VG, Venture Global Inc.

Will it survive?

• Can it pay its interest? 3.5×
  Adequate
  Operating income $5.2B ÷ interest expense $1.5B
  What this means

  Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

• How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $31.9B · 6.2× operating profit
  Heavy net debt
  Cash $2.4B − debt $34.2B
  What this means

  Netting $2.4B of cash and short-term investments against $34.2B of debt leaves $31.9B owed, about 6.2× a year's operating profit (6.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

• How long is cash tied up? —
  Not enough data
  What this means

  The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

• Return on invested capital 10%
  Solid
  NOPAT $4.0B ÷ invested capital $38.6B (debt + equity − cash)
  Industry peers: median 11%
  What this means

  The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

• Owner-earnings margin 41%
  High through the cycle
  3-yr median margin, range 37%–54%; latest $5.6B = operating cash $6.6B − maintenance capex $941M
  Industry peers: median 13%
  What this means

  What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 41% of revenue this year, a 41% median across 3 years. It chose to put $12.4B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($6.8B) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $46M of SBC) leaves $5.6B.

• Are earnings backed by cash? 2.91×
  Cash-backed
  Cash from ops $6.6B ÷ net income $2.3B
  What this means

  How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

• Where do the earnings go? 8%
  Reinvests most of it
  Dividends + buybacks $465M ÷ Owner Earnings $5.6B — this fiscal year
  What this means

  Of $5.6B Owner Earnings, $465M (8%) went back to shareholders, $465M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

• Investing or harvesting? 14.20×
  Expanding
  Capex $13.4B ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $941M
  What this means

  Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

• Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 0.3%
  Stock pay, share count unread
  Stock compensation $46M (fiscal 2025), 0.3% of revenue · no repurchases · the share count is not comparable across these years (a split or a first listing sits in the record), so the drift is withheld
  What this means

  Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 2 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

• Adequate size Pass
  Revenue ≥ $2B · $13.8B
  What this means

  Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

• Strong liquidity —
  Current ratio ≥ 2× (waived for utilities) · exempt
  What this means

  Graham exempted public utilities from this test: their working capital “takes care of itself” through the continuous bond-and-share financing of growth, so a thin current ratio is the industry's structure, not a warning. His substitute test — debt no more than twice book equity — is the next line.

• Conservative debt Miss
  Debt ≤ 2× equity (Graham's utility test) · $34.2B vs $6.7B equity
  What this means

  Graham's own substitution for public utilities: debt not exceeding twice the stock equity at book value, in place of the working-capital tests an industrial faces. A utility finances its plant with bonds by design; the question is whether the borrowing stays inside the equity behind it.

• Moderate price —
  P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
  What this means

  Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.86/share (latest year $0.91), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.72/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.