LVS, Las Vegas Sands Corp.

Will it survive?

• Can it pay its interest? 3.8×
  Adequate
  Operating income $2.8B ÷ interest expense $746M
  What this means

  Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

• How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $11.9B · 4.2× operating profit
  Heavy net debt
  Cash $3.8B − debt $15.8B
  What this means

  Netting $3.8B of cash and short-term investments against $15.8B of debt leaves $11.9B owed, about 4.2× a year's operating profit (5.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

• How long is cash tied up? —
  Not enough data
  What this means

  The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

• Return on invested capital 16%
  High through the cycle
  10-yr median, range -7%–25%; 17% latest = NOPAT $2.3B ÷ invested capital $13.5B
  Industry peers: median 12%
  What this means

  The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 17% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

• Owner-earnings margin 16%
  High through the cycle
  10-yr median margin, range -86%–29%; latest $1.9B = operating cash $3.0B − maintenance capex $1.2B
  Industry peers: median 8%
  What this means

  What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 16% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $54M of SBC) leaves $1.8B.

• Are earnings backed by cash? 1.86×
  Cash-backed
  Cash from ops $3.0B ÷ net income $1.6B
  What this means

  How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

• Where do the earnings go? 164%
  Returned more than it generated
  Dividends + buybacks $3.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $1.9B — this fiscal year
  What this means

  The company returned more than it generated: against $1.9B of Owner Earnings, $3.0B (164%) went back to shareholders, $833M dividends, $2.2B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $54M stock comp, the real buyback was about $2.2B. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands. This year's proportion is 164%; across the record (2016–2025) it is 163%, the capital-allocation section below.

• Investing or harvesting? 0.80×
  Harvesting
  Capex $1.2B ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $1.5B
  What this means

  Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

• Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 0.4%
  The count is genuinely shrinking
  Stock compensation $54M (fiscal 2025), 0.4% of revenue · repurchases $2.2B · diluted shares -9.3% since 2022
  What this means

  Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

• Adequate size Pass
  Revenue ≥ $2B · $13.0B
  What this means

  Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

• Strong liquidity Miss
  Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.14×
  What this means

  Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

• Conservative debt Miss
  Debt ≤ working capital · $15.8B vs $610M WC
  What this means

  Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

• Earnings stability Miss
  A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
  What this means

  Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

• Dividend record Miss
  Uninterrupted dividends · 8 of 10 yrs
  What this means

  An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

• Earnings growth Miss
  Earnings +33% over the record · −38%
  What this means

  At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

• Moderate price —
  P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
  What this means

  Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.21/share (latest year $2.51), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.45/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

• Profitable years 8 of 10
  What this means

  Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

• Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 10 yrs
  What this means

  A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

• Operating margin 26% → 22% (3-yr avg ends)
  What this means

  Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 26% early to 22% lately, median 22% — competition or costs are biting in.

• Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
  What this means

  The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

• Owner earnings growth −7%/yr
  What this means

  Owner earnings shrank about 7% a year over the record.

• Worst year 2020 · −47.4% op. margin
  What this means

  Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

• Share count −1.5%/yr
  What this means

  The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

• Dividend record paid
  What this means

  Paid a dividend in 8 of the years on record.

• How management talks about it Promotional
  What this means

  The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.