MVST, Microvast Holdings Inc.

Will it survive?

• Can it pay its interest? —
  No meaningful interest burden
  Little or no interest expense reported
  What this means

  Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

• How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1M · 0.2× operating profit
  Modest net debt
  Cash $105M − debt $106M
  What this means

  Netting $105M of cash and short-term investments against $106M of debt leaves $1M owed, about 0.2× a year's operating profit (15.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

• How long is cash tied up? —
  Not enough data
  What this means

  The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

• Return on invested capital -21%
  Below average through the cycle
  5-yr median, range -58%–1%; 1% latest = NOPAT $6M ÷ invested capital $412M
  Industry peers: median -31%
  What this means

  The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

• Owner-earnings margin 13%
  Positive this year, negative across the cycle
  latest $56M = operating cash $76M − maintenance capex $20M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (7-yr median -9%)
  Industry peers: median -6%
  What this means

  What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a -9% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $3M of SBC) leaves $53M.

• Are earnings backed by cash? $76M
  Loss, but cash-generative
  Net income ($29M) · cash from operations $76M
  What this means

  The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

• Where do the earnings go? —
  Not enough data
  What this means

  The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

• Investing or harvesting? —
  Not enough data
  What this means

  The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

The promise and the pay packet

• What does winning a customer cost? 5%
  Sells itself
  Selling and marketing $22M ÷ revenue $428M
  What this means

  Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.

• Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 0.7%
  Stock pay, share count unread
  Stock compensation $3M (fiscal 2025), 0.7% of revenue · no repurchases · the share count is not comparable across these years (a split or a first listing sits in the record), so the drift is withheld
  What this means

  Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

• Adequate size Miss
  Revenue ≥ $2B · $428M
  What this means

  Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

• Strong liquidity Miss
  Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.92×
  What this means

  Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

• Conservative debt Miss
  Debt ≤ working capital · $106M vs ($40M) WC
  What this means

  Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

• Earnings stability Miss
  A profit every year (7-yr record) · 6 loss years
  What this means

  Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

• Dividend record —
  Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
  What this means

  An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

• Earnings growth —
  Earnings +33% over the record · —
  What this means

  Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

• Moderate price —
  P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
  What this means

  Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.29/share (latest year $-0.08), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.07/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

• Profitable years 1 of 7
  What this means

  Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

• Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
  What this means

  A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

• Operating margin −75% → −21% (3-yr avg ends)
  What this means

  Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −75% early to −21% lately, median −35% — pricing power intact or improving.

• Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
  What this means

  The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

• Worst year 2021 · −127.7% op. margin
  What this means

  Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

• How management talks about it Promotional
  What this means

  The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.