Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← PRA Manual PRCH → ← ORBS Consumer Finance RM →

PRAA, PRA Group Inc.

Consumer Finance diversified Cyclical

A diversified business; where the profit really comes from, and whether it is earned or bought, is what the segment detail settles.

To a lesser extent, we also purchase loans in situations where the customer is involved in a bankruptcy or similar proceeding ("Insolvency" accounts).

As part of an ancillary business, we purchase and provide fee-based services for class action claims recoveries in the U.S.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
PRAA · PRA Group Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.2B
+7.8% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.3B 5-yr avg $1.0B
Operating margin 5.0% 5-yr avg 20.9%
Owner-earnings margin −3% 5-yr avg −4%
Free cash flow margin −3% 5-yr avg −4%

Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~39 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 34% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The operating margin has swung widely — from −2.5% to 1571% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

49% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States51%$611M
  • Foreign Countries35%$421M
  • United Kingdom14%$170M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$77M$25M$15M$16M$1.1B$1.1B$967M$803M$1.1B$1.2B$1.3BRevenueRevenue
$220M$214M$185M$248M$350M$375M$286M$100M$340M($30M)$67MOperating incomeOp. inc.
284.0%857.8%n/mn/m32.8%34.2%29.6%12.5%30.5%−2.5%5.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
$136M$160M$89M$117M$209M$250M$155M($83M)$110M($243M)Pretax incomePretax
$86M$164M$66M$86M$149M$183M$117M($83M)$71M($305M)($265M)Net incomeNet inc.
32%-7%15%17%20%22%24%19%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$206M$15M$81M$133M$142M$85M$22M($98M)($95M)($86M)($31M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$18M$15M$15M$16M$16M$15M$15M$13M$11M$9MDepreciation & amortizationD&A
$95M($173M)($8M)$21M($38M)($129M)($124M)($38M)($189M)$195M$217MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$14M$23M$21M$18M$17M$11M$13M$3M$4M$5M$6MCapexCapex
18.3%91.7%137.6%114.4%1.6%1.0%1.4%0.4%0.4%0.4%0.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$192M$75K$66M$115M$124M$74M$8M($100M)($99M)($90M)($38M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
247.8%0.3%440.9%731.5%11.7%6.7%0.9%−12.5%−8.9%−7.5%−2.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$192M($7M)$60M$115M$124M$74M$8M($100M)($99M)($90M)($38M)Free cash flowFCF
247.8%−29.6%404.6%731.5%11.7%6.7%0.9%−12.5%−8.9%−7.5%−2.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$60M$0$0$58M$0$647K$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$45M$0$0$0$201M$111M$0$0$20MBuybacksBuybacks
($318M)($295M)($387M)($441M)$115M$160M$120M($235M)($382M)($60M)Investing cash flowInv. cash
$94M$296M$295M$340M($252M)($263M)($121M)$355M$491M$116MFinancing cash flowFin. cash
$40M$10M($10M)($7M)($7M)($14M)($25M)$6M($20M)$31MExchange-rate effectFX
$23M$26M($22M)$25M($3M)($32M)($4M)$29M($6M)$1MChange in cashΔ cash
6%7%4%5%7%8%6%6%-1%ROICROIC
10%15%6%7%11%14%10%-7%6%-31%-25%Return on equityROE
10%15%6%7%11%14%10%−7%6%−31%−25%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$94M$121M$99M$120M$109M$88M$83M$113M$106M$104M$132MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$39M$49M$54M$57M$58M$55M$52M$36M$29M$25MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$500M$527M$464M$481M$493M$480M$436M$432M$396M$27M$27MGoodwillGoodwill
$3.2B$3.7B$3.9B$4.4B$4.5B$4.4B$4.2B$4.5B$4.9B$5.1B$5.2BTotal assetsAssets
$1.8B$2.2B$2.5B$2.8B$2.7B$2.6B$2.5B$2.9B$3.3B$3.7B$3.8BTotal debtDebt
$1.7B$2.0B$2.4B$2.7B$2.6B$2.5B$2.4B$2.8B$3.2B$3.6B$3.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
2.6×2.1×1.5×1.7×2.5×3.0×2.2×0.5×1.4×-0.1×0.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.2B$2.6B$2.8B$3.2B$3.1B$3.0B$2.9B$3.3B$3.7B$4.1BTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$8M$10M$6MRedeemable interestsRedeemable
$53M$50M$29M$58M$32M$38M$59M$72M$59M$60MNoncontrolling interestsNCI
$864M$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2B$1.1B$980M$1.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
7.9%34.8%57.1%68.0%1.4%1.5%1.3%1.4%1.2%1.3%1.3%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
46.4M45.8M45.4M45.6M45.9M45.3M39.9M39.2M39.5M39.2M38.4MShares out (diluted)Shares
$1.67$0.54$0.33$0.35$23.23$24.17$24.23$20.49$28.19$30.68$34.66Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.86$3.59$1.44$1.89$3.26$4.04$2.94$-2.13$1.79$-7.79$-6.90EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.13$0.00$1.45$2.53$2.71$1.63$0.21$-2.56$-2.49$-2.31$-0.99Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$4.13$-0.16$1.33$2.53$2.71$1.63$0.21$-2.56$-2.49$-2.31$-0.99Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.31$0.50$0.45$0.40$0.38$0.25$0.33$0.07$0.10$0.12$0.17Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$18.63$23.80$24.11$25.66$29.26$28.38$30.78$29.79$28.70$25.01$27.22Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+38.2%/yr+5.7%/yr
Capital spending / share−9.6%/yr−20.0%/yr
Book value / share+3.3%/yr−3.1%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2022

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $305M loss into ($90M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($305M)$71M($83M)$117M$183M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$9M+$11M+$13M+$15M+$15M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$16M+$13M+$11M+$13M+$16M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$195M−$189M−$38M−$124M−$129M
Cash from operations($86M)($95M)($98M)$22M$85M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$5M−$4M−$3M−$13M−$11M
Owner earnings($90M)($99M)($100M)$8M$74M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-8%-9%-13%1%7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $16M), owner earnings is nearer ($106M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($30M) ÷ interest expense $263M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $104M − debt $3.7B
    What this means

    Netting $104M of cash and short-term investments against $3.7B of debt leaves $3.6B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -1%–8%; -1% latest = NOPAT ($24M) ÷ invested capital $4.6B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -13%–732%; latest ($90M) = operating cash ($86M) − maintenance capex $5M
    Industry peers: median 36%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -8% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $16M of SBC) leaves ($106M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($305M) · cash from operations ($86M)

    In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.

    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.55×
    Harvesting
    Capex $5M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $9M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 1.3%
    The count is edging down
    Stock compensation $16M (fiscal 2025), 1.3% of revenue · repurchases $20M · diluted shares -1.8% since 2022
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity
    Current ratio ≥ 2× ·
    What this means

    Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record
    Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −201%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.82/share (latest year $-8.11), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $26.03/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 795% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 795% early to 13% lately, median 33% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −5%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Worst year 2025 · −2.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −1.9%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $406M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$129M · 32%
  • Buybacks$377M · 93%
  • Returned to owners$377M

    130% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $377M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$100M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $100M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $1.8B to $3.8B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$43.53

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 7M shares were bought for $312M, about $43.53 each.

  • Net change in share count−17.2%

    The diluted count fell from 46M to 38M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained−116%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($157M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $182M, so each retained $1 gave back about 1.16 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$27M1% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity3%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.2Bover 15 years since fiscal 2008 buying other businesses, against $129M of capital spent building over the 10-year record

$413M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Beside that spending sits $48M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2009 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Kevin P. Stevenson$5.6M$8.9M$74M
2022Kevin P. Stevenson$5.0M$463k$8M
2023Kevin P. Stevenson$6.6M$1.9M($100M)
2023Vikram A. Atal$3.1M$2.6M($100M)
2024Vikram A. Atal$7.5M$6.0M($99M)
2025Martin Sjolund$4.9M$4.9M($90M)
2025Vikram A. Atal$7.1M$4.8M($90M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2.2%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio89:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$16M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 1.3% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Consumer Finance

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
CACCCredit Acceptance Corporation$2.3B45.7%10%54%
ATLCAtlanticus Holdings Corporation$2.0B91%22.9%10%30%4y
ECPGEncore Capital Group Inc$1.8B37.4%8%18%
EZPWEZCORP Inc. Class A Non Voting$1.3B59%7.7%6%7%
PRAAPRA Group Inc.$1.2B33.5%6%4%
RMRegional Management Corp.$646M21.6%6%43%
JCAPJefferson Capital Inc.$613M50.8%13%
WRLDWorld Acceptance Corporation$585M16.9%8%44%
Group median28.2%8%30%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what PRA Group Inc. has delivered.

PRA Group Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, PRA Group Inc. earns about $4M on its 0.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −7.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($38M) on 38M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-07-31; net debt $3.6B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($6M) runs well above depreciation (—), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($36M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "PRA Group Inc. (PRAA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PRAA, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← PRA its page in the Manual PRCH →

Industry order: ← ORBS the Consumer Finance chapter RM →