Owner Scorecard


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LINC, Lincoln Educational Services Corporation

Education Services capital-intensive Capital build-outCyclical

A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.

Lincoln Educational Services Corporation offers programs in skilled trades, automotive, health sciences and information technology.

The schools operate under the brands Lincoln Technical Institute, Lincoln College of Technology and Nashville Auto Diesel College.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
LINC · Lincoln Educational Services Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$518M
+17.8% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $571M 5-yr avg $404M
Gross margin 60% 5-yr avg 58%
Operating margin 5.9% 5-yr avg 7.5%
ROIC 14% 5-yr avg 28%
Owner-earnings margin 12% 5-yr avg 4%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg −2%

Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~42 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 17% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 57% and operating margin about 4.1% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −10% and 15% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −11 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$286M$262M$263M$273M$293M$335M$348M$378M$440M$518M$571MRevenueRevenue
$141M$132M$138M$150M$171M$196M$200M$216M$258M$313M$342MGross profitGross prof.
49%51%52%55%58%59%57%57%59%60%60%Gross marginGross mgn
52%53%54%53%53%50%52%55%55%55%54%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($29M)($5M)($4M)$5M$15M$49M$16M$33M$15M$30M$34MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−10.1%−1.8%−1.5%1.9%5.0%14.7%4.7%8.8%3.4%5.8%5.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
($28M)($12M)($6M)$2M$14M$47M$16M$36M$15M$26MPretax incomePretax
($28M)($11M)($11M)$2M$49M$35M$13M$26M$10M$20M$23MNet incomeNet inc.
12%27%23%27%33%23%22%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($6M)($11M)($2M)$988K$23M$27M$882K$26M$29M$59M$94MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$11M$9M$8M$8M$7M$7M$6M$7M$11M$19M$26MDepreciation & amortizationD&A
$10M($10M)$847K($10M)($34M)($17M)($21M)($13M)$3M$15M$39MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$4M$5M$5M$5M$6M$8M$9M$41M$57M$87M$69MCapexCapex
1.3%1.8%1.8%2.0%1.9%2.2%2.6%10.8%12.9%16.7%12.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($10M)($16M)($6M)($4M)$18M$20M($5M)$19M$18M$40M$68MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−3.4%−6.1%−2.4%−1.6%6.1%5.9%−1.6%5.0%4.1%7.7%11.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($10M)($16M)($6M)($4M)$18M$20M($8M)($15M)($28M)($27M)$25MFree cash flowFCF
−3.4%−6.1%−2.4%−1.6%6.1%5.9%−2.3%−4.0%−6.3%−5.3%4.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$9M$891K$0BuybacksBuybacks
($3M)$11M($2M)($5M)($5M)$38M($21M)$7M($47M)($86M)Investing cash flowInv. cash
($4M)$7M($5M)($3M)($19M)($20M)($13M)($3M)($3M)($4M)Financing cash flowFin. cash
($9M)($7M)($618K)$45M($33M)$30M($21M)($31M)Change in cashΔ cash
-30%-4%-4%9%21%79%13%27%9%14%14%ROICROIC
-52%-25%-29%5%53%27%9%16%6%10%11%Return on equityROE
−52%−25%−29%5%53%27%9%16%6%10%11%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$21M$15M$18M$24M$38M$83M$61M$76M$59M$29M$44MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$15M$16M$19M$21M$30M$26M$37M$36M$43M$37M$46MReceivablesReceiv.
$2M$2M$1M$2M$2M$3M$3M$3M$3M$4M$4MInventoryInvent.
$14M$11M$14M$15M$16M$12M$10M$18M$37M$27M$31MAccounts payablePayables
$3M$7M$6M$8M$17M$17M$29M$20M$9M$14M$19MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$65M$45M$57M$50M$74M$122M$114M$135M$111M$87M$106MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$66M$47M$65M$57M$67M$66M$55M$73M$90M$101M$111MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×0.9×0.9×0.9×1.1×1.8×2.1×1.8×1.2×0.9×1.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$55M$53M$49M$49M$48M$23M$24M$51M$104M$172MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$15M$15M$15M$15M$15M$15M$15M$11M$11M$11M$11MGoodwillGoodwill
$163M$155M$146M$195M$245M$295M$292M$345M$437M$493M$530MTotal assetsAssets
$42M$53M$49M$34M$17M$0$26MTotal debtDebt
$21M$38M$31M$10M($21M)($83M)($18M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-4.7×-0.7×-1.6×1.8×11.6×24.4×101.7×96.1×5.9×8.9×8.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$108M$109M$106M$147M$178M$258M$293MTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$55M$46M$40M$43M$91M$129M$145M$167M$178M$200M$202MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%0.5%0.2%0.2%0.6%0.9%0.9%1.6%1.1%1.1%1.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
23.5M23.9M23.9M24.6M24.7M25.1M25.9M30.5M30.9M31.3M31.4MShares out (diluted)Shares
$12.18$10.95$11.01$11.13$11.84$13.37$13.46$12.38$14.25$16.58$18.19Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.21$-0.48$-0.48$0.08$1.96$1.38$0.49$0.85$0.32$0.64$0.73EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.41$-0.67$-0.27$-0.18$0.72$0.79$-0.21$0.62$0.58$1.28$2.16Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.41$-0.67$-0.27$-0.18$0.72$0.79$-0.31$-0.50$-0.89$-0.87$0.78Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.15$0.20$0.20$0.22$0.23$0.30$0.35$1.33$1.84$2.77$2.21Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.34$1.92$1.67$1.76$3.68$5.16$5.60$5.46$5.77$6.39$6.45Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.5%/yr+7.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+12.2%/yr
EPS−20.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+37.9%/yr+65.2%/yr
Book value / share+11.8%/yr+11.7%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue+17.8%
    “Revenue growth was primarily due to a 17.9% increase in average student population. ● Educational services and facilities expense increased $28.0 million, or 15.8% to $205.4 million for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2025 from $177.4 million in the prior year.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2019FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $40M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $19M it takes just to hold its position. It put $67M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($27M).

Reported net income$20M
Owner earnings$40M · 8% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$20M$10M$26M$13M$35M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$19M+$11M+$7M+$6M+$7M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$5M+$5M+$6M+$3M+$3M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$15M+$3M−$13M−$21M−$17M
Cash from operations$59M$29M$26M$882K$27M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$19M−$11M−$7M−$6M−$8M
Owner earnings$40M$18M$19M($5M)$20M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$67M−$46M−$34M−$3M
Free cash flow($27M)($28M)($15M)($8M)$20M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue8%4%5%-2%6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $19M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $67M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $5M), owner earnings is nearer $35M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $30M ÷ interest expense $3M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash $29M − debt $0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $29M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 26 + DIO 7 − DPO 48 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -30%–79%; 14% latest = NOPAT $23M ÷ invested capital $171M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 14% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid, recently turned positive
    latest $40M = operating cash $59M − maintenance capex $19M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 1%)
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. It chose to put $67M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($27M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $5M of SBC) leaves $35M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $59M ÷ net income $20M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 4.52×
    Expanding
    Capex $87M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $19M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Modest selling cost
    Selling and marketing $85M ÷ revenue $518M
    What this means

    Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 1.1%
    The count is rising
    Stock compensation $5M (fiscal 2025), 1.1% of revenue · no repurchases · diluted shares +20.8% since 2022
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $518M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.86×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $0 vs ($14M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.59/share (latest year $0.63), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.30/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 6 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −4% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −4% early to 6% lately, median 3% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2016 · −10.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +3.2%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$106M
  • Cash & short-term investments$44M
  • Receivables$46M
  • Inventory$4M
  • Other current assets$12M
Current liabilities$111M
  • Accounts payable$31M
  • Other current liabilities$80M
Current ratio0.96×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.92×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.40×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($5M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+22.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.6× → 1.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$192Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($221M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$197M$171M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$52Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $148M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$225M · 152%
  • Buybacks$10M · 7%
  • Returned to owners$10M

    14% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $10M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$87M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $87M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$5.95

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $10M, about $5.95 each.

  • Net change in share count33.8%

    The diluted count rose from 23M to 31M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid no dividend over the span; it returns cash through buybacks or retains it.

  • Return on what it retained39%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($92M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $36M, so each retained $1 added about 0.39 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$11M2% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity5%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$29Mover 6 years since fiscal 2009 buying other businesses, against $225M of capital spent building over the 10-year record

$13M written down across 2 years (2016, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Beside that spending sits $5M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2010 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Shaw$1.7M$2.0M$20M
2022Mr. Shaw$1.7M$842k($5M)
2023Mr. Shaw$2.5M$4.0M$19M
2024Mr. Shaw$2.6M$4.4M$18M
2025Mr. Shaw$4.0M$6.4M$40M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership12.8%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio61:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$5M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 1.1% of revenue, equal to 18.1% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers, Education Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
LOPEGrand Canyon Education Inc.$1.1B28.1%27%24%
GOTUGaotu Techedu Inc.$911M72%-8.2%-26%5%
DAOYoudao Inc.$876M44%-23.5%-13%
PRDOPerdoceo Education Corporation$846M19.7%16%17%
UTIUniversal Technical Institute Inc$836M1.5%2%4%
APEIAmerican Public Education Inc.$649M60%7.3%13%9%
LINCLincoln Educational Services Corporation$518M57%4.1%11%1%
YOULYoulife Group Inc.$275M14%0.4%1%1y0%
Group median57%2.8%11%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Lincoln Educational Services Corporation has delivered.

Lincoln Educational Services Corporation’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Lincoln Educational Services Corporation earns about $7M on its 1.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+42%/yr
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $25M on 32M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-08-10; net cash $18M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($69M) runs well above depreciation ($26M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $75M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Lincoln Educational Services Corporation (LINC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LINC, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← LIN its page in the Manual LIND →

Industry order: ← LFS the Education Services chapter LOPE →