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EVH, Evolent Health

Health Care Technology diversified UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundSerial acquirer

Evolent is a market leader in connecting care for people with complex conditions like cancer, cardiovascular disease, and musculoskeletal diagnoses.

Our acquisitions have been focused on companies with extensive experience assisting customers in managing the large and complex specialties of oncology, cardiology, radiology, musculoskeletal, physical medicine, and genetics care.

The majority of our revenues derive from our primary solution, Specialty Care Management Services, however we also offer additional administrative services to our customers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

EVH · Evolent Health

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.9B

−26.6% YoY · 15% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.1B 5-yr avg $1.7B

Gross margin 17% 5-yr avg 22%

Operating margin −20.4% 5-yr avg −6.3%

ROIC −27% 5-yr avg −9%

Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~39 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 67% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −12% through the cycle on a 23% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −6%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMJun 2026
											Income statement
$254M	$435M	$627M	$687M	$925M	$908M	$1.4B	$2.0B	$2.6B	$1.9B	$2.1B	RevenueRevenue
—	—	—	—	—	$250M	$317M	$460M	$367M	$400M	$362M	Gross profitGross prof.
—	—	—	—	—	28%	23%	23%	14%	21%	17%	Gross marginGross mgn
63%	47%	38%	34%	23%	24%	20%	18%	10%	16%	14%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
4%	4%	3%	3%	2%	2%	—	—	—	—	1%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($237M)	($73M)	($47M)	($309M)	($263M)	($42M)	$4M	($71M)	($40M)	($410M)	($428M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−93.4%	−16.7%	−7.6%	−45.0%	−28.4%	−4.7%	0.3%	−3.6%	−1.6%	−21.9%	−20.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($238M)	($76M)	($54M)	($330M)	($331M)	($30M)	($62M)	($202M)	($63M)	($535M)	—	Pretax incomePretax
($160M)	($61M)	($53M)	($302M)	($334M)	($38M)	($19M)	($113M)	($62M)	($535M)	($505M)	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
($36M)	($28M)	($21M)	($43M)	($16M)	$39M	($12M)	$143M	$19M	$39M	$54M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$17M	$32M	$45M	$61M	$61M	$60M	$67M	$123M	$118M	$116M	$112M	Depreciation & amortizationD&A
$88M	($20M)	($30M)	$183M	$242M	($400K)	($94M)	$92M	($78M)	$418M	$405M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$16M	$28M	$40M	$36M	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	CapexCapex
6.1%	6.4%	6.3%	5.2%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($51M)	($56M)	($60M)	($78M)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−20.1%	−12.8%	−9.6%	−11.4%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($51M)	($56M)	($60M)	($78M)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Free cash flowFCF
−20.1%	−12.8%	−9.6%	−11.4%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$4M	$130M	$9M	$300K	$49M	$248M	$388M	$31M	$57M	$1M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$40M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
($97M)	($12M)	($160M)	($182M)	$261M	($16M)	($259M)	($416M)	($63M)	($233K)	—	Investing cash flowInv. cash
$150M	$166M	$274M	($36M)	($12M)	($30M)	$132M	$281M	($565K)	($36M)	—	Financing cash flowFin. cash
$0	$0	($36K)	$30K	$65K	($52K)	($657K)	($79K)	($229K)	($486K)	—	Exchange-rate effectFX
$18M	$125M	$93M	($260M)	$233M	($7M)	($140M)	$8M	($45M)	$2M	—	Change in cashΔ cash
-27%	-6%	-3%	-22%	-35%	-5%	—	-4%	-2%	-26%	-27%	ROICROIC
-23%	-6%	-5%	-33%	-54%	-5%	-2%	-11%	-6%	-129%	-132%	Return on equityROE
−23%	−6%	−5%	−33%	−54%	−5%	−2%	−11%	−6%	−129%	−132%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$179M	$238M	$228M	$101M	$319M	$266M	$188M	$193M	$104M	$152M	$116M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$41M	$49M	$80M	$76M	$124M	$131M	$255M	$447M	$415M	$310M	$449M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$44M	$43M	$147M	$37M	$32M	$96M	$57M	$48M	$96M	$60M	$39M	Accounts payablePayables
($3M)	$6M	($67M)	$38M	$92M	$35M	$198M	$399M	$319M	$250M	$410M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$265M	$378M	$488M	$229M	$548M	$524M	$478M	$684M	$607M	$506M	$611M	Current assetsCur. assets
$132M	$133M	$269M	$193M	$403M	$445M	$433M	$674M	$716M	$385M	$493M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.0×	2.8×	1.8×	1.2×	1.4×	1.2×	1.1×	1.0×	0.8×	1.3×	1.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$31M	$51M	$74M	$85M	$86M	$81M	$88M	$78M	$73M	$81M	—	Net PP&ENet PP&E
$627M	$628M	$768M	$566M	$349M	$426M	$723M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$694M	$694M	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.8B	$2.7B	$2.5B	$1.9B	$2.0B	Total assetsAssets
$120M	$121M	$221M	$294M	$290M	$216M	$413M	$597M	$491M	$971M	$966M	Total debtDebt
($59M)	($117M)	($7M)	$193M	($29M)	($51M)	$225M	$404M	$386M	$819M	$851M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-961.2×	-20.0×	-8.7×	-21.2×	-9.3×	-1.7×	0.2×	-1.3×	-1.6×	-7.1×	-6.2×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$288M	$266M	$533M	$569M	$752M	$726M	$958M	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.5B	—	Total liabilitiesTotal liab.
—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	$178M	$190M	$0	—	Redeemable interestsRedeemable
$210M	$35M	$46M	$7M	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Noncontrolling interestsNCI
$703M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$929M	$620M	$694M	$859M	$1.1B	$1.0B	$415M	$383M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
7.3%	4.7%	2.8%	2.3%	1.6%	1.8%	2.5%	2.1%	1.6%	2.1%	2.0%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$161M	—	—	$200M	$215M	—	—	—	—	$398M	$398M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
45.0M	64.4M	77.3M	82.4M	84.9M	86.1M	93.7M	111M	115M	114M	112M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$5.64	$6.76	$8.11	$8.34	$10.89	$10.55	$14.43	$17.65	$22.28	$16.43	$18.69	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-3.55	$-0.94	$-0.68	$-3.67	$-3.94	$-0.44	$-0.20	$-1.02	$-0.54	$-4.68	$-4.50	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.13	$-0.87	$-0.78	$-0.95	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.13	$-0.87	$-0.78	$-0.95	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.34	$0.43	$0.51	$0.43	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$15.60	$15.71	$14.79	$11.28	$7.30	$8.06	$9.17	$9.60	$8.73	$3.64	$3.41	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.43 into 2017 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+12.6%/yr	+8.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	+7.8%/yr (3-yr)	+7.8%/yr (3-yr)
Book value / share	−14.9%/yr	−13.0%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2021FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2016–FY2019cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2019 the business turned a $302M loss into ($78M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2019	FY2018	FY2017	FY2016
Reported net income	($302M)	($53M)	($61M)	($160M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$61M	+$45M	+$32M	+$17M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$16M	+$18M	+$20M	+$19M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$183M	−$30M	−$20M	+$88M
Cash from operations	($43M)	($21M)	($28M)	($36M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$36M	−$40M	−$28M	−$16M
Owner earnings	($78M)	($60M)	($56M)	($51M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-11%	-10%	-13%	-20%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $16M), owner earnings is nearer ($94M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -7.1×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($410M) ÷ interest expense $57M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $819M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $152M − debt $971M

What this means
Netting $152M of cash and short-term investments against $971M of debt leaves $819M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 46d

Tight

DSO 60 + DIO 0 − DPO 15 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -6%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -35%–-2%; -26% latest = NOPAT ($324M) ÷ invested capital $1.2B

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -26% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median 18%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Are earnings backed by cash? $39M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($535M) · cash from operations $39M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

The promise and the pay packet

Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 2.1%

The count is rising

Stock compensation $40M (fiscal 2025), 2.1% of revenue · repurchases $40M · diluted shares +21.9% since 2022

What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.9B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.31×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $971M vs $121M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 10 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record —

Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.09/share (latest year $-4.73), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.67/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 0 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 10 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −39% → −9% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −39% early to −9% lately, median −17% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −9%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2016 · −93.4% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$611M

Cash & short-term investments$116M
Receivables$449M
Other current assets$46M

Current liabilities$493M

Accounts payable$39M
Other current liabilities$454M

Current ratio1.24×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.24×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.23×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$118Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+46.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 1.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($866M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($978M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$970M$4M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$1Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.3B67% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$916Mover 9 years since fiscal 2017 buying other businesses, against $118M of capital spent building over the 10-year record

$974M written down across 4 years (2016, 2019, 2020, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Beside that spending sits $471M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2013 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Net income
2021	Seth Blackley	$6.5M	$21.9M	($38M)
2022	Seth Blackley	$7.7M	$11.8M	($19M)
2023	Seth Blackley	$8.9M	$20.1M	($113M)
2024	Seth Blackley	$11.1M	−$9.3M	($62M)
2025	Seth Blackley	$14.2M	$2.6M	($535M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership1.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$40M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 2.1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers, Health Care Technology

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

Company	Revenuelatest FY, USD	Gross marginmedian over the record	Op. marginmedian over the record	ROICmedian over the record	Owner earn. marginmedian over the record
2413M3	$2.2B	55%4y	27.1%	33%	19%
EVHEvolent Health	$1.9B	23%	-12.2%	-6%	-12%4y
TEMTempus AI Inc.	$1.3B	—	-59.8%	-210%1y	-37%
WAYWaystar Holding Corp.	$1.1B	—	15.5%	3%	14%
DOCSDoximity	$645M	88%	33.0%	16%	40%
HSTMHealthStream Inc.	$304M	—	5.8%	4%	18%
Group median	—	55%	10.7%	4%	16%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

The owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered22%/yr’20→’25

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today—

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh EVH against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Evolent Health (EVH), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/EVH, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← EVGO its page in the Manual EVLV →

Industry order: ← DOCS the Health Care Technology chapter HSTM →