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WOLF, Wolfspeed Inc. Common Stock New

Semiconductors capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCapital build-out

Wolfspeed, Inc. is a North Carolina corporation established in 1987, and our headquarters are in Durham, North Carolina.

Our product families include power devices and silicon carbide and gallium nitride (GaN) materials.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

WOLF · Wolfspeed Inc. Common Stock New

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$758M

−6.1% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM

Cash & investments $955M

Cash burn · annual $712M

Runway 1.3 yrs

Gross margin −16%

Next report By 8/27 · the annual report (10-K) for the fiscal year ended late June · due within 60 days of period end · has filed ~58 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Power Products (55%) and Materials Products (45%).
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 168% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −38% through the cycle on a 32% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Capital spending runs about 49% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 2 lines, the largest Power Products at 55%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Power Products55%$414M
Materials Products45%$344M

By geographyEurope20%United States18%Asia Pacific14%Singapore14%Hong Kong SAR China13%Japan12%Other10%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2013–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2013’13	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMJun 2025
											Income statement
$1.4B	$772M	$925M	$538M	$471M	$526M	$572M	$759M	$807M	$758M	$758M	RevenueRevenue
$523M	$244M	$302M	$244M	$159M	$165M	$208M	$243M	$77M	($122M)	($122M)	Gross profitGross prof.
38%	32%	33%	45%	34%	31%	36%	32%	10%	−16%	−16%	Gross marginGross mgn
17%	19%	18%	31%	39%	35%	32%	28%	31%	25%	25%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
11%	15%	14%	23%	32%	34%	25%	22%	25%	23%	23%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$96M	($20M)	($28M)	($94M)	($224M)	($314M)	($203M)	($312M)	($445M)	($1.3B)	($1.3B)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
7.0%	−2.6%	−3.0%	−17.4%	−47.6%	−59.7%	−35.5%	−41.1%	−55.2%	−175.4%	−175.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$108M	($7M)	($18M)	($123M)	($206M)	($340M)	($242M)	($260M)	($573M)	($1.6B)	—	Pretax incomePretax
$87M	($98M)	($280M)	($375M)	($192M)	($524M)	($201M)	($330M)	($864M)	($1.6B)	($1.6B)	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
$285M	$221M	$174M	$202M	($29M)	($126M)	($154M)	($143M)	($726M)	($712M)	($712M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$153M	$151M	$112M	$86M	$97M	$121M	$112M	$146M	$181M	$252M	$252M	Depreciation & amortizationD&A
($9M)	$120M	$304M	$448M	$18M	$224M	($119M)	($31M)	($127M)	$572M	$572M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$77M	$87M	$172M	$125M	$230M	$571M	$637M	$950M	$2.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	CapexCapex
5.6%	11.3%	18.6%	23.2%	48.8%	108.5%	111.3%	125.2%	281.7%	167.8%	167.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$208M	$134M	$62M	$116M	($126M)	($246M)	($266M)	($288M)	($907M)	($964M)	($964M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
15.0%	17.3%	6.7%	21.6%	−26.8%	−46.9%	−46.4%	−38.0%	−112.3%	−127.2%	−127.2%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$208M	$134M	$1M	$78M	($259M)	($696M)	($791M)	($1.1B)	($3.0B)	($2.0B)	($2.0B)	Free cash flowFCF
15.0%	17.3%	0.1%	14.4%	−55.0%	−132.4%	−138.3%	−144.0%	−371.6%	−261.8%	−261.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	$429M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$2M	$104M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
($380M)	($145M)	($424M)	($227M)	($487M)	($449M)	($391M)	($1.1B)	($1.9B)	($268M)	—	Investing cash flowInv. cash
$106M	($109M)	$237M	$407M	$464M	$504M	$616M	$2.6B	$2.0B	$400M	—	Financing cash flowFin. cash
$305K	($100K)	$200K	($100K)	($100K)	$200K	($200K)	$0	($200K)	$1M	—	Exchange-rate effectFX
$11M	($34M)	($14M)	$382M	($52M)	($70M)	$71M	$1.3B	($711M)	($579M)	—	Change in cashΔ cash
3%	-1%	-1%	-4%	-7%	-10%	-5%	-9%	-6%	-9%	-9%	ROICROIC
3%	-4%	-14%	-18%	-9%	-25%	-8%	-20%	-98%	—	—	Return on equityROE
3%	−4%	−14%	−18%	−9%	−25%	−8%	−20%	−98%	—	—	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$1.0B	$133M	$387M	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$3.0B	$2.2B	$955M	$955M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$193M	$148M	$86M	$129M	$72M	$96M	$150M	$155M	$147M	$179M	$179M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$197M	$284M	$152M	$187M	$122M	$167M	$227M	$285M	$441M	$435M	$435M	InventoryInvent.
$121M	$133M	$68M	$91M	$88M	$44M	$58M	$45M	$53M	$31M	$31M	Accounts payablePayables
$268M	$300M	$170M	$226M	$106M	$218M	$319M	$395M	$535M	$584M	$584M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.5B	$1.1B	$890M	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.5B	$1.8B	$3.6B	$3.0B	$2.5B	$2.5B	Current assetsCur. assets
$207M	$212M	$249M	$268M	$291M	$449M	$389M	$628M	$665M	$7.1B	$7.1B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
7.3×	5.2×	3.6×	5.3×	5.5×	3.3×	4.5×	5.7×	4.5×	0.4×	0.4×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$543M	$581M	$589M	$625M	$831M	$1.3B	$1.5B	$2.2B	$3.7B	$3.9B	—	Net PP&ENet PP&E
$616M	$619M	$530M	$530M	$350M	$359M	$359M	$359M	$359M	$0	$0	GoodwillGoodwill
$3.1B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$2.8B	$3.2B	$3.4B	$3.9B	$6.6B	$8.0B	$6.9B	$6.9B	Total assetsAssets
—	$145M	$292M	$469M	$784M	$824M	$1.0B	$3.0B	$6.2B	$13.1B	$13.1B	Total debtDebt
—	$12M	($95M)	($582M)	($456M)	($331M)	($177M)	$71M	$4.0B	$12.1B	$12.1B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	—	-3.8×	-3.6×	-6.4×	-6.9×	-8.1×	-7.3×	-1.8×	-4.2×	-4.2×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
—	$0	$5M	$5M	$6M	$0	—	—	—	—	—	Noncontrolling interestsNCI
$2.8B	$2.2B	$2.1B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.4B	$1.6B	$882M	($447M)	($447M)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
3.9%	6.2%	4.1%	8.0%	10.0%	10.1%	9.4%	9.6%	10.5%	9.7%	9.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	—	$248M	$90M	—	—	—	—	—	$359M	$359M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
29.5M	24.6M	24.9M	25.9M	27.0M	28.1M	30.0M	31.1M	31.4M	35.3M	32.7M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$46.99	$31.33	$37.17	$20.78	$17.44	$18.71	$19.05	$24.39	$25.69	$21.44	$23.16	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.95	$-3.98	$-11.25	$-14.49	$-7.10	$-18.65	$-6.69	$-10.61	$-27.50	$-45.55	$-49.20	EPS (diluted)EPS
$7.04	$5.43	$2.49	$4.48	$-4.67	$-8.77	$-8.85	$-9.27	$-28.85	$-27.28	$-29.47	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$7.04	$5.43	$0.05	$3.00	$-9.59	$-24.78	$-26.34	$-35.13	$-95.46	$-56.13	$-60.63	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.63	$3.53	$6.92	$4.82	$8.52	$20.31	$21.21	$30.54	$72.37	$35.99	$38.87	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$95.05	$90.28	$83.07	$78.64	$77.20	$75.36	$81.23	$52.16	$28.07	$-12.65	$-13.67	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before TTM are restated ×1/4 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	12-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−6.3%/yr	+4.2%/yr
Capital spending / share	+24.4%/yr	+33.4%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2013FY2019

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($964M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $252M it takes just to hold its position. It put $1.0B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($2.0B).

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($1.6B)	($864M)	($330M)	($201M)	($524M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$252M	+$181M	+$146M	+$112M	+$121M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$73M	+$85M	+$73M	+$54M	+$53M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$572M	−$127M	−$31M	−$119M	+$224M
Cash from operations	($712M)	($726M)	($143M)	($154M)	($126M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$252M	−$181M	−$146M	−$112M	−$121M
Owner earnings	($964M)	($907M)	($288M)	($266M)	($246M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$1.0B	−$2.1B	−$804M	−$525M	−$450M
Free cash flow	($2.0B)	($3.0B)	($1.1B)	($791M)	($696M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-127%	-112%	-38%	-46%	-47%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $252M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $1.0B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $73M), owner earnings is nearer ($1.0B).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -4.2×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($1.3B) ÷ interest expense $315M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $12.1B

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $467M + ST investments $488M − debt $13.1B

What this means
Netting $955M of cash and short-term investments against $13.1B of debt leaves $12.1B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 254d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 86 + DIO 181 − DPO 13 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -6%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -10%–3%; -9% latest = NOPAT ($1.1B) ÷ invested capital $12.2B

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin -32%

Consumes cash through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -127%–22%; latest ($964M) = operating cash ($712M) − maintenance capex $252M

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -127% of revenue this year, a -32% median across 10 years. It chose to put $1.0B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($2.0B) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $73M of SBC) leaves ($1.0B).
Are earnings backed by cash? ($712M)

Loss, and burning cash

Net income ($1.6B) · cash from operations ($712M)

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 5.04×

Expanding

Capex $1.3B ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $252M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 9.7%

The count is rising

Stock compensation $73M (fiscal 2025), 9.7% of revenue · no repurchases · diluted shares +17.6% since 2022

What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $758M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.36×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $13.1B vs ($4.5B) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record —

Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-19.33/share (latest year $-33.29), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-9.25/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2013–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 1 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 0% → −91% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 0% early to −91% lately, median −41% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −12%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2025 · −175.4% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +1.5%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 29, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.7B

Cash & short-term investments$1.2B
Receivables$97M
Inventory$281M
Other current assets$167M

Current liabilities$243M

Accounts payable$21M
Other current liabilities$222M

Current ratio7.03×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio5.88×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio4.79×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$1.5Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Cash runway0.6 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−19.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters3.1× → 7.0×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$613Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($417M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$1.8B$108M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$71Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$24M0% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$896Mover 11 years since fiscal 2010 buying other businesses, against $6.4B of capital spent building over the 10-year record

$697M written down across 3 years (2018, 2019, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Beside that spending sits $294M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2009 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Stock-based compensation$73M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 9.7% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$76M · 10% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“We had two customers during each of fiscal 2025, 2024 and 2023 that each represented more than 10% of our consolidated revenue.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Semiconductors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics, research and the inventory cycle. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

Company	Revenuelatest FY, USD	Gross marginmedian over the record	Op. marginmedian over the record	ROICmedian over the record	Owner earn. marginmedian over the record	R&D / revenuelatest FY	Capex / revenuelatest FY	Inventory dayslatest FY
PLABPhotronics	$849M	25%	13.3%	11%	13%	1.9%	22.2%	41
FORMFormFactor	$785M	40%	8.4%	7%	11%	14.7%	13.2%	85
WOLFWolfspeed Inc. Common Stock New	$758M	32%	-38.3%	-6%	-32%	23.1%	167.8%	181
TET1 Energy Inc.	$755M	25%2y	-31.1%1y	-14%	2%1y	—	10.4%	61
IMOSChipMOS TECHNOLOGIES INC.	$714M	20%	12.3%	10%	9%	—	22.4%	50
DQDAQO New Energy Corp.	$665M	37%	29.5%	15%	35%	—	26.0%	77
AAOIApplied Optoelectronics Inc.	$456M	26%	-19.9%	-13%	-13%	18.8%	39.3%	210
AMBQAmbiq Micro Inc.	$73M	38%2y	-54.0%2y	-141%1y	—	53.1%	—	153
Group median	—	29%	-5.7%	1%	9%	18.8%	22.4%	81

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Wolfspeed Inc. Common Stock New is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered12%/yr’20→’25

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today−262%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh WOLF against another business →

The owners of WOLF: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Wolfspeed Inc. Common Stock New (WOLF), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WOLF, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← WNS its page in the Manual WOOF →

Industry order: ← VIAV the Semiconductors chapter