Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← GDOT Manual GDYN → ← GDEV IT Services & Consulting GDYN →

GDRX, GoodRx Holdings Inc.

IT Services & Consulting asset-light Distress / turnaroundCyclicalSerial acquirer

Revenue is led by Prescription transactions revenue (68%) and Pharma Direct Revenue (19%), with 2 more lines behind.

To achieve this, we are building the leading, consumer-focused digital healthcare platform in the United States.

GoodRx was founded to solve the challenges that consumers face in understanding, accessing, and affording healthcare by removing the friction and inefficiencies in the system.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
GDRX · GoodRx Holdings Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$797M
+0.6% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $785M 5-yr avg $770M
Operating margin 9.5% 5-yr avg 3.5%
ROIC 4% 5-yr avg 2%
Owner-earnings margin 25% 5-yr avg 21%
Free cash flow margin 25% 5-yr avg 21%

Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~37 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 35% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 8 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 5.1% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from −50% to 36% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Stock-based pay runs about 12% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 20% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Prescription transactions revenue is 68% of revenue, with Pharma Direct Revenue the other meaningful line at 19%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Prescription transactions revenue68%$544M
  • Pharma Direct Revenue19%$151M
  • Subscription revenue11%$84M
  • Other revenue2%$18M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$250M$388M$551M$745M$767M$750M$792M$797M$785MRevenueRevenue
45%49%130%70%66%62%61%56%55%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
18%8%11%17%19%18%16%15%15%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$77M$140M($276M)$13M$2M($27M)$66M$87M$75MOperating incomeOp. inc.
31.0%36.0%−50.1%1.8%0.2%−3.6%8.3%11.0%9.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$52M$83M($303M)($10M)($23M)($56M)$31M$57MPretax incomePretax
$44M$66M($294M)($25M)($33M)($9M)$16M$30M$16MNet incomeNet inc.
16%20%48%46%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$45M$83M$131M$179M$147M$138M$184M$168M$202MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$10M$14M$18M$35M$54M$108M$70M$85M$89MDepreciation & amortizationD&A
($10M)($82K)$9M$9M$5M($65M)($1M)($24M)$28MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$804K$1M$21M$5M$4M$1M$1M$4M$4MCapexCapex
0.3%0.4%3.7%0.6%0.5%0.1%0.2%0.4%0.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$44M$82M$111M$174M$143M$137M$183M$164M$197MOwner earningsOwner earn.
17.8%21.1%20.1%23.4%18.6%18.3%23.1%20.6%25.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$44M$82M$111M$174M$143M$137M$183M$164M$197MFree cash flowFCF
17.8%21.1%20.1%23.4%18.6%18.3%23.1%20.6%25.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$31M$56M$140M$157M$0$0$43M$13MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$102M$104M$159M$216MBuybacksBuybacks
($3M)($37M)($92M)($179M)($210M)($56M)($70M)($120M)Investing cash flowInv. cash
($25M)($55M)$906M($31M)($120M)($167M)($337M)($234M)Financing cash flowFin. cash
$17M($9M)$946M($30M)($184M)($85M)($224M)($187M)Change in cashΔ cash
-53%2%-3%4%6%4%ROICROIC
-41%-3%-4%-1%2%5%3%Return on equityROE
Balance sheet
$35M$26M$969M$941M$757M$672M$448M$262M$296MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$48M$69M$118M$117M$144M$146M$236M$182MReceivablesReceiv.
$8M$10M$18M$18M$36M$14M$19M$9MAccounts payablePayables
$40M$58M$101M$99M$107M$132M$216M$173MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$87M$1.1B$1.1B$920M$873M$659M$643M$1.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$33M$60M$81M$76M$123M$124M$246M$1.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.6×18.2×13.4×12.1×7.1×5.3×2.6×1.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2M$23M$22M$20M$16M$13M$12MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$220M$236M$261M$330M$412M$411M$411M$430M$430MGoodwillGoodwill
$387M$1.5B$1.6B$1.6B$1.6B$1.4B$1.4B$2.3BTotal assetsAssets
$671M$667M$663M$659M$656M$492M$488M$487MTotal debtDebt
$645M($302M)($278M)($98M)($16M)$43M$226M$190MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
0.1×-0.5×1.2×2.1×1.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$737M$759M$776M$790M$827M$663M$788MTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
($1.2B)($1.1B)$711M$832M$815M$762M$725M$616M$648MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.7%1.0%72.1%21.5%15.7%14.0%12.5%9.6%8.8%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
118M231M275M410M413M410M392M357M345MShares out (diluted)Shares
$2.11$1.68$2.00$1.82$1.86$1.83$2.02$2.23$2.28Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.37$0.29$-1.07$-0.06$-0.08$-0.02$0.04$0.09$0.05EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.38$0.35$0.40$0.42$0.35$0.33$0.47$0.46$0.57Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.38$0.35$0.40$0.42$0.35$0.33$0.47$0.46$0.57Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.01$0.01$0.07$0.01$0.01$0.00$0.00$0.01$0.01Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-9.82$-4.70$2.59$2.03$1.97$1.86$1.85$1.73$1.88Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.95 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.49 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
7-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+0.8%/yr+2.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+3.0%/yr+2.7%/yr
EPS−18.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.5%/yr−33.3%/yr
Book value / share−7.8%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Pharma Direct Revenue+41.2%
    “Pharma direct revenue increased $44.1 million, or 41%, year-over year, driven by organic growth as we continued to expand our market penetration with pharma manufacturers and other customers.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Subscription revenue-3.2%
    “Subscription revenue decreased $2.8 million, or 3%, year-over year, primarily driven by a decrease in the number of subscription plans with 674 thousand subscription plans as of December 31, 2025 compared to 684 thousand as of December 31, 2024.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2018FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $30M of profit into $164M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$30M
Owner earnings$164M · 21% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$30M$16M($9M)($33M)($25M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$85M+$70M+$108M+$54M+$35M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$77M+$99M+$105M+$120M+$160M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$24M−$1M−$65M+$5M+$9M
Cash from operations$168M$184M$138M$147M$179M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$4M−$1M−$1M−$4M−$5M
Owner earnings$164M$183M$137M$143M$174M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue21%23%18%19%23%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $77M), owner earnings is nearer $88M.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $87M ÷ interest expense $43M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $226M · 2.6× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $262M − debt $488M
    What this means

    Netting $262M of cash and short-term investments against $488M of debt leaves $226M owed, about 2.6× a year's operating profit (5.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    5-yr median, range -53%–6%; 6% latest = NOPAT $47M ÷ invested capital $843M
    Industry peers: median 3%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    8-yr median margin, range 18%–23%; latest $164M = operating cash $168M − maintenance capex $4M
    Industry peers: median 15%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 21% of revenue this year, a 20% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $77M of SBC) leaves $88M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $168M ÷ net income $30M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $216M ÷ Owner Earnings $164M — this fiscal year
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $164M of Owner Earnings, $216M (132%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $216M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $77M stock comp, the real buyback was about $140M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands. This year's proportion is 132%; across the record (2018–2025) it is 186%, the capital-allocation section below.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.04×
    Harvesting
    Capex $4M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $85M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Heavy selling cost
    Selling and marketing $332M ÷ revenue $797M
    What this means

    Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 9.6%
    The count is genuinely shrinking
    Stock compensation $77M (fiscal 2025), 9.6% of revenue · repurchases $216M · diluted shares -13.5% since 2022
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $797M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.61×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $488M vs $397M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (8-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 8 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.04/share (latest year $0.09), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.81/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 8
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 6% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 6% early, 5% lately, median 2%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 15%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +16%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 16% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −50.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.6B
  • Cash & short-term investments$296M
  • Receivables$182M
  • Other current assets$1.1B
Current liabilities$1.2B
  • Debt due within a year$5M
  • Accounts payable$9M
  • Other current liabilities$1.1B
Current ratio1.38×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.38×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.26×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$441Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$5M due · $296M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Jun 30, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−1.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters5.5× → 1.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$159Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($96M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$539M$52M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$9Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2018–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$37M · 3%
  • Dividends$1.3B · 125%
  • Buybacks$581M · 54%
  • Returned to owners$1.9B

    186% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.3B as dividends and $581M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$889M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $889M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $581M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count191.2%

    The diluted count rose from 118M to 345M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$11.38/sh

    Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$494M35% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity70%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$428Mover 7 years since fiscal 2019 buying other businesses, against $37M of capital spent building over the 8-year record

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Beside that spending sits $154M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2018 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership18.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$77M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 9.6% of revenue, equal to 87.6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, IT Services & Consulting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics and what the growth costs. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the recordSales & marketinglatest FYStock paylatest FY
ATHMAutohome Inc.$956M79%22.1%14%34%
EVTCEvertec Inc.$932M26.5%15%33%3.2%
NRDSNerdWallet Inc.$837M92%0.8%1%10%69.9%3.4%
RAMPLiveRamp Holdings Inc.$813M69%-24.1%-13%1%25.3%10.2%
GDRXGoodRx Holdings Inc.$797M5.1%2%20%41.6%9.6%
UPWKUpwork Inc.$788M73%-5.3%-7%3%18.2%8.3%
LZLegalZoom.com Inc.$756M66%3.3%15%34.6%15.0%
CARSCars.com Inc. Common Stock$723M90%3y8.1%5%21%33.1%4.3%
Group median4.2%2%18%33.9%8.3%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what GoodRx Holdings Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, GoodRx Holdings Inc. earns about $162M on its 20.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 20.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+2%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+16%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $197M on 340M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $190M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($4M) runs well above depreciation ($89M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $198M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "GoodRx Holdings Inc. (GDRX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GDRX, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← GDOT its page in the Manual GDYN →

Industry order: ← GDEV the IT Services & Consulting chapter GDYN →