Owner Scorecard


← Japan catalog ← 1925 Manual 1963 → ← 1925 Homebuilders BZH →

1928 · Sekisui House

General Bldg Contractors - Residential Bldgs Capital-intensive J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET
1928 · Sekisui House

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Sekisui House’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 1928) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥2.03T¥2.16T¥2.16T¥2.42T¥2.45T¥2.59T¥2.93T¥3.11T¥4.06T¥4.20TRevenueRevenue
¥478.0B¥473.5B¥786.0B¥839.8BGross profitGross prof.
20%19%19%20%Gross marginGross mgn
11%12%11%12%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%0%0%0%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
¥184.2B¥195.5B¥189.2B¥205.3B¥186.5B¥230.2B¥261.5B¥271.0B¥331.4B¥341.4BOperating incomeOp. inc.
9.1%9.1%8.8%8.5%7.6%8.9%8.9%8.7%8.2%8.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥121.9B¥133.2B¥128.6B¥141.3B¥123.5B¥153.9B¥184.5B¥202.3B¥217.7B¥232.1BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥115.8B¥165.4B¥125.1B¥363.8B¥192.0B¥118.0B¥125.5B¥15.7B¥62.9B¥216.3BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥23.1B¥22.0B¥22.2B¥21.5B¥21.7B¥24.1B¥26.7B¥27.7B¥35.2B¥42.8BDepreciationDeprec.
(¥29.2B)¥10.1B(¥25.6B)¥201.0B¥46.7B(¥59.9B)(¥85.8B)(¥214.4B)(¥190.1B)(¥58.5B)Working capital & otherWC & other
¥94.6B¥62.9B¥53.9B¥66.6B¥87.5B¥83.0B¥92.2B¥76.9B¥76.7B¥66.9BCapexCapex
4.7%2.9%2.5%2.8%3.6%3.2%3.1%2.5%1.9%1.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥92.7B¥143.4B¥102.9B¥342.2B¥170.2B¥94.0B¥98.8B(¥12.1B)¥27.6B¥173.6BOwner earningsOwner earn.
4.6%6.6%4.8%14.2%7.0%3.6%3.4%−0.4%0.7%4.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥21.2B¥102.5B¥71.2B¥297.1B¥104.5B¥35.1B¥33.3B(¥61.3B)(¥13.8B)¥149.4BFree cash flowFCF
1.0%4.7%3.3%12.3%4.3%1.4%1.1%−2.0%−0.3%3.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥41.1B¥47.6B¥54.5B¥55.1B¥58.7B¥55.6B¥66.4B¥76.9B¥83.0B¥92.7BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥22.0B¥19M¥3.4B¥10.0B¥5.0B¥15.0B¥30.0B¥40.0B¥18M¥14MBuybacksBuybacks
10%10%10%13%12%12%11%10%8%8%ROICROIC
11%11%11%11%10%10%11%11%13%13%Return on equityROE
7%7%6%7%5%6%7%7%8%8%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥204.7B¥324.7B¥342.9B¥583.3B¥600.2B¥515.2B¥332.7B¥292.9B¥390.3B¥434.9BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥7.2B¥7.6B¥8.5B¥8.3B¥7.3B¥9.5B¥12.2B¥12.5B¥12.2B¥11.9BInventoryInvent.
¥7.2B¥7.6B¥8.5B¥8.3B¥7.3B¥9.5B¥12.2B¥12.5B¥12.2B¥11.9BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥1.36T¥1.57T¥1.57T¥1.82T¥1.78T¥1.95T¥2.09T¥2.50T¥3.71T¥3.91TCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥713.9B¥706.9B¥781.3B¥821.9B¥835.8B¥867.9B¥1.04T¥1.14T¥1.56T¥1.40TCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.9×2.2×2.0×2.2×2.1×2.2×2.0×2.2×2.4×2.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥48M¥6.2B¥4.6B¥3.1B¥1.6B¥250M¥31.4B¥17.8B¥134.2B¥114.6BGoodwillGoodwill
¥2.18T¥2.42T¥2.41T¥2.63T¥2.63T¥2.80T¥3.01T¥3.35T¥4.81T¥5.01TTotal assetsAssets
¥486.8B¥616.6B¥633.6B¥580.5B¥556.4B¥543.3B¥585.6B¥751.6B¥1.85T¥1.85TTotal debtDebt
¥282.1B¥291.9B¥290.7B(¥2.8B)(¥43.9B)¥28.2B¥252.8B¥458.7B¥1.46T¥1.42TNet debt / (cash)Net debt
79.2×52.4×40.1×41.8×67.4×60.0×49.2×21.9×9.9×8.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥1.12T¥1.21T¥1.20T¥1.23T¥1.29T¥1.52T¥1.67T¥1.79T¥1.69T¥1.83TShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
710M691M691M691M685M685M685M663M663M663MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥2856.11¥3126.41¥3127.79¥3496.81¥3573.77¥3782.16¥4277.65¥4687.61¥6121.57¥6330.54Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥171.70¥192.89¥186.17¥204.52¥180.44¥224.78¥269.50¥305.23¥328.37¥350.00EPS (diluted)EPS
¥130.61¥207.58¥149.03¥495.52¥248.65¥137.24¥144.23¥-18.20¥41.70¥261.74Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥29.92¥148.34¥103.10¥430.22¥152.60¥51.24¥48.64¥-92.41¥-20.83¥225.29Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥57.89¥68.96¥78.95¥79.74¥85.77¥81.22¥96.98¥115.96¥125.14¥139.81Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥133.28¥91.07¥78.01¥96.46¥127.78¥121.15¥134.61¥116.07¥115.68¥100.93Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥1575.72¥1749.17¥1732.95¥1787.37¥1890.92¥2221.40¥2435.50¥2706.52¥2548.16¥2758.40Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+9.2%/yr+12.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share+8.0%/yr+1.0%/yr
EPS+8.2%/yr+14.2%/yr
Dividends / share+10.3%/yr+10.3%/yr
Capital spending / share−3.0%/yr−4.6%/yr
Book value / share+6.4%/yr+7.8%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥173.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥42.8B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥24.2B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥149.4B.

Reported net income¥232.1B
Owner earnings¥173.6B · 4% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥232.1B¥217.7B¥202.3B¥184.5B¥153.9B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥42.8B+¥35.2B+¥27.7B+¥26.7B+¥24.1B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−¥58.5B−¥190.1B−¥214.4B−¥85.8B−¥59.9B
Cash from operations¥216.3B¥62.9B¥15.7B¥125.5B¥118.0B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥42.8B−¥35.2B−¥27.7B−¥26.7B−¥24.1B
Owner earnings¥173.6B¥27.6B(¥12.1B)¥98.8B¥94.0B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥24.2B−¥41.5B−¥49.2B−¥65.5B−¥58.9B
Free cash flow¥149.4B(¥13.8B)(¥61.3B)¥33.3B¥35.1B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue4%1%0%3%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥42.8B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥24.2B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Peers, Homebuilders

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
1925Daiwa House Industry$35.2B20%4y8.9%10%5%
DHID.R. Horton Inc.$34.3B24%14.2%16%5%
LENLennar Corporation$34.2B13.9%16%8%
1928Sekisui House$26.5B20%4y8.7%10%4%
PHMPulteGroup Inc.$17.3B16.3%19%9%
TOLToll Brothers Inc.$11.0B22%11.6%13%9%
NVRNVR Inc.$10.3B16.0%76%12%
1808Haseko$8.0B16%4y9.0%13%5%
Group median20%12.7%15%6%

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥341.4B ÷ interest expense ¥39.2B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥1.42T · 4.1× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash ¥434.9B − debt ¥1.85T
    What this means

    Netting ¥434.9B of cash and short-term investments against ¥1.85T of debt leaves ¥1.42T owed, about 4.1× a year's operating profit (5.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 8%–13%; 8% latest = NOPAT ¥269.7B ÷ invested capital ¥3.24T
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -0%–14%; latest ¥173.6B = operating cash ¥216.3B − maintenance capex ¥42.8B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years.

  • Mostly cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥216.3B ÷ net income ¥232.1B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks ¥92.7B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥173.6B — this fiscal year
    What this means

    Of ¥173.6B Owner Earnings, ¥92.7B (53%) went back to shareholders, ¥92.7B dividends, ¥14M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does. This year's proportion is 53%; across the record (2017–2026) it is 61%, the capital-allocation section below.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.57×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥66.9B ÷ depreciation ¥42.8B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 9% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 9% early, 8% lately, median 9%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 7%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth −2%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 2% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · 7.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.8%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥1.50T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥761.1B · 51%
  • Dividends¥631.6B · 42%
  • Buybacks¥125.5B · 8%
  • Returned to owners¥757.1B

    61% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥631.6B as dividends and ¥125.5B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose ¥1.36T and cash and short-term investments rose ¥230.2B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥125.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−6.6%

    The diluted count fell from 710M to 663M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥139.81/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 10% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained−6%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥881.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell ¥49.9B, so each retained ¥1 gave back about 0.06 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Sekisui House has delivered.

¥

Through the cycle, Sekisui House earns about ¥182.8B on its 4.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.1% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+1%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+1%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ¥149.4B on 663M diluted shares; net debt ¥1.42T. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥66.9B) runs well above depreciation (¥42.8B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥173.6B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 1925 its page in the Manual 1963 →

Industry order: ← 1925 the Homebuilders chapter BZH →