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OBT, Orange County Bancorp Inc.
We offer a full suite of financial products, including checking, savings and money market accounts, certificates of deposit and treasury management services.
Continues to successfully recruit seasoned lenders with expertise and proven track records in its historical and expanded operating markets.
Continues to enjoy particularly strong growth in its newer markets of Rockland and Westchester Counties, which offer significant growth potential as a function of market size and demographics, while Orange County continues to represent approximately 42% of the Bank's deposits as of December 31, 2025.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~42 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has hovered around the cost of equity (median 15%, above 12% in 4 of 6 years). It runs at a 53% efficiency ratio, lean. A bank that earns above its cost of equity through the cycle compounds book value; whether this one did it by underwriting discipline or by reaching for risk is what the 10-K, and the worst years in the record, will tell you.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| $60M | $73M | $90M | $102M | $108M | $127M | RevenueRevenue |
| $53M | $64M | $84M | $118M | $127M | $135M | Interest incomeInt. inc. |
| $5M | $4M | $6M | $29M | $35M | $31M | Interest expenseInt. exp. |
| $49M | $60M | $78M | $88M | $92M | $104M | Net interest incomeNet int. |
| $11M | $12M | $12M | $13M | $16M | $23M | Noninterest incomeFee inc. |
| $5M | $2M | $10M | $8M | $8M | $8M | Credit-loss provisionProvision |
| $15M | $27M | $30M | $37M | $35M | $52M | Pretax incomePretax |
| $12M | $21M | $24M | $29M | $28M | $42M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 20% | 20% | 20% | 21% | 20% | 19% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| 0.7% | 1.0% | 1.1% | 1.2% | 1.1% | 1.6% | Return on assetsROA |
| 9% | 12% | 18% | 18% | 15% | 15% | Return on equityROE |
| 6% | 9% | 14% | 15% | 12% | 12% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| 9% | 12% | 19% | 19% | 16% | 15% | Return on tangible equityROTCE |
| 67% | 60% | 56% | 56% | 61% | 53% | Efficiency ratioEffic. |
| $4M | $4M | $5M | $5M | $5M | $7M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ($331M) | ($291M) | ($434M) | ($145M) | ($29M) | ($74M) | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $416M | $456M | $184M | $162M | ($2M) | $84M | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| $96M | $185M | ($220M) | $61M | $3M | $54M | Change in cashΔ cash |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| $1.1B | $1.3B | — | $1.7B | $1.8B | $2.0B | Loans held for investmentLoans |
| $16M | $18M | $22M | $25M | $26M | $28M | Credit-loss allowanceAllowance |
| $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| $1.5B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.3B | DepositsDeposits |
| $5M | $5M | $5M | $5M | $5M | $5M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $1.5B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.4B | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| $135M | $183M | $138M | $165M | $186M | $284M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||
| 9.0M | 9.9M | 11.2M | 11.3M | 11.3M | 12.5M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.30 | $2.14 | $2.17 | $2.62 | $2.47 | $3.33 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.40 | $0.41 | $0.42 | $0.46 | $0.47 | $0.57 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $15.02 | $18.40 | $12.29 | $14.69 | $16.41 | $22.73 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| $14.21 | $17.69 | $11.69 | $14.11 | $15.87 | $22.26 | Tangible book / shareTBVPS |
Share counts before 2023 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 5-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +8.8%/yr | +8.8%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +23.4%/yr | +23.4%/yr |
| EPS | +20.8%/yr | +20.8%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +7.4%/yr | +7.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +21.3%/yr | +21.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | +8.6%/yr | +8.6%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Net interest income+13.4%
“Net interest income increased $12.3 million, or 13.4%, to $104.1 million for the year ended December 31, 2025 from $91.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2024 due primarily to an increase in net interest margin.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 15%StrongNet income $42M ÷ equity $284MIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- SolidNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $5M − intangibles $535K)Industry peers: median 11%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Efficiency ratio 53%Low cost ratio (<58%)Noninterest expense $68M ÷ (net interest income + fees)Industry peers: median 58%
What this means
The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 10.7%Well capitalizedEquity $284M ÷ assets $2.7B
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 87%Deposit-fundedDeposits $2.3B ÷ assets $2.7B
What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 7%LowProvision for credit losses $8M ÷ net interest income $104M
What this means
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
The franchise and the credit cycle
- A true franchiseNoninterest-bearing deposits $726M ÷ deposits $2.3B · pays 1.76% on the interest-bearing rest (avg of year-ends)
What this means
The share of deposits the bank pays nothing for — checking accounts that stay through rate cycles. This is the deposit moat in one number: a high share means cheap, sticky raw material for lending; a low share means the funding reprices with every rate move. Buffett's Wells letter is built on exactly this economics.
- Net charge-offs 0.30%Disciplined bookCharge-offs net of recoveries $6M ÷ loans $1.9B (avg of year-ends) · worst year on record 0.48% · allowance held at 1.45% of loans
What this means
Loans actually written off, net of what was later recovered — the realized truth the provisions were guessing at. Graham's rule applies doubly here: the worst year in the record, not the average, is the read, because a loan book's sins are committed in the good years and confessed in the bad ones.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership8.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the deposit base could leave overnight?Deposits $2.3B (XBRL, FY2025) — the uninsured portion in the filer's own words
“In addition, as of December 31, 2025, the aggregate amount of all our uninsured certificates of deposit was $10.5 million.”verify →
- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Credit & receivables as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Banks
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | ROEmedian over the record | ROTCEmedian over the record | Efficiencymedian over the record | NII / assetsmedian over the record | Noninterest-bearing sharelatest FY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CBANColony Bankcorp Inc. | $132M | 9% | 10% | 72% | 2.9% | 17% |
| UNTYUnity Bancorp Inc. | $132M | 15% | 15% | 48% | 3.5% | 20% |
| RBBRBB Bancorp | $129M | 10% | 10% | 47% | 3.0% | 16% |
| OBTOrange County Bancorp Inc. | $127M | 15% | 15% | 58% | 3.5% | 31% |
| RRBIRed River Bancshares Inc. | $126M | 11% | 11% | 58% | 2.8% | 31% |
| CZNCCitizens & Northern Corp | $123M | 9% | 10% | 65% | 3.3% | 21% |
| PCBPCB Bancorp | $116M | 11% | 11% | 53% | 3.6% | 20% |
| CZFSCitizens Financial Services Inc. | $112M | 12% | 15% | 58% | 3.1% | 22% |
| Group median | — | 11% | 11% | 58% | 3.2% | 20% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookA bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Orange County Bancorp Inc.’s record justifies.
Tangible book / share, delivered−11%/yr’20→’25
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $278M on 13M shares, a 15% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Manual order: ← OBK its page in the Manual OC →
Industry order: ← OBK the Banks chapter OCFC →