Owner Scorecard


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UFPI, UFP Industries

Paper & Forest Products capital-intensive

UFP Industries is a holding company with subsidiaries throughout the United States, Mexico, Canada, Spain, India and Australia that design, manufacture and supply products made from wood, wood and non-wood composites, and other materials to three segments: retail, packaging, and construction.

Segments consist of UFP Retail Solutions ("Retail"), UFP Packaging ("Packaging") and UFP Construction ("Construction"), and align with the end markets we serve.

Among other advantages, this structure allows for a more specialized and focused sales approach, more efficient use of resources and capital, and quicker introduction of new products and services.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
UFPI · UFP Industries
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$6.3B
−5.0% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $6.2B 5-yr avg $7.7B
Gross margin 16% 5-yr avg 18%
Operating margin 5.1% 5-yr avg 8.1%
ROIC 9% 5-yr avg 22%
Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg 8%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 6%

Next report By 11/5 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~39 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 16% and operating margin about 6.2% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 5 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$3.2B$3.9B$4.5B$4.4B$5.2B$8.6B$9.6B$7.2B$6.7B$6.3B$6.2BRevenueRevenue
$475M$543M$593M$686M$800M$1.4B$1.8B$1.4B$1.2B$1.1B$1.0BGross profitGross prof.
15%14%13%16%16%16%19%20%18%17%16%Gross marginGross mgn
10%9%9%10%9%8%9%11%11%11%11%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$164M$181M$207M$245M$346M$738M$950M$647M$492M$364M$316MOperating incomeOp. inc.
5.1%4.6%4.6%5.5%6.7%8.5%9.9%9.0%7.4%5.8%5.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
$161M$176M$198M$241M$341M$726M$935M$671M$540M$392MPretax incomePretax
$101M$120M$149M$180M$247M$536M$693M$514M$415M$295M$249MNet incomeNet inc.
34%30%23%24%26%24%25%23%22%25%26%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$173M$137M$117M$349M$336M$512M$832M$960M$643M$546M$493MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$41M$49M$55M$60M$64M$84M$94M$111M$125M$138M$145MDepreciationDeprec.
$28M($35M)($90M)$105M$22M($119M)$17M$300M$65M$75M$62MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$54M$71M$96M$85M$89M$151M$174M$180M$232M$269M$226MCapexCapex
1.7%1.8%2.1%1.9%1.7%1.8%1.8%2.5%3.5%4.3%3.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$132M$88M$62M$289M$273M$428M$738M$849M$518M$407M$348MOwner earningsOwner earn.
4.1%2.2%1.4%6.5%5.3%5.0%7.7%11.8%7.8%6.4%5.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$119M$65M$21M$264M$247M$361M$657M$780M$410M$276M$267MFree cash flowFCF
3.7%1.7%0.5%6.0%4.8%4.2%6.8%10.8%6.2%4.4%4.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$80M$61M$54M$39M$65M$476M$180M$52M$30M$30MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$3M$20M$22M$25M$31M$40M$59M$68M$81M$82M$81MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$13M$25M$29M$96M$82M$141M$433MBuybacksBuybacks
($228M)($138M)($121M)($142M)($155M)($611M)($354M)($240M)($271M)($273M)Investing cash flowInv. cash
$3M($5M)$4M($67M)$85M($45M)($210M)($163M)($307M)($530M)Financing cash flowFin. cash
($2M)$650K($464K)$482K$962K($2M)$979K$6M($7M)$3MExchange-rate effectFX
($54M)($6M)($618K)$140M$268M($145M)$268M$563M$57M($255M)Change in cashΔ cash
11%12%13%15%19%28%31%23%17%12%9%ROICROIC
12%12%14%14%17%27%27%17%13%10%8%Return on equityROE
12%10%12%12%15%25%25%15%10%7%6%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$44M$40M$42M$187M$461M$323M$595M$1.2B$1.2B$949M$644MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$282M$328M$343M$364M$471M$738M$618M$549M$501M$476M$731MReceivablesReceiv.
$397M$460M$556M$487M$567M$963M$973M$728M$721M$722M$749MInventoryInvent.
$125M$140M$137M$142M$212M$319M$207M$203M$225M$206M$293MAccounts payablePayables
$555M$648M$763M$708M$826M$1.4B$1.4B$1.1B$997M$992M$1.2BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$756M$863M$995M$1.1B$1.5B$2.1B$2.3B$2.5B$2.5B$2.3B$2.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$272M$303M$310M$354M$464M$776M$612M$568M$512M$494M$557MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.8×2.8×3.2×3.1×3.3×2.7×3.7×4.4×4.9×4.6×4.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$298M$329M$355M$387M$417M$589M$689M$777M$891M$993MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$199M$213M$224M$230M$252M$315M$337M$336M$340M$344M$345MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.3B$1.5B$1.6B$1.9B$2.4B$3.2B$3.7B$4.0B$4.2B$4.0B$4.1BTotal assetsAssets
$112M$146M$202M$164M$312M$320M$278M$276M$234M$230M$234MTotal debtDebt
$67M$106M$160M($23M)($149M)($3M)($317M)($877M)($969M)($719M)($409M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
35.9×29.2×23.3×28.2×37.1×53.4×68.3×50.3×38.7×33.3×31.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$432M$491M$559M$632M$922M$1.2B$1.1B$968M$901M$934MTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$0$7M$20M$5M$4MRedeemable interestsRedeemable
$11M$15M$15M$14M$23M$38M$33M$30M$21M$22MNoncontrolling interestsNCI
$849M$959M$1.1B$1.2B$1.5B$2.0B$2.6B$3.0B$3.2B$3.1B$3.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.3%0.5%0.6%0.6%0.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$11M$2M$5M$2M$2MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
60.2M60.4M60.4M60.1M59.9M60.4M60.7M60.6M58.9M56.8M54.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$53.81$65.29$74.28$73.44$86.00$143.09$158.72$119.04$112.98$111.28$115.19Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.68$1.98$2.46$2.99$4.12$8.87$11.42$8.48$7.04$5.19$4.60EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.19$1.46$1.02$4.80$4.55$7.10$12.16$14.01$8.80$7.17$6.44Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.97$1.08$0.34$4.40$4.13$5.99$10.84$12.85$6.97$4.87$4.93Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.05$0.32$0.37$0.41$0.51$0.67$0.97$1.13$1.37$1.45$1.49Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.89$1.18$1.59$1.41$1.49$2.50$2.87$2.97$3.95$4.74$4.18Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$14.10$15.90$17.76$20.68$24.37$32.78$42.27$49.47$54.76$53.92$56.13Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+8.4%/yr+5.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+14.1%/yr+9.5%/yr
EPS+13.4%/yr+4.7%/yr
Dividends / share+44.0%/yr+23.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+20.4%/yr+26.1%/yr
Book value / share+16.1%/yr+17.2%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $407M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $138M it takes just to hold its position. It put $131M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $276M.

Reported net income$295M
Owner earnings$407M · 6% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$295M$415M$514M$693M$536M
Depreciationnon-cash charge added back+$138M+$125M+$111M+$94M+$84M
Amortization of intangible assetsnon-cash charge added back; the purchase price of past acquisitions, expensed over time+$23M+$24M+$21M+$19M+$14M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$38M+$38M+$35M+$28M+$11M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$52M+$42M+$279M−$3M−$132M
Cash from operations$546M$643M$960M$832M$512M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$138M−$125M−$111M−$94M−$84M
Owner earnings$407M$518M$849M$738M$428M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$131M−$108M−$70M−$80M−$67M
Free cash flow$276M$410M$780M$657M$361M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue6%8%12%8%5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $138M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $131M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $38M), owner earnings is nearer $370M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $364M ÷ interest expense $11M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $914M + ST investments $34M − debt $230M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $719M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 27 + DIO 50 − DPO 14 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 11%–31%; 12% latest = NOPAT $274M ÷ invested capital $2.4B
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 1%–12%; latest $407M = operating cash $546M − maintenance capex $138M
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. It chose to put $131M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $276M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $38M of SBC) leaves $370M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $546M ÷ net income $295M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $515M ÷ Owner Earnings $407M — this fiscal year
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $407M of Owner Earnings, $515M (127%) went back to shareholders, $82M dividends, $433M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $38M stock comp, the real buyback was about $395M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands. This year's proportion is 127%; across the record (2016–2025) it is 33%, the capital-allocation section below.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.95×
    Expanding
    Capex $269M ÷ property depreciation $138M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 0.6%
    The count is genuinely shrinking
    Stock compensation $38M (fiscal 2025), 0.6% of revenue · repurchases $433M · diluted shares -6.4% since 2022
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 6 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $6.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 4.59×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $230M vs $1.8B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +231%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $7.39/share (latest year $5.34), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $55.52/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 5% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 5% early to 7% lately, median 6% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 21%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +17%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 17% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2017 · 4.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.6%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 27, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.2B
  • Cash & short-term investments$644M
  • Receivables$731M
  • Inventory$749M
  • Other current assets$96M
Current liabilities$557M
  • Debt due within a year$5M
  • Accounts payable$293M
  • Other current liabilities$259M
Current ratio3.98×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.64×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.15×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.7Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$5M due · $644M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Jun 27, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+2.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters4.3× → 4.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2.6Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$1.2BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$408M$174M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$6Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$1.4B · 30%
  • Dividends$431M · 9%
  • Buybacks$819M · 18%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$2.0B · 42%
  • Returned to owners$1.2B

    33% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $431M as dividends and $819M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$80.34

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 10M shares were bought for $819M, about $80.34 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $28.62 (2018) to $100.14 (2024); its heaviest year, 2025, paid $96.25 ($433M).

  • Net change in share count−10.1%

    The diluted count fell from 60M to 54M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.45/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 44% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained25%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.0B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $498M, so each retained $1 added about 0.25 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$478M12% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity11%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.1Bover 15 years since fiscal 2010 buying other businesses, against $1.4B of capital spent building over the 10-year record

$22M written down across 4 years (2020, 2022, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Beside that spending sits $162M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2009 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Matthew Missad$9.8M$16.1M$428M
2022$10.3M$8.2M$738M
2023$8.5M$25.9M$849M
2024$5.9M$5.4M$518M
2025William Schwartz$3.7M$2.0M$407M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

  • Insider ownership2.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$38M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 0.6% of revenue, equal to 10.4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Paper & Forest Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
3861Oji Holdings$11.7B21%4y4.9%4%4%
SUZSuzano S.A.$9.7B38%30.9%12%4y26%
UFPIUFP Industries$6.3B16%6.2%16%6%
WFGWest Fraser Timber Co. Ltd$5.5B36%9.6%12%10%
SLVMSylvamo Corporation$3.4B12.0%17%10%
MAGNMagnera Corporation$3.2B15%2.6%1%3%
LPXLouisiana-Pacific Corporation$2.7B27%18.3%29%11%
MATVMativ Holdings$2.0B23%6.2%6%10%
Group median23%7.9%12%10%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what UFP Industries has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, UFP Industries earns about $371M on its 5.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−6%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+16%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $267M on 55M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-27; net cash $409M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($226M) runs well above depreciation ($145M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $355M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "UFP Industries (UFPI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/UFPI, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← UFCS its page in the Manual UFPT →

Industry order: ← SUZ the Paper & Forest Products chapter WFG →