Owner Scorecard


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SVC, Service Properties Trust

REITs — Hotels REIT Unprofitable

We are a REIT formed in 1995 under the laws of the State of Maryland.

As of December 31, 2025, we owned 760 service-focused retail net lease properties with an aggregate of 13,601,902 square feet located in 42 states and 94 hotels with an aggregate of 21,243 rooms or suites located in 31 states, the District of Columbia, Ontario, Canada, and San Juan, Puerto Rico.

As of December 31, 2025, our net lease portfolio was occupied by 181 tenants with a weighted average (by annual minimum rent) lease term of 7.4 years, operating under 140 brands in 21 distinct industries.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SVC · Service Properties Trust
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.8B
−4.3% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.7B 5-yr avg $1.8B
Cash margin 7% 5-yr avg 11%
Dividend / operating cash 5% 5-yr avg 27%
Debt / assets 94% 5-yr avg 77%

Next report Est. 11/2–11/6 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~36 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle
Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings, and a property downturn meets a balance sheet built on leverage. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Operating cash per share has shrunk (−17% a year). The dividend takes 5% of FFO, and is covered. Debt is 94% of assets, heavy for a REIT. The quality and location of the properties, the lease terms and occupancy, and the cost of the debt are what the 10-K settles, and no single ratio captures them.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$2.0B$2.2B$2.3B$2.3B$1.3B$1.5B$1.9B$1.9B$1.9B$1.8B$1.7BRevenueRevenue
$223M$215M$186M$260M($311M)($545M)($132M)($33M)($276M)($202M)($423M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$357M$387M$403M$428M$499M$486M$401M$384M$372M$315M$304MDepreciation & amortizationD&A
$607M$628M$597M$618M$38M$50M$243M$486M$139M$118M$123MCash from operationsOp. cash
$314M$340M$347M$354M$94M$7M$38M$132M$101M$7M$7MDividends paidDiv. paid
Balance sheet
52%54%58%57%249%13%16%27%73%6%5%Dividend / operating cashPayout
Cash flow & returns
($520M)($795M)($428M)($2.1B)($52M)($101M)$397M($30M)($223M)$529MInvesting cash flowInv. cash
($81M)$193M($191M)$1.5B$24M$907M($1.5B)($304M)$43M($432M)Financing cash flowFin. cash
$6M$26M($21M)$5M$10M$856M($902M)$152M($40M)$215MChange in cashΔ cash
Balance sheet
$8.7B$9.4B$9.5B$11.4B$11.2B$10.2B$9.6B$9.8B$9.6B$7.9B$7.6BReal estate (gross)RE gross
$6.6B$7.2B$7.2B$9.0B$8.7B$9.2B$7.5B$7.4B$7.1B$6.5B$5.8BTotal assetsAssets
39%45%50%59%71%67%76%77%82%85%94%Debt / assetsDebt/assets
$2.6B$3.2B$3.6B$5.3B$6.1B$6.1B$5.7B$5.6B$5.8B$5.5B$5.5BTotal debtDebt
$2.6B$3.2B$3.6B$5.3B$6.1B$5.2B$5.6B$5.5B$5.7B$5.2B$5.5BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$162M$182M$195M$225M$306M$366M$342M$336M$384M$414M$394MInterest expenseInt. exp.
2.4×2.1×2.0×1.7×-0.2×-0.6×0.5×0.6×0.3×0.3×1.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$3.5B$4.4B$4.6B$6.5B$6.6B$7.6B$6.1B$6.1B$6.3B$5.8BTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$3.1B$2.8B$2.6B$2.5B$2.1B$1.6B$1.4B$1.2B$852M$646M$806MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
78.0M82.1M82.1M82.2M82.1M82.3M82.4M82.5M82.7M83.0M80.9MShares out (diluted)Shares
$4.03$4.14$4.22$4.30$1.14$0.08$0.46$1.61$1.22$0.08$0.08Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$40.10$33.57$31.63$30.50$25.61$18.90$16.86$14.86$10.30$7.79$9.96Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before TTM are restated ×1/2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−2.0%/yr+7.3%/yr
Dividends / share−35.2%/yr−41.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+1.3%/yr+26.4%/yr
Book value / share−16.6%/yr−21.2%/yr
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • What an owner could take out ($107M) to $118M
    A range, because the filings do not split maintenance from expansion
    Between cash from operations less all capital spending $118M − $225M = ($107M), and cash from operations $118M
    What this means

    Owner earnings is what a business produces in cash after the spending needed to keep it competitive. For a property trust that spending cannot be read: the filings mix the money that replaces a roof with the money that buys a building, and management decides which is which. Rather than model the split and publish a single figure, the two ends are shown. The upper end is operating cash, which no owner could exceed. The lower end deducts every dollar of capital spending, which is too harsh, since a trust that is growing is charged for buildings it is adding. A trust whose distribution sits near the lower end is paying it out of the properties; one whose distribution exceeds the upper end is paying it from somewhere else.

  • Thin against what the buildings cost
    Cash from operations $118M ÷ real estate at cost $7.9B
    What this means

    The cash the properties throw off, measured against what they cost to acquire and build rather than against a market value nobody filed. Read it across the record: a portfolio whose yield on cost is rising is either raising rents faster than it is adding buildings, or buying well. Gross cost is used deliberately, so accumulated depreciation cannot shrink the denominator and flatter the return.

  • Lightly covered
    Dividends $7M ÷ cash from operations $118M
    Occupancy at fiscal year end, in the filing’s words
    Occupancy, as filed — the scope is the sentence’s own words96.6%
    “Our net lease properties were 96.6% occupied as of December 31, 2025 with a weighted (by annual minimum rent) average lease term of 7.4 years, operating under 140 brands in 21 distinct industries.”
    Occupancy, as filed — the scope is the sentence’s own words96.6%
    “As of December 31, 2025, our net lease properties were 96.6% occupied and we had 26 properties available for lease.”
    ✓ each figure is its sentence’s own characters, dated to the fiscal year end inside the sentence
    What this means

    A REIT must distribute most of its taxable income, so a high payout is normal and the question is whether the cash covers it. This is a harder test than the industry's usual one: funds from operations adds depreciation back without deducting the capital that genuinely keeps buildings competitive, so a distribution can look covered on that measure and still be funded by borrowing or by selling buildings. Above 100% of operating cash, it is being funded by something other than the properties.

  • Withheld — not in the filings' structured data
    What this means

    Funds from operations is defined by the industry's trade association rather than by accounting rules, and no REIT tags it in the structured data behind this site. Rebuilding it from the standard tags misses the figure these companies report by as much as half, because the gains on property sales it must exclude sit behind each filer's own custom tags. Rather than publish an invented number under the industry's name, the record shows the cash the properties actually produced.

Is it sound?

  • Heavy
    Total debt $5.7B ÷ assets $6.5B
    Industry peers: median 39%
    What this means

    Every REIT runs on leverage; how much is the question. Heavy debt is what turns a property downturn into a wipeout, as 2008 showed, so a conservative balance sheet is part of the moat here, not a drag on it.

  • Thin
    (operating income + depreciation) ÷ interest $414M
    Industry peers: median 3.5×
    What this means

    How many times the property cash earnings cover the interest bill. The bill counted here is every dollar of interest the trust incurred, including the part it charged into the cost of buildings under construction rather than against this year's earnings — that money is paid to lenders all the same, and leaving it out flatters exactly the trusts doing the most building. Comfortable coverage is what lets a REIT refinance through a tight credit market instead of being forced to sell into one.

  • Consolidated accounts only
    What this means

    These figures are the trust's consolidated accounts. Where a REIT owns buildings through joint ventures it does not control, its share of those properties — and of the debt against them — sits outside every line here, and the filings do not tag it in a form this pipeline can read. Read the equity-method and off-balance-sheet notes in the 10-K before concluding anything about total leverage.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$424k$299k($45M)
2022$106k$83k$139M
2022$255k$174k$139M
2023$135k$191k$285M
2024$147k−$39k($164M)
2025$437k$353k($107M)
2025$810−$25k($107M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Hotel & lodging REITs

The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDCash marginmedian over the recordCash / assetsmedian over the recordDividend / cashmedian over the recordDebt / assetsmedian over the record
HSTHost Hotels & Resorts Inc.$6.1B24%11.1%46%34%
RHPRyman Hospitality Properties$2.6B24%10.0%48%65%
SVCService Properties Trust$1.8B19%4.9%53%69%
PEBPebblebrook Hotel Trust$1.5B18%4.6%7%39%
APLEApple Hospitality REIT$1.4B30%7.7%67%29%
RLJRLJ Lodging Trust$1.3B21%5.5%37%46%
DRHDiamondrock Hospitality Company$1.1B21%6.7%44%34%
INNSummit Hotel Properties Inc.$729M24%5.7%18%48%
Group median22%6.2%45%42%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

A reit / real estate isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Service Properties Trust (SVC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SVC, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← SUPN its page in the Manual SVCO →

Industry order: ← RLJ the REITs — Hotels chapter