← All companies ← FG Manual FGN → ← FFIN Banks FHB →

FGBIP, First Guaranty Bancshares, Inc.

Banks financial

A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.

Our principal business consists of attracting deposits from the general public and local municipalities in our market areas and then investing those deposits.

We serve the credit needs of our customer base, including commercial real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, commercial leases, one-to-four-family residential real estate loans, construction and land development loans, agricultural and farmland loans, and to a lesser extent, consumer and multifamily loans.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

FGBIP · First Guaranty Bancshares, Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$95M

−15.7% YoY · −1% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · FY2025, with 5-yr average

Revenue $95M 5-yr avg $103M

Return on equity −25% 5-yr avg 2%

Return on tangible equity −25% 5-yr avg 2%

Efficiency ratio 86% 5-yr avg 73%

Equity / assets 5.5% 5-yr avg 6.8%

Next report By 11/13 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 45 days of period end · has filed ~45 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 9%, above 12% in only 2 of 10 years). It runs at a 86% efficiency ratio, on the heavy side. The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

Most recent quarterly filing 10-Q filed Aug 14, 2026 Source at SEC EDGAR →

Operating income up 47.6% year over year

figures computed from the filing's XBRL

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25
										Income statement
$58M	$61M	$62M	$70M	$98M	$100M	$111M	$95M	$113M	$95M	RevenueRevenue
$59M	$68M	$78M	$92M	$101M	$112M	$137M	$183M	$222M	$213M	Interest incomeInt. inc.
$10M	$14M	$21M	$30M	$26M	$22M	$37M	$98M	$133M	$126M	Interest expenseInt. exp.
$48M	$53M	$57M	$62M	$75M	$90M	$100M	$85M	$88M	$87M	Net interest incomeNet int.
$9M	$8M	$5M	$8M	$24M	$11M	$11M	$11M	$25M	$8M	Noninterest incomeFee inc.
$4M	$4M	$1M	$5M	$15M	$2M	$4M	$4M	$20M	$82M	Credit-loss provisionProvision
$21M	$19M	$18M	$18M	$26M	$34M	$36M	$12M	$16M	($69M)	Pretax incomePretax
$14M	$12M	$14M	$14M	$20M	$27M	$29M	$9M	$12M	($56M)	Net incomeNet inc.
34%	39%	20%	20%	20%	21%	21%	23%	22%	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
										Cash flow & returns
0.9%	0.7%	0.8%	0.7%	0.8%	0.9%	0.9%	0.3%	0.3%	-1.4%	Return on assetsROA
11%	8%	10%	9%	11%	12%	12%	4%	5%	-25%	Return on equityROE
7%	5%	6%	5%	8%	9%	9%	1%	3%	−25%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
12%	9%	10%	10%	13%	13%	13%	4%	5%	-25%	Return on tangible equityROTCE
57%	63%	69%	67%	59%	64%	64%	84%	68%	86%	Efficiency ratioEffic.
$5M	$5M	$6M	$6M	$6M	$6M	$7M	$7M	$5M	$560K	Dividends paidDiv. paid
($68M)	($83M)	$7M	($132M)	($128M)	($453M)	($468M)	($206M)	($142M)	$130M	Investing cash flowInv. cash
$26M	$91M	$56M	$42M	$337M	$388M	$252M	$388M	$386M	$160M	Financing cash flowFin. cash
($19M)	$20M	$90M	($61M)	$232M	($38M)	($179M)	$203M	$278M	$281M	Change in cashΔ cash
										Balance sheet
$949M	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.8B	$2.2B	$2.5B	$2.7B	$2.7B	$2.1B	Loans held for investmentLoans
$11M	$9M	$11M	$11M	$25M	$24M	$24M	$31M	$35M	$41M	Credit-loss allowanceAllowance
$1.5B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$2.1B	$2.5B	$2.9B	$3.2B	$3.6B	$4.0B	$4.1B	Total assetsAssets
$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.9B	$2.2B	$2.6B	$2.7B	$3.0B	$3.5B	$3.6B	DepositsDeposits
$2M	$3M	$3M	$13M	$13M	$13M	$13M	$13M	$13M	$0	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$2.0B	$2.3B	$2.7B	$2.9B	$3.3B	$3.7B	$3.9B	Total liabilitiesTotal liab.
$124M	$144M	$147M	$166M	$179M	$224M	$235M	$250M	$255M	$226M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
										Per share
8.4M	9.7M	9.7M	10.7M	10.7M	10.7M	10.7M	11.2M	12.5M	14.0M	Shares out (basic avg)Shares
$1.68	$1.21	$1.47	$1.34	$1.90	$2.55	$2.70	$0.83	$1.00	$-4.01	EPS (basic)EPS
$0.58	$0.54	$0.58	$0.54	$0.58	$0.60	$0.64	$0.66	$0.41	$0.04	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$14.86	$14.86	$15.20	$15.57	$16.66	$20.89	$21.93	$22.36	$20.40	$16.18	Book value / shareBVPS
$14.49	$14.05	$14.48	$13.68	$14.85	$19.14	$20.26	$20.82	$19.09	$15.99	Tangible book / shareTBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−0.1%/yr	−5.8%/yr
Dividends / share	−25.7%/yr	−41.4%/yr
Capital spending / share	−14.4%/yr	−27.1%/yr
Book value / share	+0.9%/yr	−0.6%/yr

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Material weakness in financial controls

“As previously reported in Part I, Item 4 of our Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2025, management identified a material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Is it a good business?

Return on equity -25%

Loss on equity

Net income ($56M) ÷ equity $226M

Industry peers: median 6%

In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
Return on tangible equity -25%

Loss

Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $0 − intangibles $3M)

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
Efficiency ratio 86%

High cost ratio (>75%)

Noninterest expense $82M ÷ (net interest income + fees)

Industry peers: median 63%

What this means
The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.

Is it sound?

Capital (equity / assets) 5.5%

Thin

Equity $226M ÷ assets $4.1B

What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
Deposit funding 89%

Deposit-funded

Deposits $3.6B ÷ assets $4.1B

What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
Credit cost (provision / NII) 94%

Elevated

Provision for credit losses $82M ÷ net interest income $87M

What this means
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.

The franchise and the credit cycle

Deposit franchise 11%

Rate-sensitive funding

Noninterest-bearing deposits $415M ÷ deposits $3.6B

What this means
The share of deposits the bank pays nothing for — checking accounts that stay through rate cycles. This is the deposit moat in one number: a high share means cheap, sticky raw material for lending; a low share means the funding reprices with every rate move. Buffett's Wells letter is built on exactly this economics.
Net charge-offs 3.20%

Heavy losses

Charge-offs net of recoveries $76M ÷ loans $2.4B (avg of year-ends) · worst year on record 3.69% · allowance held at 1.97% of loans

What this means
Loans actually written off, net of what was later recovered — the realized truth the provisions were guessing at. Graham's rule applies doubly here: the worst year in the record, not the average, is the read, because a loan book's sins are committed in the good years and confessed in the bad ones.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$3M0% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $57M of capital spent building over the 10-year record

$13M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership49.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the deposit base could leave overnight?
withheld
the filing states its uninsured deposits on a netted basis ("excludes public funds deposits that are collateralized…"), which cannot be checked against the deposits line the record carries — withheld rather than shown unverifiedverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Banks

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

Company	Revenuelatest FY, USD	ROEmedian over the record	ROTCEmedian over the record	Efficiencymedian over the record	NII / assetsmedian over the record	Noninterest-bearing sharelatest FY
CFFNCapitol Federal Financial Inc.	$201M	6%	6%	51%	2.0%	—
NFBKNorthfield Bancorp, Inc.	$154M	5%	5%	57%	2.5%	18%
KRNYKearny Financial Corp	$154M	4%	4%	69%	2.2%	10%
WSBFWaterstone Financial, Inc.	$142M	7%	7%	76%	2.5%	—
FMAOFarmers & Merchants Bancorp Inc.	$121M	9%	10%	63%	3.1%	19%
PDLBPonce Financial Group Inc.	$109M	2%	2%	81%	3.0%	—
NECBNorthEast Community Bancorp Inc.	$105M	11%	11%	44%	4.7%	17%
FGBIPFirst Guaranty Bancshares, Inc.	$95M	9%	10%	66%	3.0%	11%
Group median	—	7%	7%	64%	2.7%	17%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what First Guaranty Bancshares, Inc.’s record justifies.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Cost of equity 10% Long-term growth 3%

Tangible book / share, delivered1%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book—

Justified by the return—

Normalized return on tangible equity10%

Price / book—

Earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $224M on 17M shares, a 10% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Weigh FGBIP against another business →

The owners of FGBIP: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "First Guaranty Bancshares, Inc. (FGBIP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FGBIP, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← FG its page in the Manual FGN →

Industry order: ← FFIN the Banks chapter FHB →