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TLN, Talen Energy Corporation
Talen is a leading independent power producer and energy infrastructure company dedicated to powering the future.
We produce and sell electricity, capacity, and ancillary services into wholesale U.S. power markets, with our generation fleet principally located in the Mid-Atlantic, Ohio, and Montana.
See "—Our Key Markets and Revenue Streams—Contracted Revenues—AWS PPA" for additional information.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~38 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Electricity Sales and Ancillary Services (75%), Capacity revenues (19%) and Physical electricity sales, bilateral contracts, other (4%).
- Situation
- Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates. Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 3.5% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −6.5% and 11% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. Modest returns here are the design, not a verdict: a regulated utility's prices are set by commission, so the questions are the return the regulator allows, how fast the invested base it earns that return on is growing, and the health of the relationship with the commissions that decide both — all of which live in the 10-K, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Electricity Sales And Ancillary Services is 75% of revenue, with Capacity revenues the other meaningful line at 19%.
- Electricity Sales And Ancillary Services75%$1.9B
- Capacity revenues19%$485M
- Physical electricity sales, bilateral contracts, other4%$93M
- Product and Service, Other0%$0
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2013–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2013’13 | 2014’14 | 2015’15 | 2022’22 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $4.5B | $4.6B | $4.5B | $3.1B | $2.1B | $2.6B | $3.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 3% | 8% | 24% | 20% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($293M) | $397M | ($39M) | $241M | $226M | ($90M) | $88M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −6.5% | 8.7% | −0.9% | 7.8% | 10.7% | −3.5% | 2.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($420M) | $303M | ($368M) | ($1.3B) | $1.1B | ($166M) | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| ($230M) | $410M | ($341M) | ($1.3B) | $998M | ($219M) | ($185M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| $410M | $462M | $768M | $187M | $256M | $704M | $796M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| — | — | — | $520M | $298M | $279M | $330M | Depreciation & amortizationD&A |
| $640M | $52M | $1.1B | $956M | ($1.1B) | $118M | $83M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $583M | $416M | $451M | $232M | $85M | $98M | $228M | CapexCapex |
| 13.0% | 9.1% | 10.1% | 7.5% | 4.0% | 3.8% | 6.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($173M) | $46M | $317M | ($45M) | $171M | $606M | $568M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −3.8% | 1.0% | 7.1% | −1.5% | 8.1% | 23.5% | 16.5% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($173M) | $46M | $317M | ($45M) | $171M | $606M | $568M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −3.8% | 1.0% | 7.1% | −1.5% | 8.1% | 23.5% | 16.5% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $603M | — | $0 | $3.8B | $6.4B | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | $0 | $2.0B | $103M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| ($631M) | $497M | ($915M) | ($368M) | $1.2B | ($4.0B) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $47M | ($846M) | ($64M) | $426M | ($2.0B) | $3.7B | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| ($174M) | $113M | ($211M) | $245M | ($536M) | $387M | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| — | 5% | -0% | — | 5% | -1% | 1% | ROICROIC |
| -5% | 10% | -8% | — | 72% | -20% | -11% | Return on equityROE |
| −5% | 10% | −8% | — | 72% | −20% | −11% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| $239M | $352M | $141M | $988M | $328M | $689M | $231M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $186M | $205M | — | $66M | $160M | $240M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $455M | $508M | — | $302M | $278M | $298M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $280M | $422M | — | $368M | $438M | $538M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $2.7B | $2.8B | — | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.0B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $2.9B | $2.1B | — | $455M | $1.1B | $1.3B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.9× | 1.3× | — | 2.3× | 1.3× | 0.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $6.4B | $8.6B | — | $3.2B | $7.5B | — | Net PP&ENet PP&E |
| $86M | $72M | $0 | — | — | — | — | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $10.8B | $12.8B | — | $6.1B | $10.9B | $15.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $2.2B | $4.2B | — | $3.0B | $6.8B | $9.6B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $1.9B | $4.1B | — | $2.7B | $6.1B | $9.3B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -1.8× | 3.2× | -0.2× | 0.7× | 0.9× | -0.3× | 0.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $4.8B | $3.9B | $4.3B | ($482M) | $1.4B | $1.1B | $1.6B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | — | — | 0.0% | 1.6% | 20.4% | 16.5% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||
| 83.5M | 83.5M | 110M | 0K | 56.5M | 45.7M | 45.8M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $53.82 | $54.85 | $40.77 | — | $37.44 | $56.49 | $75.11 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-2.75 | $4.91 | $-3.10 | — | $17.67 | $-4.79 | $-4.04 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-2.07 | $0.55 | $2.88 | — | $3.03 | $13.26 | $12.41 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-2.07 | $0.55 | $2.88 | — | $3.03 | $13.26 | $12.41 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $6.98 | $4.98 | $4.10 | — | $1.50 | $2.14 | $4.98 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $57.44 | $46.78 | $39.15 | — | $24.55 | $23.92 | $35.32 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1/1.95 into 2024 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 12-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +0.4%/yr | +50.9%/yr (1-yr) |
| Owner earnings / share | — | +338.1%/yr (1-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −9.4%/yr | +42.5%/yr (1-yr) |
| Book value / share | −7.0%/yr | −2.6%/yr (1-yr) |
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $219M loss into $606M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2022 | FY2015 | FY2014 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($219M) | $998M | ($1.3B) | ($341M) | $410M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$279M | +$298M | +$520M | — | — |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$526M | +$33M | — | — | — |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$118M | −$1.1B | +$956M | +$1.1B | +$52M |
| Cash from operations | $704M | $256M | $187M | $768M | $462M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$98M | −$85M | −$232M | −$451M | −$416M |
| Owner earnings | $606M | $171M | ($45M) | $317M | $46M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 23% | 8% | -1% | 7% | 1% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $526M), owner earnings is nearer $80M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
In dashed depreciation years the filer's own depreciation concepts changed scope and do not reconcile with the adjacent years; the add-back is withheld rather than guessed, and its amount remains inside "Working capital & other."
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -0.3×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($90M) ÷ interest expense $302M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $689M − debt $6.8B
What this means
Netting $689M of cash and short-term investments against $6.8B of debt leaves $6.1B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle4-yr median, range -1%–5%; -1% latest = NOPAT ($71M) ÷ invested capital $7.2BIndustry peers: median 3%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran -1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle6-yr median margin, range -4%–23%; latest $606M = operating cash $704M − maintenance capex $98MIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 23% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 6 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $526M of SBC) leaves $80M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($219M) · cash from operations $704M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $103M ÷ Owner Earnings $606M — this fiscal year
What this means
Of $606M Owner Earnings, $103M (17%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $103M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($526M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does. This year's proportion is 17%; across the record (2013–2025) it is 224%, the capital-allocation section below.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.35×HarvestingCapex $98M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $279M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
The promise and the pay packet
- Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 20.4%Stock pay, share count unreadStock compensation $526M (fiscal 2025), 20.4% of revenue · repurchases $103M · the share count is not comparable across these years (a split or a first listing sits in the record), so the drift is withheld
What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $2.6B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× (waived for utilities) · exempt
What this means
Graham exempted public utilities from this test: their working capital “takes care of itself” through the continuous bond-and-share financing of growth, so a thin current ratio is the industry's structure, not a warning. His substitute test — debt no more than twice book equity — is the next line.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ 2× equity (Graham's utility test) · $6.8B vs $1.1B equity
What this means
Graham's own substitution for public utilities: debt not exceeding twice the stock equity at book value, in place of the working-capital tests an industrial faces. A utility finances its plant with bonds by design; the question is whether the borrowing stays inside the equity behind it.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (6-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record —Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.55/share (latest year $-4.57), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $22.81/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2013–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 2 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 0% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 0% early to 5% lately, median −1% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2013 · −6.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2013, understand why before trusting the good years.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$231M
- Receivables$240M
- Inventory$298M
- Other current assets$259M
- Debt due within a year$29M
- Other current liabilities$1.3B
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of Jun 30, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $837M against the $29M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 29 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.
How the cash was used, 2013–2025
Over the record, the business generated $2.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$1.9B · 67%
- Buybacks$2.1B · 74%
- Returned to owners$2.1B
224% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $2.1B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$1.1B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.1B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks$150.67
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 14M shares were bought for $2.1B, about $150.67 each.
- Net change in share count−45.2%
The diluted count fell from 84M to 46M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$526M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 20.4% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, Electric Utilities
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ELPCCompanhia Paranaense de Energia (COPEL) | $4.4B | — | -6.7% | — | 11% |
| ENICEnel Chile S.A. | $4.2B | — | 20.4% | — | 19% |
| BEPCBROOKFIELD RENEWABLE CORPORATION | $3.7B | — | 4.1% | 2% | 13% |
| TLNTalen Energy Corporation | $2.6B | — | 3.5% | 2% | 4% |
| AQNAlgonquin Power & Utilities Corp. | $2.4B | 71%4y | 20.7% | 4% | 8% |
| PAMPampa Energia S.A. | $1.9B | 38% | 29.5% | 13% | 11% |
| CWENClearway Energy Inc. | $1.4B | 67% | 21.6% | 2% | 36% |
| EDNEDENOR | $1.4B | — | -0.9% | 5%2y | 11% |
| Group median | — | — | 12.3% | 3% | 11% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Talen Energy Corporation has delivered.
Talen Energy Corporation’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Talen Energy Corporation earns about $104M on its 4.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 23.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $568M on 48M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-08-05; net debt $9.3B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($228M) runs well above depreciation ($330M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $698M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← TKR its page in the Manual TLRY →
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