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BETR, Better Home & Finance Holding Company
We are a technology-enabled homeownership company that offers mortgage, home equity, and other homeownership products through a digital platform.
Our services are designed to support customers across key stages of the homeownership cycle including purchase, ownership, refinance, and sale.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~44 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median -146%, above 12% in only 2 of 4 years). The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →16% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- United States84%$139M
- International16%$26M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2022–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| $378M | $72M | $108M | $165M | $160M | RevenueRevenue |
| $27M | $29M | $39M | $60M | — | Interest incomeInt. inc. |
| $17M | — | $21M | $43M | — | Interest expenseInt. exp. |
| $10M | ($3M) | $18M | $17M | $15M | Net interest incomeNet int. |
| — | $0 | $2M | $584K | $1M | Credit-loss provisionProvision |
| ($876M) | ($534M) | ($205M) | ($166M) | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| ($877M) | ($536M) | ($206M) | ($166M) | ($180M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| -81.0% | -59.2% | -22.6% | -11.0% | -11.7% | Return on assetsROA |
| — | -438% | — | -446% | -311% | Return on equityROE |
| — | −438% | — | −446% | −311% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| — | -1030% | — | -3947% | -611% | Return on tangible equityROTCE |
| $8M | $0 | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| ($35M) | ($39M) | ($144M) | ($662M) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| ($1.5B) | $381M | $239M | $714M | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| $726K | ($1M) | ($217K) | ($8M) | — | Exchange-rate effectFX |
| ($633M) | $182M | ($285M) | ($121M) | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| — | $5M | $113M | $724M | — | Loans held for investmentLoans |
| — | — | $2M | $2M | — | Credit-loss allowanceAllowance |
| $1.1B | $906M | $913M | $1.5B | $1.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| $0 | $12M | $134M | $763M | $746M | DepositsDeposits |
| $17M | $32M | $24M | $11M | $11M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $1.3B | $783M | $971M | $1.5B | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| $436M | $0 | — | — | — | Redeemable interestsRedeemable |
| ($604M) | $123M | ($58M) | $37M | $58M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||
| 291M | 9.2M | 15.1M | 15.4M | 17.5M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $-3.01 | $-58.09 | $-13.65 | $-10.80 | $-10.26 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-2.07 | $13.28 | $-3.85 | $2.42 | $3.30 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| $-2.35 | $5.64 | $-6.80 | $0.27 | $1.68 | Tangible book / shareTBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1/31.55 into 2023 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.64 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 3-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +102.2%/yr | +102.2%/yr (3-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +24.5%/yr | +24.5%/yr (3-yr) |
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity -446%Loss on equityNet income ($166M) ÷ equity $37MIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- Return on tangible equity -3947%LossNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $11M − intangibles $22M)Industry peers: median 6%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Not enough data
What this means
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 2.5%ThinEquity $37M ÷ assets $1.5B
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 51%Mostly deposit-fundedDeposits $763M ÷ assets $1.5B
What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 3%LowProvision for credit losses $584K ÷ net interest income $17M
What this means
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
The franchise and the credit cycle
- Solid core depositsDemand deposits $182M ÷ deposits $763M
What this means
The share of deposits the bank pays nothing for — checking accounts that stay through rate cycles. This is the deposit moat in one number: a high share means cheap, sticky raw material for lending; a low share means the funding reprices with every rate move. Buffett's Wells letter is built on exactly this economics.
- Not enough data
What this means
Not derivable from the filings' structured data — some filers carry recoveries only on segment axes, and a gross figure dressed as net would be a wrong number.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 4-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$21M written down across 2 years (2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Beside that spending sits $112M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2022 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 4-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership16.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$20M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 12.4% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Credit & receivables as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Mortgage & Specialty Finance
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | ROEmedian over the record | ROTCEmedian over the record | Efficiencymedian over the record | NII / assetsmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AGMFederal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation | $408M | — | — | 24%1y | 1.1%1y |
| CMTGClaros Mortgage Trust Inc. | $188M | 5% | 5% | — | 2.8% |
| BETRBetter Home & Finance Holding Company | $165M | -442%2y | -2488%2y | — | 1.0% |
| ARRARMOUR Residential REIT Inc. | $158M | — | — | — | 0.8%1y |
| RWTRedwood Trust Inc. | $155M | — | — | — | 0.3%1y |
| ADAMAdamas Trust Inc. | $149M | 10%1y | 11%1y | — | 1.2%1y |
| TRTXTPG RE Finance Trust Inc. | $146M | 6% | 6% | — | 2.4% |
| RKTRocket Companies Inc. | $125M | — | — | — | 0.2%1y |
| Group median | — | 5% | 5% | — | 1.1% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA bank / financial isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).
Manual order: ← BETA its page in the Manual BF-B →
Industry order: ← ARR the Mortgage & Specialty Finance chapter CIM →