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HTZ, Hertz Global Holdings Inc
We are one of the largest worldwide vehicle rental companies and our Hertz brand name is among the most recognized globally.
We are engaged principally in the business of renting vehicles primarily through our Hertz, Dollar and Thrifty brands.
We have an extensive network of airport and off airport rental locations in the U.S. and major European markets.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~38 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 28% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −4.1%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −2%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 25% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →24% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- United States76%$6.4B
- International24%$2.1B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $8.8B | $8.8B | $9.5B | $9.8B | $5.3B | $7.3B | $8.7B | $9.4B | $9.0B | $8.5B | $8.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| 10% | 10% | 11% | 10% | 12% | 9% | 11% | 10% | 9% | 11% | 11% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($487M) | ($575M) | ($255M) | $5M | ($2.1B) | $683M | $2.4B | $286M | ($3.2B) | ($830M) | ($222M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −5.5% | −6.5% | −2.7% | 0.1% | −39.0% | 9.3% | 28.2% | 3.1% | −35.8% | −9.8% | −2.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($470M) | ($575M) | ($257M) | $13M | ($2.1B) | $683M | $2.4B | $286M | ($3.2B) | ($830M) | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| ($491M) | $327M | ($225M) | ($58M) | ($1.7B) | $366M | $2.1B | $616M | ($2.9B) | ($747M) | ($279M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $2.5B | $2.4B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $953M | $1.8B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.2B | $1.6B | $1.4B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $265M | $240M | $218M | $203M | $225M | $196M | $142M | $149M | $139M | $117M | $110M | Depreciation & amortizationD&A |
| $2.7B | $1.8B | $2.5B | $2.7B | $2.4B | $1.2B | $337M | $1.7B | $4.9B | $2.3B | $1.6B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $134M | $173M | $177M | $224M | $98M | $71M | $150M | $188M | $105M | $97M | $110M | CapexCapex |
| 1.5% | 2.0% | 1.9% | 2.3% | 1.9% | 1.0% | 1.7% | 2.0% | 1.2% | 1.1% | 1.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $2.4B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.7B | $855M | $1.7B | $2.4B | $2.3B | $2.1B | $1.5B | $1.3B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 27.2% | 25.2% | 25.0% | 27.4% | 16.3% | 23.7% | 27.5% | 24.8% | 23.4% | 18.0% | 14.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $2.4B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.7B | $855M | $1.7B | $2.4B | $2.3B | $2.1B | $1.5B | $1.3B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 27.2% | 25.2% | 25.0% | 27.4% | 16.3% | 23.7% | 27.5% | 24.4% | 23.4% | 18.0% | 14.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $2M | $15M | $2M | $1M | — | — | — | — | — | — | $1M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $100M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $654M | $2.5B | $315M | $0 | $0 | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| ($2.0B) | ($3.0B) | ($4.2B) | ($4.4B) | $4.6B | ($3.5B) | ($4.2B) | ($4.0B) | ($2.9B) | ($2.0B) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| ($183M) | $988M | $1.6B | $1.5B | ($5.4B) | $2.8B | $487M | $1.3B | $658M | $372M | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| ($11M) | $28M | ($14M) | $1M | $46M | ($34M) | ($25M) | $25M | ($26M) | $32M | — | Exchange-rate effectFX |
| — | $410M | ($94M) | ($50M) | $218M | $1.1B | ($1.2B) | ($212M) | ($73M) | $34M | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| -3% | -3% | -1% | 0% | -31% | 3% | 13% | 2% | -16% | -4% | -1% | ROICROIC |
| -46% | 22% | -21% | -3% | -3061% | 12% | 78% | 20% | -1871% | — | — | Return on equityROE |
| −46% | 22% | −21% | −3% | n/m | 12% | 78% | 20% | n/m | — | — | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $816M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $865M | $1.1B | $2.3B | $943M | $764M | $592M | $565M | $631M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $777M | $758M | $974M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.2B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $777M | $758M | $974M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.2B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $858M | $840M | $778M | $757M | $666M | $608M | $637M | $671M | $623M | — | — | Net PP&ENet PP&E |
| $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.0B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $19.2B | $20.1B | $21.4B | $24.6B | $16.9B | $19.8B | $22.5B | $24.6B | $21.8B | $22.3B | $23.9B | Total assetsAssets |
| $13.5B | $14.9B | $16.3B | $17.1B | $6.3B | $10.9B | $13.9B | $15.7B | $16.3B | $17.1B | $19.1B | Total debtDebt |
| $12.7B | $13.8B | $15.2B | $16.2B | $5.2B | $8.6B | $12.9B | $14.9B | $15.7B | $16.5B | $18.4B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | — | — | -29.3× | — | — | — | -3.4× | -0.8× | -0.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $18.1B | $18.5B | $20.3B | $22.7B | $16.8B | $16.8B | $19.9B | $21.5B | $21.6B | $22.8B | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| — | — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | — | Redeemable interestsRedeemable |
| — | $0 | $59M | $119M | $37M | — | — | — | — | — | — | Noncontrolling interestsNCI |
| $1.1B | $1.5B | $1.1B | $1.8B | $56M | $3.0B | $2.6B | $3.1B | $153M | ($459M) | ($628M) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | −0.0% | 0.1% | — | — | — | — | 0.1% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| $172M | $86M | — | — | $213M | — | — | — | — | — | $213M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 168M | 190M | 192M | 234M | 300M | 315M | 403M | 326M | 306M | 322M | 418M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $52.40 | $46.33 | $49.50 | $41.79 | $17.53 | $23.29 | $21.55 | $28.75 | $29.57 | $26.41 | $21.31 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-2.92 | $1.72 | $-1.17 | $-0.25 | $-5.71 | $1.16 | $5.11 | $1.89 | $-9.35 | $-2.32 | $-0.67 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $14.26 | $11.69 | $12.39 | $11.44 | $2.85 | $5.51 | $5.93 | $7.13 | $6.92 | $4.75 | $3.16 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $14.26 | $11.69 | $12.39 | $11.44 | $2.85 | $5.51 | $5.93 | $7.01 | $6.92 | $4.75 | $3.16 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.80 | $0.91 | $0.92 | $0.96 | $0.33 | $0.23 | $0.37 | $0.58 | $0.34 | $0.30 | $0.26 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $6.40 | $8.00 | $5.53 | $7.56 | $0.19 | $9.45 | $6.56 | $9.48 | $0.50 | $-1.43 | $-1.50 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2021 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −7.3%/yr | +8.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −11.5%/yr | +10.7%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −10.3%/yr | −1.6%/yr |
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $747M loss into $1.5B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($747M) | ($2.9B) | $616M | $2.1B | $366M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$117M | +$139M | +$149M | +$142M | +$196M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | — | — | — | — | +$10M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$2.3B | +$4.9B | +$1.7B | +$337M | +$1.2B |
| Cash from operations | $1.6B | $2.2B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $1.8B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$97M | −$105M | −$149M | −$150M | −$71M |
| Owner earnings | $1.5B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $1.7B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | −$39M | — | — |
| Free cash flow | $1.5B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $1.7B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 18% | 23% | 25% | 27% | 24% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -0.8×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($830M) ÷ interest expense $1.1B
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $565M − debt $17.1B
What this means
Netting $565M of cash and short-term investments against $17.1B of debt leaves $16.5B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -31%–13%; -4% latest = NOPAT ($656M) ÷ invested capital $16.0BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 16%–27%; latest $1.5B = operating cash $1.6B − maintenance capex $97MIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 18% of revenue this year, a 25% median across 10 years.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($747M) · cash from operations $1.6B
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $1.5B — this fiscal year
What this means
Of $1.5B Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does. This year's proportion is 0%; across the record (2016–2025) it is 17%, the capital-allocation section below.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.83×MaintainingCapex $97M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $117M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 2 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $8.5B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record —Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.80/share (latest year $-2.10), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-1.29/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −5% → −14% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −5% early to −14% lately, median −6% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −3%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 3% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −39.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $19.3B, of which the leases are 12%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $22.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$1.4B · 6%
- Buybacks$3.5B · 16%
- Retained (debt / cash)$17.1B · 78%
- Returned to owners$3.5B
17% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $3.5B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $5.5B and cash and short-term investments fell $185M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $3.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count148.8%
The diluted count rose from 168M to 418M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$471M written down across 3 years (2016, 2017, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Beside that spending sits $927M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2014 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time. The cash figure above counts only cash consideration: goodwill of $1.0B against it says much of the buying was paid for in stock, which never passes through the cash-flow statement.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. West | $14.2M | $13.6M | $1.7B |
| 2021 | Mr. West | $12.7M | $11.9M | $1.7B |
| 2022 | Mr. West | $182.1M | $132.1M | $2.4B |
| 2022 | Mr. West | $887k | −$809k | $2.4B |
| 2023 | Mr. West | $2.9M | −$41.8M | $2.3B |
| 2024 | Mr. West | $35.2M | $14.4M | $2.1B |
| 2024 | Mr. West | $547k | −$45.6M | $2.1B |
| 2025 | Mr. West | $4.5M | $14.2M | $1.5B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio122:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Auto Dealers & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RRyder System | $12.7B | 61%2y | 8.0% | 6% | -3% |
| CARAvis Budget Group Inc. | $11.7B | — | 3.0% | 5% | — |
| AAPAdvance Auto Parts | $8.6B | 44% | 6.2% | 12% | 4% |
| HTZHertz Global Holdings Inc | $8.5B | — | -4.1% | -2% | 25% |
| CSANCosan S.A. ADS | $8.5B | 28% | 19.0% | 10% | 18% |
| RUSHARush Enterprises Inc. Common Stock Cl A | $7.4B | 19% | 4.5% | 12% | 5% |
| UHALU-Haul Holding | $6.0B | 96% | 19.3% | 8% | 11% |
| BGSIBoyd Group Services Inc. | $3.1B | 46%2y | 3.2%2y | 7%2y | 9%2y |
| Group median | — | — | 5.4% | 7% | 9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Hertz Global Holdings Inc has delivered.
Through the cycle, Hertz Global Holdings Inc earns about $2.1B on its 24.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $1.3B on 356M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-07-30; net debt $18.4B. The if-converted diluted count is 418M, 17% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($110M) runs well above depreciation ($110M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.3B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← HTO its page in the Manual HTZWW →
Industry order: ← GPI the Auto Dealers & Services chapter HTZWW →