Owner Scorecard


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EXAS, Exact Sciences

Life Sciences Tools & Services consumer brand UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundSerial acquirer

A healthcare-services business, paid to deliver or facilitate care.

Building on the success of the Cologuard and Oncotype DX tests, we are investing in our pipeline to develop innovative solutions for use before, during, and after a cancer diagnosis.

Our current products and services focus on screening and precision oncology tests.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
EXAS · Exact Sciences
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.2B
+17.7% YoY · 17% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.2B 5-yr avg $2.5B
Gross margin 70% 5-yr avg 70%
Operating margin −6.4% 5-yr avg −26.0%
ROIC −4% 5-yr avg −10%
Owner-earnings margin 11% 5-yr avg −2%
Free cash flow margin 11% 5-yr avg −4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 56% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −37% through the cycle on a 71% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 10% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on volume, payer mix and reimbursement. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −13%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$99M$266M$454M$876M$1.5B$1.8B$2.1B$2.5B$2.8B$3.2B$3.2BRevenueRevenue
$54M$187M$336M$660M$1.1B$1.3B$1.4B$1.8B$1.9B$2.3B$2.3BGross profitGross prof.
55%71%74%75%76%74%68%70%70%70%70%Gross marginGross mgn
191%99%94%84%72%94%76%65%61%60%60%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
34%16%15%16%37%22%19%17%16%16%16%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($169M)($118M)($159M)($234M)($768M)($856M)($594M)($215M)($1.0B)($206M)($206M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−170.1%−44.5%−35.1%−26.7%−51.5%−48.4%−28.5%−8.6%−38.0%−6.4%−6.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
($167M)($115M)($175M)($406M)($829M)($843M)($633M)($202M)($1.0B)($204M)Pretax incomePretax
($167M)($114M)($175M)($213M)($824M)($596M)($624M)($204M)($1.0B)($208M)($208M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($130M)($72M)($69M)($112M)$136M($102M)($224M)$156M$211M$491M$491MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$11M$15M$21M$34M$70M$85M$100M$114M$120M$125M$125MDepreciationDeprec.
$2M($7M)$25M($41M)$737M$155M$93M$15M$905M$357M$357MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$15M$48M$150M$173M$65M$136M$214M$124M$136M$135M$135MCapexCapex
14.9%18.2%33.0%19.7%4.4%7.7%10.3%5.0%4.9%4.1%4.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($141M)($86M)($89M)($146M)$71M($188M)($324M)$32M$75M$357M$357MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−142.3%−32.4%−19.7%−16.6%4.8%−10.6%−15.5%1.3%2.7%11.0%11.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($145M)($120M)($219M)($284M)$71M($238M)($438M)$32M$75M$357M$357MFree cash flowFCF
−145.8%−45.2%−48.2%−32.4%4.8%−13.5%−21.0%1.3%2.7%11.0%11.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$3M$18M$974M$7M$500M$15M$52M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
($12M)($161M)($782M)($124M)($702M)($1.1B)$74M$50M($442M)$195MInvesting cash flowInv. cash
$150M$261M$934M$253M$1.9B$8M$76M$160M$232M($338M)Financing cash flowFin. cash
($215K)$143K$36K$0$0$23K$30K$1M($3M)$891KExchange-rate effectFX
$8M$29M$83M$17M$1.3B($1.2B)($73M)$367M($3M)$349MChange in cashΔ cash
-46%-21%-13%-7%-23%-13%-9%-3%-20%-4%-4%ROICROIC
-50%-22%-39%-11%-37%-18%-20%-6%-43%-9%-9%Return on equityROE
−50%−22%−39%−11%−37%−18%−20%−6%−43%−9%−9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$311M$425M$1.1B$324M$1.8B$1.0B$632M$778M$1.0B$965M$965MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$9M$26M$45M$130M$233M$217M$158M$204M$249M$299M$299MReceivablesReceiv.
$7M$26M$39M$62M$92M$105M$118M$127M$162M$166M$166MInventoryInvent.
$710K$16M$28M$26M$36M$68M$75M$79M$90M$176M$176MAccounts payablePayables
$15M$36M$56M$166M$290M$254M$201M$252M$322M$289M$289MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$334M$487M$1.2B$554M$2.2B$1.4B$982M$1.2B$1.6B$1.6B$1.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$31M$68M$136M$236M$633M$517M$413M$515M$732M$641M$641MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
10.9×7.2×9.0×2.3×3.5×2.8×2.4×2.3×2.1×2.4×2.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$38M$80M$245M$455M$452M$580M$685M$698M$694M$709MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$2M$17M$1.2B$1.2B$2.3B$2.3B$2.4B$2.4B$2.4B$2.4BGoodwillGoodwill
$377M$599M$1.5B$3.5B$4.9B$6.7B$6.2B$6.5B$5.9B$5.9B$5.9BTotal assetsAssets
$5M$4M$665M$804M$1.9B$2.2B$2.2B$2.3B$2.3B$2.3B$2.3BTotal debtDebt
($306M)($420M)($459M)$480M$22M$1.1B$1.6B$1.5B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-574.3×-4.3×-1.2×-11.3×-46.0×-30.2×-11.1×-38.8×-5.2×-5.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$42M$78M$843M$1.2B$2.7B$3.3B$3.2B$3.3B$3.5B$3.5BTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$335M$520M$447M$2.0B$2.2B$3.4B$3.0B$3.1B$2.4B$2.4B$2.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
23.9%13.4%13.3%12.4%10.3%14.3%9.9%9.3%7.8%6.7%6.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
102M116M122M131M151M171M176M180M184M189M189MShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.97$2.30$3.72$6.68$9.87$10.31$11.82$13.88$14.98$17.21$17.21Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.63$-0.99$-1.43$-1.62$-5.45$-3.48$-3.54$-1.13$-5.59$-1.10$-1.10EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.38$-0.75$-0.73$-1.11$0.47$-1.09$-1.84$0.18$0.40$1.89$1.89Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.42$-1.04$-1.79$-2.17$0.47$-1.39$-2.48$0.18$0.40$1.89$1.89Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.15$0.42$1.23$1.32$0.43$0.79$1.22$0.69$0.74$0.71$0.71Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.28$4.50$3.66$14.91$14.79$19.77$17.26$17.46$13.04$12.72$12.72Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+37.6%/yr+11.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share+32.0%/yr
Capital spending / share+19.4%/yr+10.6%/yr
Book value / share+16.3%/yr−3.0%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2020FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $208M loss into $357M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($208M)($1.0B)($204M)($624M)($596M)
Depreciationnon-cash charge added back+$125M+$120M+$114M+$100M+$85M
Amortization of intangible assetsnon-cash charge added back; the purchase price of past acquisitions, expensed over time+$97M+$95M+$92M+$97M+$95M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$218M+$215M+$231M+$207M+$253M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$260M+$810M−$78M−$4M+$60M
Cash from operations$491M$211M$156M($224M)($102M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$135M−$136M−$124M−$100M−$85M
Owner earnings$357M$75M$32M($324M)($188M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$114M−$50M
Free cash flow$357M$75M$32M($438M)($238M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue11%3%1%-16%-11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $218M), owner earnings is nearer $139M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($206M) ÷ interest expense $39M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $956M + ST investments $9M − debt $2.3B
    What this means

    Netting $965M of cash and short-term investments against $2.3B of debt leaves $1.4B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 34 + DIO 62 − DPO 65 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -46%–-3%; -4% latest = NOPAT ($163M) ÷ invested capital $3.8B
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid, recently turned positive
    latest $357M = operating cash $491M − maintenance capex $135M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -13%)
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a -13% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $218M of SBC) leaves $139M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($208M) · cash from operations $491M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.08×
    Maintaining
    Capex $135M ÷ property depreciation $125M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Heavy selling cost
    Selling and marketing $1.1B ÷ revenue $3.2B
    What this means

    Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 6.7%
    The count is rising
    Stock compensation $218M (fiscal 2025), 6.7% of revenue · no repurchases · diluted shares +7.0% since 2022
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.43×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.3B vs $915M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 10 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record
    Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.52/share (latest year $-1.09), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $12.58/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 0 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 10 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −83% → −18% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −83% early to −18% lately, median −38% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −7%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Worst year 2016 · −170.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.6B
  • Cash & short-term investments$965M
  • Receivables$299M
  • Inventory$166M
  • Other current assets$126M
Current liabilities$641M
  • Accounts payable$176M
  • Other current liabilities$465M
Current ratio2.43×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.17×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.50×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$915Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+20.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.6× → 2.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($887M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$196M$196M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $286M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$1.2B · 418%
  • Source of funding−$910M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $910M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $5M to $2.3B.

  • Net change in share count84.4%

    The diluted count rose from 102M to 189M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$3.3B56% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity99%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.6Bover 9 years since fiscal 2017 buying other businesses, against $1.2B of capital spent building over the 10-year record

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Beside that spending sits $590M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2009 (tagged in 12 of those years; 5 years untagged) — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2020Mr. Conroy$20.2M$31.5M$71M
2021Mr. Conroy$14.7M−$2.1M($188M)
2022Mr. Conroy$14.2M$2.4M($324M)
2023Mr. Conroy$16.1M$35.9M$32M
2024Mr. Conroy$15.5M−$714k$75M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.2%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio109:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$218M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 6.7% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers, Life Sciences Tools & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
LHLabcorp$14.0B28%11.9%8%9%
DGXQuest Diagnostics$11.0B35%14.6%10%12%
EXASExact Sciences$3.2B71%-36.6%-13%-13%
FTREFortrea Holdings Inc.$2.7B1.1%1%5%
NTRANatera Inc.$2.3B37%3y-46.0%-62%-33%
RDNTRadNet$2.0B13%4y4.9%4%5%
GHGuardant Health Inc.$982M61%3y-101.3%-30%-62%
CAICaris Life Sciences Inc.$812M-62.4%-62%
Group median36%-17.7%1%-4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Exact Sciences has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.65% 10-year Treasury (Aug 19, 2026) + 4.35 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023+234%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.65%, as of Aug 19, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $357M on 191M shares outstanding, per the 10-K cover, as of 2026-02-12; net debt $1.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Exact Sciences (EXAS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/EXAS, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← EWBC its page in the Manual EXC →

Industry order: ← DGX the Life Sciences Tools & Services chapter EYPT →