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TROO, TROOPS Inc. Ordinary Shares
TROOPS, Inc. is a conglomerate group of various businesses with its headquarters based in Hong Kong.
Giant Credit Limited has been providing personal loans and corporate loans to its customers since 2016.
The principal business of FAF is money lending which is similar to Giant Credit Limited but with a larger customer base.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Insurance Consultancy Services (75%) and Interest On Loans (13%), with 2 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median -14%, above 12% in only 0 of 10 years). The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Insurance Consultancy Services is 75% of revenue, with Interest On Loans the other meaningful line at 13%.
- Insurance Consultancy Services75%$13M
- Interest On Loans13%$2M
- Property lease and management8%$1M
- Technology Service3%$549K
- Advisory And Referral Services1%$137K
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $5M | $51K | $2M | $5M | $4M | $4M | $4M | $4M | $10M | $17M | $17M | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | $0 | $2K | $39K | $93K | — | — | — | — | $93K | Net interest incomeNet int. |
| — | — | — | $194K | $2M | — | — | — | — | — | $2M | Credit-loss provisionProvision |
| ($5M) | ($11M) | ($21M) | ($37M) | ($68M) | ($8M) | ($346K) | ($2M) | ($13M) | ($28M) | ($28M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| -5.0% | -11.4% | -11.0% | -26.5% | -75.4% | -12.0% | -0.5% | -2.4% | -16.9% | -40.4% | -40.4% | Return on assetsROA |
| -6% | -13% | -15% | -31% | -96% | -13% | -1% | -3% | -20% | -57% | -57% | Return on equityROE |
| −6% | −13% | −15% | −31% | −96% | −13% | −1% | −3% | −20% | −57% | −57% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| -20% | -39% | -18% | -32% | -674% | -14% | -1% | -3% | -25% | -79% | -79% | Return on tangible equityROTCE |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $100M | $98M | $191M | $140M | $90M | $70M | $70M | $70M | $79M | $69M | $69M | Total assetsAssets |
| $37M | $31M | $248K | $4M | $60M | $385K | $385K | $385K | $12M | $12M | $12M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $87M | $84M | $138M | $120M | $71M | $63M | $62M | $61M | $68M | $49M | $49M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 7.4M | 11.3M | 35.1M | 79.2M | 98.1M | 102M | 102M | 102M | 102M | 121M | 122M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $-0.68 | $-0.99 | $-0.60 | $-0.47 | $-0.69 | $-0.08 | $-0.00 | $-0.02 | $-0.13 | $-0.23 | $-0.23 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $11.68 | $7.39 | $3.94 | $1.51 | $0.72 | $0.62 | $0.61 | $0.60 | $0.67 | $0.41 | $0.40 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| $3.35 | $2.54 | $3.29 | $1.46 | $0.10 | $0.61 | $0.61 | $0.59 | $0.53 | $0.29 | $0.29 | Tangible book / shareTBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.53 into 2017 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×3.09 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×2.26 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −16.0%/yr | +26.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | −51.9%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | — | −4.2%/yr |
| Book value / share | −31.1%/yr | −10.8%/yr |
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity -57%Loss on equityNet income ($28M) ÷ equity $49M
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- LossNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $12M − intangibles $1M)
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 39%
What this means
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 71.0%Well capitalizedEquity $49M ÷ assets $69M
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Funding —Not enough data
What this means
Deposits or total assets missing.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 2129%ElevatedProvision for credit losses $2M ÷ net interest income $93K
What this means
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
The franchise and the credit cycle
- Not enough data
What this means
The deposit mix isn't cleanly tagged in the filings' structured data; the funding read above carries what is.
- Not enough data
What this means
Not derivable from the filings' structured data — some filers carry recoveries only on segment axes, and a gross figure dressed as net would be a wrong number.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$3M
- Receivables$456K
- Inventory$26K
- Other current assets$11M
- Accounts payable$1M
- Other current liabilities$15M
From the company's latest filing.
Peers, Consumer Finance
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | ROEmedian over the record | ROTCEmedian over the record | Efficiencymedian over the record | NII / assetsmedian over the record | Noninterest-bearing sharelatest FY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DFSDiscover Financial Services | $17.9B | 25% | 26% | 39% | 8.6% | 1% |
| ALLYAlly Financial Inc. | $7.9B | 8% | 8% | — | — | — |
| OMFOneMain Holdings Inc. | $4.9B | — | — | 39%1y | 15.3%1y | — |
| SLMSLM Corporation | $2.0B | — | — | 33%1y | 5.0%1y | 0% |
| TROOTROOPS Inc. Ordinary Shares | $17M | -14% | -22% | — | 0.0%4y | — |
| Group median | — | 8% | 8% | — | 6.8% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. TROOPS Inc. Ordinary Shares reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what TROOPS Inc. Ordinary Shares’s record justifies.
Tangible book / share, delivered15%/yr’20→’25
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $35M on 122M shares, a −22% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Manual order: ← TRMD its page in the Manual TRP →
Industry order: ← SLMBP the Consumer Finance chapter WRLD →