)$10M$8M$10MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$3M$2M$2M$2M$1M$1M$2M$5M$3M$3M$2MDepreciation & amortizationD&A
($7M)$21M($22M)$3M$12M($9M)($14M)($1M)$14M$34M$2MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$978K$1M$1M$714K$3M$3M$1M$3M$5M$950K$847KCapexCapex
0.8%1.5%1.5%0.8%4.1%3.5%1.1%2.6%4.8%1.2%1.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($11M)$33M($15M)($541K)($4M)($9M)$4M($11M)$5M$7M$9MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−8.9%39.5%−15.3%−0.6%−6.6%−10.5%3.8%−9.4%4.9%8.7%10.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($11M)$33M($15M)($541K)($4M)($9M)$4M($11M)$5M$7M$9MFree cash flowFCF
−8.9%39.5%−15.3%−0.6%−6.6%−10.5%3.8%−9.4%4.9%8.7%10.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$5M$35M$35MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$4M$2M$4MBuybacksBuybacks
$11M($1M)$4M($2M)($13M)($8M)$19M($38M)($2M)($912K)Investing cash flowInv. cash
$457K$13M($2M)($157K)($2M)$1M($8M)$12M($11M)$270KFinancing cash flowFin. cash
($138K)$2M($1M)($2M)$2M$656K($2M)$52K$922K($417K)Exchange-rate effectFX
$2M$47M($13M)($3M)($14M)($12M)$14M($34M)($2M)$7MChange in cashΔ cash
-13%7%7%10%-1%3%31%-14%-7%-63%12%ROICROIC
-10%10%6%-6%-19%2%18%-14%-10%-57%3%Return on equityROE
−10%10%6%−6%−19%2%18%−14%−10%−57%3%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$28M$51M$46M$53M$45M$33M$47M$13M$11M$18M$83MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$18M$23M$18M$13M$11M$23M$25M$26M$22M$20M$20MReceivablesReceiv.
$23M$30M$18M$18M$17M$22M$25M$35M$27M$19M$20MInventoryInvent.
$15M$22M$7M$4M$3M$8M$7M$11M$5M$8M$10MAccounts payablePayables
$25M$31M$29M$26M$26M$36M$43M$51M$44M$31M$30MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$83M$157M$130M$108M$77M$81M$103M$81M$65M$60M$128MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$38M$86M$48M$31M$7M$15M$23M$30M$20M$20M$24MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.2×1.8×2.7×3.5×10.2×5.4×4.5×2.7×3.2×2.9×5.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$16M$16M$11M$10M$12M$14M$7M$10M$12M$10MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$11M$11M$7M$7M$7M$11M$11M$28M$21M$908K$908KGoodwillGoodwill
$118M$192M$149M$126M$102M$117M$134M$137M$119M$93M$157MTotal assetsAssets
$10M$8M$6M$6M$5M$5M$327K$11M$290K$294K$294KTotal debtDebt
($17M)($43M)($40M)($47M)($40M)($28M)($47M)($2M)($11M)($18M)($83M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
15.6×105.4×-28.8×-12.1×-1095.7×264.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$53M$101M$56M$39M$21M$31M$35M$49M$37M$39MTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$67M$90M$93M$87M$82M$86M$98M$88M$82M$53M$116MShareholders’ equityEquity
1.2%1.6%0.9%0.7%0.5%0.5%0.5%1.1%1.5%1.5%1.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$6M$6M$20MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
13.2M13.5M15.1M14.3M14.2M14.3M14.2M14.1M14.2M14.3M15.3MShares out (diluted)Shares
$9.14$6.15$6.64$5.96$4.62$5.94$7.49$8.06$7.12$5.55$5.35Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.53$0.68$0.35$-0.36$-1.11$0.11$1.22$-0.89$-0.60$-2.12$0.26EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.81$2.43$-1.01$-0.04$-0.31$-0.63$0.29$-0.75$0.35$0.48$0.57Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.81$2.43$-1.01$-0.04$-0.31$-0.63$0.29$-0.75$0.35$0.48$0.57Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.07$0.09$0.10$0.05$0.19$0.21$0.08$0.21$0.34$0.07$0.06Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$5.09$6.70$6.18$6.13$5.76$5.97$6.94$6.28$5.80$3.73$7.57Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−5.4%/yr+3.7%/yr
Capital spending / share−1.2%/yr−18.9%/yr
Book value / share−3.4%/yr−8.3%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $30M loss into $7M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($30M)($8M)($13M)$17M$2M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$3M+$3M+$5M+$2M+$1M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$1M+$2M+$1M+$543K+$401K
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$34M+$14M−$1M−$14M−$9M
Cash from operations$8M$10M($8M)$5M($6M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$950K−$5M−$3M−$1M−$3M
Owner earnings$7M$5M($11M)$4M($9M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue9%5%-9%4%-11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $1M), owner earnings is nearer $6M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($28M) ÷ interest expense $26K
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net cash
    Cash $18M − debt $690K
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $17M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 91 + DIO 131 − DPO 54 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -63%–31%; -62% latest = NOPAT ($23M) ÷ invested capital $36M
    Industry peers: median -1%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -62% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Positive this year, negative across the cycle
    latest $7M = operating cash $8M − maintenance capex $950K (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -4%)
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a -4% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $1M of SBC) leaves $6M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($30M) · cash from operations $8M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.35×
    Harvesting
    Capex $950K ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $3M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 1.5%
    The count is flat
    Stock compensation $1M (fiscal 2025), 1.5% of revenue · no repurchases · diluted shares +0.8% since 2022
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $79M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.94×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $690K vs $40M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record
    Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −792%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.98/share (latest year $-1.73), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.05/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 1% → −19% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 1% early to −19% lately, median −1% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −7%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 7% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · −35.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +0.9%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$128M
  • Cash & short-term investments$83M
  • Receivables$20M
  • Inventory$20M
  • Other current assets$4M
Current liabilities$24M
  • Accounts payable$10M
  • Other current liabilities$13M
Current ratio5.41×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio4.54×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio3.52×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$104Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+14.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.2× → 5.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$114Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$86MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$18M$18M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$6Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $18M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$20M · 109%
  • Buybacks$10M · 55%
  • Returned to owners$10M

    $0 as dividends and $10M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$12M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $12M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$5.19

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $4M, about $5.19 each.

  • Net change in share count15.9%

    The diluted count rose from 13M to 15M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2M2% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity2%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$34Mover 11 years since fiscal 2009 buying other businesses, against $20M of capital spent building over the 10-year record

$32M written down across 3 years (2018, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 81% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Beside that spending sits $11M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2010 (tagged in 15 of those years; 1 year untagged) — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Stock-based compensation$1M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 1.5% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Semiconductor Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics, research and the inventory cycle. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the recordR&D / revenuelatest FYCapex / revenuelatest FYInventory dayslatest FY
ACMRACM Research Inc.$901M47%14.3%20%-12%16.1%6.2%512
ACLSAxcelis Technologies$839M43%13.9%21%13%13.0%1.3%260
VECOVeeco Instruments Inc.$664M40%5.2%-1%6%18.0%2.4%252
AZTAAzenta Inc.$594M44%-6.1%-3%6%5.1%5.7%85
ERIIEnergy Recovery Inc.$135M67%14.2%13%8%9.7%1.0%188
ASYSAmtech Systems Inc.$79M37%1.8%1%-4%1.2%131
AEHRAehr Test Systems$50M39%-11.0%-8%-10%25.3%4.1%467
VELOVelo3D Inc.$46M-5%-153.6%-130%-140%23.2%5.9%185
Group median42%3.5%-0%1%3.3%220
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Amtech Systems Inc. has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.65% 10-year Treasury (Aug 19, 2026) + 4.35 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−7%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.65%, as of Aug 19, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $9M on 18M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-07-31; net cash $83M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Amtech Systems Inc. (ASYS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ASYS, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← ASTS its page in the Manual ATAI →

Industry order: ← ASML the Semiconductor Equipment chapter AZTA →