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AXS, Axis Capital Holdings Limited
AXIS is a global specialty underwriter and provider of insurance and reinsurance solutions with operations in Bermuda, the United States, Europe, Singapore, and Canada.
Our underwriting operations are organized around our global underwriting platforms, AXIS Insurance and AXIS Re.
The markets in which we operate have historically been cyclical.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report Est. 10/26–10/30 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~29 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Underwriting discipline and the float. What decides it: whether the combined ratio stays below 100% so the policies make money on their own, how large the float is against equity, and what that float earns once it is invested. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- It underwrites at a profit, about a 92% combined ratio (it keeps roughly 8% of premiums before investing the float). Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about 2% a year across the record. The float runs about 2.9× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $4.0B | $4.6B | $5.1B | $5.2B | $4.8B | $5.3B | $5.2B | $5.6B | $6.0B | $6.6B | $6.8B | RevenueRevenue |
| $3.8B | $4.0B | $4.7B | $4.5B | $4.3B | $4.9B | $5.3B | $5.1B | $5.8B | $6.1B | — | Premiums written (net)Prem. written |
| $3.7B | $4.1B | $4.8B | $4.6B | $4.4B | $4.7B | $5.2B | $5.1B | $5.3B | $5.7B | $6.0B | Premiums earnedPremiums |
| $520M | ($377M) | $14M | $347M | ($133M) | $681M | $245M | $403M | $1.0B | $1.2B | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| $513M | ($369M) | $43M | $323M | ($120M) | $619M | $223M | $376M | $1.1B | $1.0B | $1.1B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 1% | — | — | 7% | — | 9% | 9% | 7% | -5% | 18% | 17% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $407M | $259M | $11M | $199M | $344M | $1.2B | $798M | $1.3B | $1.8B | ($41M) | $2.5B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| 59% | 79% | 67% | 66% | 75% | 64% | 63% | 67% | 60% | 58% | 52% | Loss ratioLoss |
| 20% | 20% | 20% | 22% | 21% | 20% | 20% | 20% | 20% | 20% | 20% | Expense ratioExpense |
| ≈ 94% | ≈ 120% | ≈ 106% | ≈ 105% | ≈ 114% | ≈ 99% | ≈ 95% | ≈ 103% | ≈ 93% | ≈ 94% | ≈ 92% | Combined ratioCombined |
| — | +10.0% | +3.4% | +3.2% | +7.2% | −0.4% | −2.9% | +1.8% | −3.6% | −3.9% | — | Cost of float (avg)Float cost |
| ($292M) | ($200M) | ($200M) | ($79M) | ($16M) | ($32M) | ($26M) | $412M | ($24M) | ($87M) | — | Prior-yr reserve developmentReserve dev. |
| 8% | -7% | 1% | 6% | -2% | 11% | 5% | 7% | 18% | 16% | 17% | Return on equityROE |
| 6% | −9% | −2% | 3% | −5% | 9% | 2% | 4% | 15% | 14% | 15% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| $132M | $135M | $134M | $137M | $142M | $146M | $149M | $154M | $152M | $143M | $137M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $495M | $261M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $35M | $0 | $200M | $888M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| ($129M) | $392M | $639M | ($774M) | $490M | ($1.2B) | ($762M) | ($856M) | $280M | ($629M) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| ($202M) | ($546M) | ($186M) | $278M | ($909M) | ($186M) | ($150M) | ($202M) | ($417M) | ($1.1B) | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| ($9M) | $17M | $3M | $44M | $2M | ($74K) | ($30M) | $12M | ($28M) | $14M | — | Exchange-rate effectFX |
| $67M | $122M | $466M | ($254M) | ($73M) | ($186M) | ($143M) | $209M | $1.7B | ($1.7B) | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $13.5B | $14.8B | $13.2B | $14.3B | $14.3B | $15.1B | $14.4B | $15.3B | $15.0B | $15.8B | $16.6B | Investments (total)Investments |
| $7.1B | $9.2B | $7.8B | $7.8B | $8.8B | $9.3B | $8.9B | $9.4B | $10.1B | $8.8B | — | Float (underwriting basis)Float |
| $20.8B | $24.8B | $24.1B | $25.6B | $25.9B | $27.4B | $27.7B | $30.3B | $32.7B | $34.5B | $36.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| $14.5B | $19.4B | $19.1B | $20.1B | $20.6B | $22.0B | $23.0B | $25.0B | $26.6B | $28.1B | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| $6.3B | $5.3B | $5.0B | $5.5B | $5.3B | $5.4B | $4.6B | $5.3B | $6.1B | $6.4B | $6.5B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 91.5M | 84.1M | 84.0M | 84.5M | 84.3M | 85.3M | 85.7M | 86.0M | 85.2M | 79.3M | 74.2M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $5.61 | $-4.39 | $0.51 | $3.83 | $-1.43 | $7.25 | $2.60 | $4.37 | $12.70 | $12.73 | $14.88 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.45 | $1.61 | $1.59 | $1.62 | $1.68 | $1.71 | $1.74 | $1.79 | $1.78 | $1.80 | $1.84 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $68.52 | $63.50 | $59.88 | $65.63 | $62.85 | $63.44 | $54.16 | $61.19 | $71.49 | $80.19 | $87.64 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +7.3%/yr | +7.6%/yr |
| EPS | +9.5%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | +2.5%/yr | +1.4%/yr |
| Book value / share | +1.8%/yr | +5.0%/yr |
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Combined ratio ≈ 94%Underwriting profitTotal benefits, losses and expenses $5.3B ÷ premiums earned $5.7BIndustry peers: median 100%
What this means
The heart of a property-casualty insurer: claims and costs as a share of premiums. Below 100% means it is paid to hold the float, the gold standard; above 100% means it loses money on the policies and must make it back on investments. Approximate here, taken from the filer's total benefits, losses and expenses over premiums, so it can sit a point or two off the company's headline figure; a number held below 100% across cycles is the mark of a disciplined underwriter, the rarest thing in the business.
- Return on equity 16%StrongNet income $1.0B ÷ equity $6.4BIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.
The float
- Float $8.8B1.4× equityNet reserves + unearned premiums − prepaid reinsurance − receivables − DAC = $8.8B
What this means
Money held against future claims and invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.
- Not enough data
What this means
Net investment income wasn't found.
The cost and the reserves
- Cost of float −3.9%Paid to hold the moneyUnderwriting profit $367M ÷ two-year average float $9.5B
What this means
Buffett's own yardstick: the underwriting result as the price of holding the float, divided the way his tables divide it — over the two-year average of float where the record carries both years, since the year's result was earned on money that arrived through the year. At or below zero, policyholders are paying the company to invest their money — the gold standard. A modest positive cost can still beat borrowing; a chronic high cost means the float is expensive leverage.
- Reserve development −$87MPast promises heldPrior-year development, FY2025: favorable (reserves released) · record: 9 favorable, 1 unfavorable of 10
What this means
Each year an insurer restates what its old accident years actually cost. Persistent favorable development means management reserved honestly and released the cushion; persistent unfavorable development means past profits were overstated by under-reserving — the industry's chronic sin, and the single most tell-tale line an owner can read. Signed as the company files it: negative favorable, positive unfavorable.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $9.3M | $10.0M | $619M |
| 2022 | $11.6M | $8.9M | $223M |
| 2023 | $6.8M | $7.0M | $376M |
| 2023 | $21.3M | $14.2M | $376M |
| 2024 | $7.9M | $18.6M | $1.1B |
| 2025 | $9.6M | $18.0M | $1.0B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership0.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio55:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$45M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 0.7% of revenue, equal to 3.5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Credit & receivables, Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Insurance — Property & Casualty
The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Combined ratiomedian over the record | Loss ratiomedian over the record | Yield on floatmedian over the record | ROTCEmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CINFCincinnati Financial Corporation | $12.6B | 98% | 66% | 10.3% | 14% |
| AFGAmerican Financial Group | $8.2B | 105% | 63% | 7.8% | 17% |
| THGHanover Insurance Group | $6.6B | 99% | 64% | 5.8% | 13% |
| AXSAxis Capital Holdings Limited | $6.6B | 101% | 65% | — | 7% |
| MCYMercury General | $6.0B | 100% | 75% | 6.7% | 10% |
| SIGISelective Insurance | $5.3B | 97% | 61% | 6.0% | 10% |
| KMPBKemper Corporation | $4.8B | — | 78%3y | 5.8% | 9% |
| WTMWhite Mountains Insurance Group Ltd. | $3.7B | 121% | 60%1y | 2.2%1y | 15% |
| Group median | — | 100% | 65% | — | 12% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookAn insurer is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Axis Capital Holdings Limited’s record justifies.
Tangible book / share, delivered6%/yr’20→’25
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). An insurer earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for an insurer.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $6.3B on 73M shares, a 7% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the insurer keeps earning that return; an underwriting cycle, a reserve shortfall or a bad year on the float changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Manual order: ← AXP its page in the Manual AXSM →
Industry order: ← ASIC the Insurance — Property & Casualty chapter BNT →