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JBLU, JetBlue Airways Corporation

Airlines capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

JetBlue is the carrier of choice for the majority of travelers who have been underserved by other airlines.

Looking to the future, we plan to continue to grow in our high-value geographies, invest in industry-leading products, and provide award-winning service by our 23,000 dedicated employees, whom we refer to as crewmembers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

JBLU · JetBlue Airways Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$9.1B

−2.3% YoY · 25% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $9.5B 5-yr avg $8.6B

Operating margin −5.9% 5-yr avg −3.7%

ROIC −5% 5-yr avg −3%

Owner-earnings margin −9% 5-yr avg −0%

Free cash flow margin −11% 5-yr avg −5%

Next report Est. 10/26–10/30 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~29 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 19% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −1.9%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Capital spending runs about 12% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on load factor against unit cost, and fuel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −2%, above 15% in 2 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

40% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

Domestic & Canada60%$5.5B
Caribbean and Latin America35%$3.1B
Atlantic5%$471M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMJun 2026
											Income statement
$6.6B	$7.0B	$7.7B	$8.1B	$3.0B	$6.0B	$9.2B	$9.6B	$9.3B	$9.1B	$9.5B	RevenueRevenue
$1.3B	$973M	$266M	$800M	($1.7B)	($80M)	($298M)	($230M)	($684M)	($368M)	($565M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
19.1%	13.9%	3.5%	9.9%	−58.0%	−1.3%	−3.3%	−2.4%	−7.4%	−4.1%	−5.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$1.2B	$918M	$219M	$768M	($1.9B)	($263M)	($437M)	($334M)	($897M)	($774M)	—	Pretax incomePretax
$727M	$1.1B	$189M	$569M	($1.4B)	($182M)	($362M)	($310M)	($795M)	($602M)	($886M)	Net incomeNet inc.
38%	—	14%	26%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$1.6B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.4B	($683M)	$1.6B	$379M	$400M	$144M	($94M)	($128M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$393M	$424M	$469M	$525M	$535M	$540M	$585M	$621M	$655M	$688M	$711M	Depreciation & amortizationD&A
$489M	($214M)	$514M	$324M	$108M	$1.3B	$126M	$50M	$245M	($220M)	$9M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$850M	$1.1B	$908M	$932M	$715M	$907M	$767M	$1.1B	$1.5B	$1.1B	$953M	CapexCapex
12.9%	15.3%	11.9%	11.5%	24.2%	15.0%	8.4%	11.7%	15.9%	11.9%	10.0%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$1.2B	$955M	$731M	$924M	($1.2B)	$1.1B	($206M)	($221M)	($511M)	($782M)	($839M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
18.8%	13.6%	9.5%	11.4%	−41.2%	18.3%	−2.2%	−2.3%	−5.5%	−8.6%	−8.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$782M	$305M	$292M	$517M	($1.4B)	$735M	($388M)	($728M)	($1.3B)	($1.2B)	($1.1B)	Free cash flowFCF
11.9%	4.3%	3.8%	6.4%	−47.3%	12.2%	−4.2%	−7.6%	−14.4%	−12.9%	−11.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$297M	$131M	$22M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$120M	$380M	$375M	$535M	$160M	—	—	—	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
($1.0B)	($979M)	($1.2B)	($1.1B)	($1.3B)	($704M)	($908M)	($1.4B)	($3.1B)	$658M	—	Investing cash flowInv. cash
($472M)	($536M)	$131M	$165M	$3.0B	($830M)	($360M)	$1.1B	$3.8B	($417M)	—	Financing cash flowFin. cash
$115M	($130M)	$174M	$485M	$951M	$108M	($889M)	$129M	$831M	$147M	—	Change in cashΔ cash
16%	17%	4%	10%	-20%	-1%	-4%	-3%	-6%	-3%	-5%	ROICROIC
18%	24%	4%	12%	-34%	-5%	-10%	-9%	-30%	-28%	-56%	Return on equityROE
18%	24%	4%	12%	−34%	−5%	−10%	−9%	−30%	−28%	−56%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$1.1B	$695M	$890M	$1.3B	$3.1B	$2.9B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$3.9B	$2.5B	$2.2B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$172M	$245M	$211M	$231M	$98M	$207M	$317M	$336M	$348M	$372M	$434M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$47M	$55M	$78M	$81M	$71M	$74M	$87M	$109M	$158M	$193M	$304M	InventoryInvent.
$242M	$378M	$437M	$401M	$365M	$499M	$532M	$641M	$619M	$655M	$674M	Accounts payablePayables
($23M)	($78M)	($148M)	($89M)	($196M)	($218M)	($128M)	($196M)	($113M)	($90M)	$64M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.8B	$3.3B	$3.2B	$1.9B	$2.2B	$4.3B	$3.2B	$3.2B	Current assetsCur. assets
$2.2B	$2.1B	$2.5B	$2.7B	$2.7B	$3.4B	$3.7B	$3.6B	$3.9B	$4.4B	$4.5B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.6×	0.6×	0.5×	0.7×	1.3×	0.9×	0.5×	0.6×	1.1×	0.7×	0.7×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$7.3B	$8.0B	$8.0B	$8.6B	$8.4B	$8.8B	$9.1B	$9.7B	$10.7B	$11.2B	—	Net PP&ENet PP&E
$9.3B	$9.8B	$11.0B	$11.9B	$13.4B	$13.6B	$13.0B	$13.9B	$16.8B	$16.6B	$16.4B	Total assetsAssets
$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.7B	$2.4B	$4.9B	$4.0B	$3.7B	$4.7B	$8.6B	$8.6B	$8.5B	Total debtDebt
$334M	$512M	$790M	$1.0B	$1.9B	$1.2B	$2.1B	$3.0B	$4.7B	$6.1B	$6.4B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	—	—	—	—	—	-1.8×	-1.1×	-1.9×	-0.6×	-1.0×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$4.0B	$4.7B	$4.7B	$4.8B	$4.0B	$3.8B	$3.6B	$3.3B	$2.6B	$2.1B	$1.6B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.9%	0.5%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
342M	330M	315M	298M	278M	318M	324M	333M	346M	362M	374M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$19.24	$21.22	$24.35	$27.12	$10.66	$18.98	$28.30	$28.88	$26.82	$25.03	$25.44	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.12	$3.45	$0.60	$1.91	$-4.88	$-0.57	$-1.12	$-0.93	$-2.30	$-1.66	$-2.37	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.62	$2.89	$2.32	$3.10	$-4.39	$3.47	$-0.64	$-0.66	$-1.48	$-2.16	$-2.25	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.29	$0.92	$0.93	$1.73	$-5.04	$2.31	$-1.20	$-2.19	$-3.86	$-3.24	$-2.89	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.48	$3.25	$2.89	$3.12	$2.58	$2.85	$2.37	$3.39	$4.27	$2.98	$2.55	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$11.73	$14.32	$14.90	$16.08	$14.24	$12.10	$11.01	$10.02	$7.63	$5.85	$4.25	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.0%/yr	+18.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	+2.0%/yr	+2.9%/yr
Book value / share	−7.4%/yr	−16.3%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2024

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($782M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $688M it takes just to hold its position. It put $390M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($1.2B).

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($602M)	($795M)	($310M)	($362M)	($182M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$688M	+$655M	+$621M	+$585M	+$540M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$40M	+$39M	+$39M	+$30M	+$28M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$220M	+$245M	+$50M	+$126M	+$1.3B
Cash from operations	($94M)	$144M	$400M	$379M	$1.6B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$688M	−$655M	−$621M	−$585M	−$540M
Owner earnings	($782M)	($511M)	($221M)	($206M)	$1.1B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$390M	−$823M	−$507M	−$182M	−$367M
Free cash flow	($1.2B)	($1.3B)	($728M)	($388M)	$735M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-9%	-6%	-2%	-2%	18%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $688M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $390M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $40M), owner earnings is nearer ($822M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -0.6×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($368M) ÷ interest expense $588M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $6.4B

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $1.9B + ST investments $213M − debt $8.6B

What this means
Netting $2.2B of cash and short-term investments against $8.6B of debt leaves $6.4B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. It also holds $318M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $6.1B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -2%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -20%–17%; -3% latest = NOPAT ($291M) ÷ invested capital $8.7B

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 4%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -41%–19%; latest ($782M) = operating cash ($94M) − maintenance capex $688M

Industry peers: median 13%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -9% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. It chose to put $390M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($1.2B) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $40M of SBC) leaves ($822M).
Are earnings backed by cash? ($94M)

Loss, and burning cash

Net income ($602M) · cash from operations ($94M)

In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 1.57×

Expanding

Capex $1.1B ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $688M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

What does winning a customer cost? 3%

Sells itself

Selling and marketing $305M ÷ revenue $9.1B

What this means
Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.
Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 0.4%

The count is rising

Stock compensation $40M (fiscal 2025), 0.4% of revenue · no repurchases · diluted shares +11.9% since 2022

What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $9.1B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.74×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $8.6B vs ($1.2B) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record —

Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −183%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.51/share (latest year $-1.60), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.62/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 4 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 12% → −5% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 12% early to −5% lately, median −2% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −35%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2020 · −58.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +0.6%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.2B

Cash & short-term investments$2.0B
Receivables$434M
Inventory$304M
Other current assets$399M

Current liabilities$4.5B

Accounts payable$674M
Other current liabilities$3.9B

Current ratio0.70×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.63×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.45×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($1.4B)the cushion left after near-term bills

Cash runway1.9 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+14.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 0.7×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$9.4B$908M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $9.9B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$2.7Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$244M

'27$188M

'28$170M

'29$149M

'30$144M

later$1.2B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$244Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$2.1Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$1.4Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$8.6B

Lease obligations (present value)$1.4B

Total fixed claims on the business$9.9B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $9.9B, of which the leases are 14%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $7.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$9.8B · 132%
Buybacks$1.6B · 21%

Returned to owners$1.6B
78% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.6B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$4.0B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $4.0B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $1.4B to $8.5B.
Average price paid for buybacks$18.54
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 85M shares were bought for $1.6B, about $18.54 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $12.31 (2020) to $20.69 (2016); its heaviest year, 2019, paid $19.04 ($535M).
Net change in share count9.2%
The diluted count rose from 342M to 374M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$3.4M	$3.4M	$1.1B
2022	$3.5M	$1.9M	($206M)
2023	$10.8M	$9.1M	($221M)
2024	$6.8M	$8.1M	($511M)
2024	$2.4M	$1.5M	($511M)
2025	$5.2M	$971k	($782M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership2.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$40M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 0.4% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Airlines

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

Company	Revenuelatest FY, USD	Gross marginmedian over the record	Op. marginmedian over the record	ROICmedian over the record	Owner earn. marginmedian over the record
LUVSouthwest Airlines Co.	$28.1B	—	7.6%	11%	11%
RYAAYRyanair Holdings plc	$16.2B	—	13.3%	21%	16%
LTMLATAM Airlines Group S.A.	$14.3B	22%	9.1%	4%	13%
ALKAlaska Air	$14.2B	—	6.3%	7%	10%
JBLUJetBlue Airways Corporation	$9.1B	—	-1.9%	-2%	4%
SKYWSkyWest Inc.	$4.1B	15%	11.1%	6%	22%
ULCCFrontier Group Holdings Inc.	$3.7B	—	-1.4%	-24%	-4%
CPACopa Holdings S.A.	$3.6B	—	14.0%	15%	21%
Group median	—	—	8.3%	6%	12%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what JetBlue Airways Corporation has delivered.

JetBlue Airways Corporation’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, below the record’s own through-cycle owner earnings. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, JetBlue Airways Corporation earns about $331M on its 3.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −8.6% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($331M) Net of stock comp (−$38M TTM) Steady-state · maintenance capex (($816M))

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($1.1B) on 377M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-30; net debt $6.5B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($953M) runs well above depreciation ($711M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($816M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh JBLU against another business →

The owners of JBLU: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "JetBlue Airways Corporation (JBLU), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/JBLU, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← JBL its page in the Manual JBSS →

Industry order: ← DAL the Airlines chapter LTM →