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LOAR, Loar Holdings Inc.
Loar is centered around a commitment to a consistent and focused business model—creating a portfolio of proprietary products serving a highly diverse set of applications, end markets and customers within the aerospace and defense value chain.
We specialize in the design, manufacture, and sale of niche aerospace and defense components that are essential for today's aircraft and aerospace and defense systems.
Furthermore, our products have significant aftermarket exposure, which has historically generated predictable and recurring revenue.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~43 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Commercial Aerospace (45%) and Business Jet and General Aviation (25%), with 2 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 49% and operating margin about 22% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. That margin has held in a narrow 21%–22% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. Inventory runs near 23% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the backlog and program execution. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 3 years). This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Commercial Aerospace at 45%.
- Commercial Aerospace45%$222M
- Business Jet and General Aviation25%$124M
- Defense25%$123M
- Other6%$28M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2023–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||
| $317M | $403M | $496M | $586M | RevenueRevenue |
| $154M | $199M | $261M | $306M | Gross profitGross prof. |
| 49% | 49% | 53% | 52% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 26% | 28% | 29% | 28% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 2% | 2% | 3% | 2% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $69M | $88M | $106M | $128M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 21.9% | 21.8% | 21.4% | 21.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $2M | $29M | $81M | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| ($5M) | $22M | $72M | $68M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 24% | 10% | 11% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||
| $13M | $55M | $112M | $121M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $10M | $11M | $12M | $13M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $7M | $10M | $13M | $24M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $60M | $383M | $508M | $508M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| ($73M) | ($392M) | ($521M) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $46M | $370M | $439M | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| $19K | ($285K) | $131K | — | Exchange-rate effectFX |
| ($14M) | $33M | $31M | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| 4% | 5% | 5% | 6% | ROICROIC |
| -1% | 2% | 6% | 6% | Return on equityROE |
| −1% | 2% | 6% | 6% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||
| $21M | $54M | $85M | $122M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $59M | $64M | $88M | $107M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $78M | $93M | $109M | $128M | InventoryInvent. |
| $13M | $12M | $19M | $29M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $124M | $144M | $178M | $205M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $171M | $221M | $298M | $375M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $51M | $42M | $64M | $76M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 3.3× | 5.3× | 4.7× | 4.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $72M | $77M | $83M | — | Net PP&ENet PP&E |
| $471M | $694M | $1.0B | $1.1B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $1.1B | $1.5B | $2.0B | $2.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| $535M | $277M | $716M | $949M | Total debtDebt |
| $514M | $223M | $631M | $827M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 1.0× | 1.7× | 4.1× | 2.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $632M | $362M | $855M | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| $418M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.1% | 2.8% | 3.0% | 2.9% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||
| 204K | 91.7M | 95.9M | 96K | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1556.26 | $4.39 | $5.18 | $6132.36 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-22.62 | $0.24 | $0.75 | $711.42 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $2049.71 | $11.87 | $12.25 | $12547.80 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×449.43 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1/1003.21 into TTM — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $106M ÷ interest expense $26M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $631M · 5.9× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $85M − debt $716M
What this means
Netting $85M of cash and short-term investments against $716M of debt leaves $631M owed, about 5.9× a year's operating profit (6.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 65 + DIO 169 − DPO 29 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle3-yr median, range 4%–5%; 5% latest = NOPAT $95M ÷ invested capital $1.8BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median -2%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $112M ÷ net income $72M
In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
The promise and the pay packet
- Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 3.0%Stock pay, share count unreadStock compensation $15M (fiscal 2025), 3.0% of revenue · no repurchases · the share count is not comparable across these years (a split or a first listing sits in the record), so the drift is withheld
What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $496M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 4.70×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $716M vs $235M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.32/share (latest year $0.77), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $12.54/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$122M
- Receivables$107M
- Inventory$128M
- Other current assets$18M
- Debt due within a year$7M
- Accounts payable$29M
- Other current liabilities$40M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 3-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Beside that spending sits $98M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2023 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 3-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$15M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 3.0% of revenue, equal to 14.1% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, Aerospace & Defense
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ATROAstronics Corporation | $862M | 22% | 1.8% | 2% | 4% |
| DCODucommun Incorporated | $825M | 21% | 5.3% | 5% | 2% |
| MBUUMalibu Boats Inc. | $808M | 25% | 14.0% | 23% | 11% |
| RKLBRocket Lab Corporation | $602M | 15% | -68.4% | -28% | -59% |
| LOARLoar Holdings Inc. | $496M | 49% | 21.8% | 5% | — |
| KRMNKarman Holdings Inc. | $472M | 38% | 16.4% | 10% | -4% |
| RDWRedwire Corporation | $335M | 18% | -51.0% | -59% | -22% |
| TATTTAT Technologies Ltd. | $178M | 19% | 3.5% | 0% | -2% |
| Group median | — | 22% | 4.4% | 3% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFLoar Holdings Inc. is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← LNTH its page in the Manual LOB →
Industry order: ← LMT the Aerospace & Defense chapter LUNR →