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AVAV, AeroVironment Inc.
We are a defense technology provider delivering integrated capabilities across air, land, sea, space, and cyber.
We develop and deploy autonomous systems, precision strike systems, counter-UAS technologies, space-based platforms, directed energy systems, and cyber and electronic warfare capabilities.
Systems within the SUAS portfolio utilize our common and interoperable handheld ground control systems and an array of spare parts and accessories.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 9/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late July · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~39 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is AxS (69%) and SCDE (31%).
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 40% and operating margin about 9.5% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −33% and 13% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 18% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the backlog and program execution. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →AxS is 69% of revenue, with SCDE the other meaningful segment at 31%.
- AxS69%$1.4B
- SCDE31%$619M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMApr 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $233M | $268M | $314M | $367M | $395M | $446M | $541M | $717M | $821M | $2.0B | $2.0B | RevenueRevenue |
| $97M | $108M | $128M | $153M | $165M | $141M | $174M | $284M | $319M | $501M | $501M | Gross profitGross prof. |
| 42% | 40% | 41% | 42% | 42% | 32% | 32% | 40% | 39% | 25% | 25% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 20% | 19% | 19% | 16% | 17% | 22% | 24% | 16% | 19% | 22% | 22% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 12% | 10% | 11% | 13% | 14% | 12% | 12% | 14% | 12% | 6% | 6% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $21M | $30M | $34M | $47M | $43M | ($10M) | ($179M) | $72M | $41M | ($311M) | ($311M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 8.9% | 11.3% | 10.8% | 12.8% | 11.0% | −2.2% | −33.1% | 10.0% | 5.0% | −15.7% | −15.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $22M | $31M | $47M | $47M | $24M | ($13M) | ($191M) | $62M | $45M | ($288M) | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| $13M | $18M | $47M | $41M | $23M | ($4M) | ($176M) | $60M | $44M | ($265M) | ($265M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 21% | 31% | 10% | 12% | 2% | — | — | 3% | 2% | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($8M) | $70M | $27M | $25M | $87M | ($10M) | $11M | $15M | ($1M) | ($78M) | ($78M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $5M | $6M | $8M | $10M | $19M | $61M | $100M | $36M | $41M | $265M | $265M | Depreciation & amortizationD&A |
| ($30M) | $41M | ($35M) | ($32M) | $37M | ($72M) | $77M | ($97M) | ($107M) | ($117M) | ($117M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $9M | $10M | $9M | $11M | $11M | $22M | $15M | $23M | $20M | $63M | $63M | CapexCapex |
| 3.9% | 3.6% | 2.8% | 3.1% | 2.9% | 5.0% | 2.8% | 3.2% | 2.4% | 3.2% | 3.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($13M) | $64M | $18M | $14M | $75M | ($32M) | ($3M) | ($8M) | ($21M) | ($141M) | ($141M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −5.7% | 23.8% | 5.7% | 3.8% | 19.1% | −7.2% | −0.6% | −1.1% | −2.5% | −7.1% | −7.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($17M) | $60M | $18M | $14M | $75M | ($32M) | ($3M) | ($8M) | ($21M) | ($141M) | ($141M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −7.4% | 22.5% | 5.7% | 3.8% | 19.1% | −7.2% | −0.6% | −1.1% | −2.5% | −7.1% | −7.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ($37M) | ($6M) | $12M | $59M | ($379M) | ($52M) | ($7M) | ($52M) | ($28M) | ($1.2B) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $3M | $2M | ($1M) | ($2M) | $194M | ($17M) | $51M | ($23M) | ($3M) | $1.6B | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| — | — | — | — | — | ($1M) | $397K | ($284K) | $225K | $360K | — | Exchange-rate effectFX |
| ($44M) | $64M | $29M | $82M | ($98M) | ($80M) | $56M | ($60M) | ($32M) | $336M | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| 5% | 7% | 11% | 16% | 6% | -1% | -26% | 9% | 5% | -5% | -5% | ROICROIC |
| 3% | 4% | 10% | 8% | 4% | -1% | -32% | 7% | 5% | -6% | -6% | Return on equityROE |
| 3% | 4% | 10% | 8% | 4% | −1% | −32% | 7% | 5% | −6% | −6% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $200M | $257M | $323M | $303M | $181M | $102M | $133M | $73M | $41M | $632M | $632M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $69M | $57M | $31M | $74M | $63M | $60M | $88M | $70M | $102M | $316M | $316M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $41M | $37M | $54M | $46M | $72M | $91M | $139M | $150M | $144M | $313M | $313M | InventoryInvent. |
| $16M | $21M | $16M | $20M | $25M | $19M | $31M | $48M | $72M | $161M | $161M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $94M | $73M | $69M | $99M | $109M | $132M | $195M | $172M | $174M | $469M | $469M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $354M | $399M | $470M | $504M | $402M | $369M | $477M | $516M | $607M | $1.9B | $1.9B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $48M | $62M | $45M | $67M | $96M | $101M | $121M | $145M | $172M | $439M | $439M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 7.4× | 6.4× | 10.5× | 7.5× | 4.2× | 3.6× | 3.9× | 3.6× | 3.5× | 4.3× | 4.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $16M | $19M | $17M | $22M | $59M | $62M | $40M | $47M | $51M | $167M | — | Net PP&ENet PP&E |
| $122K | — | — | $6M | $314M | $334M | $181M | $276M | $257M | $2.5B | $2.5B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $433M | $473M | $509M | $585M | $929M | $914M | $825M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $5.7B | $5.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | — | $198M | $188M | $133M | $27M | $30M | $729M | $729M | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | — | — | $17M | $86M | $545K | ($46M) | ($11M) | $97M | $97M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $382M | $409M | $463M | $510M | $612M | $608M | $551M | $823M | $887M | $4.4B | $4.4B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.5% | 1.8% | 2.2% | 1.7% | 1.8% | 1.2% | 2.0% | 2.4% | 2.6% | 1.9% | 1.9% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | $1M | — | — | — | — | $156M | $156M | $18M | $241M | $241M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 23.3M | 23.8M | 24.1M | 24.1M | 24.4M | 24.7M | 25.0M | 27.3M | 28.2M | 49.1M | 49.1M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $10.00 | $11.27 | $13.06 | $15.25 | $16.21 | $18.06 | $21.58 | $26.23 | $29.13 | $40.27 | $40.27 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.56 | $0.75 | $1.97 | $1.71 | $0.96 | $-0.17 | $-7.04 | $2.18 | $1.55 | $-5.40 | $-5.40 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.57 | $2.68 | $0.75 | $0.58 | $3.09 | $-1.29 | $-0.14 | $-0.28 | $-0.74 | $-2.87 | $-2.87 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.74 | $2.53 | $0.75 | $0.58 | $3.09 | $-1.29 | $-0.14 | $-0.28 | $-0.74 | $-2.87 | $-2.87 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.39 | $0.40 | $0.37 | $0.47 | $0.46 | $0.90 | $0.59 | $0.84 | $0.69 | $1.27 | $1.27 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $16.39 | $17.18 | $19.22 | $21.17 | $25.12 | $24.63 | $22.00 | $30.11 | $31.47 | $89.64 | $89.64 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.74 into 2026 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +16.7%/yr | +20.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +14.2%/yr | +22.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +20.8%/yr | +29.0%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue+140.9%
“Revenue for the fiscal year ended April 30, 2026 was $1,976.8 million, as compared to $820.6 million for the fiscal year ended April 30, 2025, representing an increase of $1,156.2 million, or 141%. The increase in revenue was due to an increase in product revenue of $722.6 million, and an increase in service revenue of $433.6 million.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $265M loss into ($141M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($265M) | $44M | $60M | ($176M) | ($4M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$265M | +$41M | +$36M | +$100M | +$61M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$38M | +$21M | +$17M | +$11M | +$5M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$117M | −$107M | −$97M | +$77M | −$72M |
| Cash from operations | ($78M) | ($1M) | $15M | $11M | ($10M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$63M | −$20M | −$23M | −$15M | −$22M |
| Owner earnings | ($141M) | ($21M) | ($8M) | ($3M) | ($32M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -7% | -3% | -1% | -1% | -7% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $38M), owner earnings is nearer ($179M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“In connection with the preparation of its audited consolidated financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2024, BlueHalo identified three material weaknesses in its internal control over financial reporting.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $377M + ST investments $255M − debt $739M
What this means
Netting $632M of cash and short-term investments against $739M of debt leaves $107M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 58 + DIO 77 − DPO 40 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -26%–16%; -5% latest = NOPAT ($246M) ÷ invested capital $4.8BIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -7%–24%; latest ($141M) = operating cash ($78M) − maintenance capex $63MIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -7% of revenue this year, a -1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $38M of SBC) leaves ($179M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($78M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($265M) · cash from operations ($78M)
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.24×HarvestingCapex $63M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $265M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
The promise and the pay packet
- Modest selling costSelling and marketing $313M ÷ revenue $2.0B
What this means
Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.
- Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 1.9%Stock pay, share count unreadStock compensation $38M (fiscal 2026), 1.9% of revenue · no repurchases · the share count is not comparable across these years (a split or a first listing sits in the record), so the drift is withheld
What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $2.0B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 4.30×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $739M vs $1.5B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record —Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −306%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.07/share (latest year $-5.24), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $86.95/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 10% → −0% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 10% early to −0% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −5%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2023 · −33.1% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Apr 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$632M
- Receivables$316M
- Inventory$313M
- Other current assets$629M
- Accounts payable$161M
- Other current liabilities$279M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated $138M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$192M · 140%
- Source of funding−$55M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $55M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Net change in share count110.6%
The diluted count rose from 23M to 49M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$572M written down across 5 years (2018, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Beside that spending sits $341M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2013 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time. The cash figure above counts only cash consideration: goodwill of $2.5B against it says much of the buying was paid for in stock, which never passes through the cash-flow statement.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Wahid Nawabi | $2.5M | $6.5M | $75M |
| 2022 | Wahid Nawabi | $3.5M | −$1.0M | ($32M) |
| 2023 | Wahid Nawabi | $4.9M | $7.0M | ($3M) |
| 2024 | Wahid Nawabi | $7.6M | $16.1M | ($8M) |
| 2025 | Wahid Nawabi | $7.4M | $6.6M | ($21M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$38M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2026, 1.9% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, Aerospace & Defense
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EMBJEmbraer S.A. | $7.6B | 16% | 2.1% | -6%1y | 10% |
| SAROStandardAero Inc. | $6.1B | 14% | 7.5% | 7%2y | -0% |
| HEIHeico Corp. | $4.5B | 39% | 21.1% | 14% | 18% |
| AIRAAR Corp. | $3.3B | 17% | 5.0% | 5% | 1% |
| AVAVAeroVironment Inc. | $2.0B | 40% | 9.5% | 6% | -1% |
| KTOSKratos Defense & Security Solutions Inc. | $1.3B | 26% | 2.8% | 2% | 1% |
| ATROAstronics Corporation | $862M | 22% | 1.8% | 2% | 4% |
| DCODucommun Incorporated | $825M | 21% | 5.3% | 5% | 2% |
| Group median | — | 22% | 5.2% | 5% | 1% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFAeroVironment Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered34%/yr’21→’26
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← AVAH its page in the Manual AVB →
Industry order: ← ATRO the Aerospace & Defense chapter AXON →