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OIO, OIO Group
A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
ESA is a waste management, treatment and recycling company involved in the collection and recycling of hazardous and non-hazardous industrial waste from customers such as pharmaceutical, semiconductor, petrochemical and electroplating companies.
ESA then sells these converted circular products to local and international end users, traders or overseas refiners who require the circular products for their own commercial use or for further processing including manufacturing and galvanizing purposes.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn.
- What moves the needle
- Whether the heavy assets earn more than they cost to keep. What decides it: the return on the capital sunk into them, how much of the capex is merely standing still versus growing, and what a downturn does to a fixed-cost base. Here the balance sheet is the defense and cyclicality the enemy. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −13%, above 15% in 0 of 3 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. Modest returns here are the design, not a verdict: a regulated utility's prices are set by commission, so the questions are the return the regulator allows, how fast the invested base it earns that return on is growing, and the health of the relationship with the commissions that decide both — all of which live in the 10-K, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2022–2024
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | TTMTTMJun 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||
| $5M | $6M | $6M | $5M | RevenueRevenue |
| $4M | $5M | — | $4M | Gross profitGross prof. |
| 78% | 84% | — | 82% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| ($2M) | ($94M) | ($410K) | ($482K) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −42.8% | n/m | −6.7% | −9.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($2M) | ($95M) | ($633K) | ($633K) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||
| $2M | $5M | ($3M) | ($2M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $2M | $2M | $2M | $2M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $3M | $99M | ($4M) | ($3M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $503K | $651K | $305K | $446K | CapexCapex |
| 10.1% | 10.6% | 5.0% | 8.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $1M | $5M | ($3M) | ($3M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 29.4% | 75.1% | −56.0% | −48.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $1M | $5M | ($3M) | ($3M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 29.4% | 75.1% | −56.0% | −48.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| -13% | -961% | -2% | -3% | ROICROIC |
| -18% | -1184% | -4% | -5% | Return on equityROE |
| −18% | n/m | −4% | −5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||
| $252K | $367K | $635K | $142K | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $815K | $1M | $1M | $1M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $221K | $64K | $440K | $454K | InventoryInvent. |
| $4M | $7M | $4M | $5M | Accounts payablePayables |
| ($3M) | ($5M) | ($3M) | ($4M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $1M | $1M | $2M | $2M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $10M | $15M | $9M | $9M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.1× | 0.1× | 0.2× | 0.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $22M | $22M | $21M | $20M | Net PP&ENet PP&E |
| $26M | $26M | $26M | $25M | Total assetsAssets |
| $371K | $112K | — | $112K | Total debtDebt |
| $119K | ($254K) | — | ($29K) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -8.7× | -243.0× | -1.2× | -1.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $13M | $8M | $15M | $14M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||
| 25.5M | 25.9M | 26.0M | 26.0M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.20 | $0.24 | $0.23 | $0.20 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.09 | $-3.67 | $-0.02 | $-0.02 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.06 | $0.18 | $-0.13 | $-0.10 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.06 | $0.18 | $-0.13 | $-0.10 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.02 | $0.03 | $0.01 | $0.02 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $0.51 | $0.31 | $0.57 | $0.52 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2024 are restated ×4 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2024 the business reported a $633K loss but ($3M) of owner earnings: $3M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($633K) | ($95M) | ($2M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$2M | +$2M | +$2M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$4M | +$99M | +$3M |
| Cash from operations | ($3M) | $5M | $2M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$305K | −$651K | −$503K |
| Owner earnings | ($3M) | $5M | $1M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -56% | 75% | 29% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -1.5×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($482K) ÷ interest expense $325K
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cashCash $142K − debt $112K
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $29K, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- How long is cash tied up? -1685dNegative, funded by othersDSO 77 + DIO 169 − DPO 1931 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle3-yr median, range -961%–-2%; -3% latest = NOPAT ($381K) ÷ invested capital $14MIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years (it ran -3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cashOwner earnings ($3M) = operating cash ($2M) − maintenance capex $446KIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -48% of revenue this year.
- Loss, and burning cashNet income ($633K) · cash from operations ($2M)
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.27×HarvestingCapex $446K ÷ depreciation $2M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 2 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $5M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× (waived for utilities) · exempt
What this means
Graham exempted public utilities from this test: their working capital “takes care of itself” through the continuous bond-and-share financing of growth, so a thin current ratio is the industry's structure, not a warning. His substitute test — debt no more than twice book equity — is the next line.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ 2× equity (Graham's utility test) · $112K vs $14M equity
What this means
Graham's own substitution for public utilities: debt not exceeding twice the stock equity at book value, in place of the working-capital tests an industrial faces. A utility finances its plant with bonds by design; the question is whether the borrowing stays inside the equity behind it.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.26/share (latest year $-0.02), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.52/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Jun 30, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$142K
- Receivables$1M
- Inventory$454K
- Accounts payable$5M
- Other current liabilities$4M
From the company's latest filing.
Peers, Waste Management
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WMWaste Management Inc. | $25.2B | 38% | 17.3% | 12% | 13% |
| RSGRepublic Services Inc. | $16.6B | 40% | 17.5% | 9% | 13% |
| WCNWaste Connections Inc. | $9.5B | 41% | 15.5% | 6% | 15% |
| CLHClean Harbors Inc. | $6.0B | 31% | 8.6% | 8% | 6% |
| CWSTCasella Waste Systems Inc. | $1.8B | 33% | 6.8% | 4% | 6% |
| OIOOIO Group | $5M | 81%2y | -24.8%2y | -13% | -13%2y |
| GFLGFL Environmental Inc. | as filed: C$6.6B | 11% | -4.1% | -1% | 3% |
| Group median | — | 38% | 8.6% | 6% | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. OIO Group's US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what OIO Group has delivered.
OIO Group’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, below the record’s own through-cycle owner earnings. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
—
9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings ($3M) on 26M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $29K. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← OGI its page in the Manual OMAB →
Industry order: ← GFL the Waste Management chapter RSG →