Owner Scorecard


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AKBA, Akebia Therapeutics Inc.

Pharmaceuticals consumer brand Unprofitable

We are a fully integrated biopharmaceutical company with two commercial products for patients impacted by kidney disease.

CKD significantly impacts the United States, or U.S. , healthcare system, potentially affecting approximately 35.5 million patients.

Our two commercial products address certain complications of kidney disease.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
AKBA · Akebia Therapeutics Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$236M
+47.5% YoY · −4% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $219M 5-yr avg $219M
Gross margin 80% 5-yr avg 61%
Operating margin −6.9% 5-yr avg −39.6%
Owner-earnings margin 18% 5-yr avg −31%
Free cash flow margin 18% 5-yr avg −31%

Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~38 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Auryxia (77%), Vafseo (19%) and License Collaboration and Other Revenue (4%).
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −42% through the cycle on a 62% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −116%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Auryxia is 77% of revenue, with Vafseo the other meaningful line at 19%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Auryxia77%$182M
  • Vafseo19%$46M
  • License Collaboration And Other Revenue4%$9M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$2M$181M$208M$335M$295M$212M$292M$195M$160M$236M$219MRevenueRevenue
$226M($2M)$61M$207M$120M$97M$197M$174MGross profitGross prof.
67%−1%29%71%62%61%83%80%Gross marginGross mgn
n/m15%42%45%52%82%47%52%67%46%52%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
n/m127%140%96%74%70%44%32%24%26%32%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($136M)($77M)($178M)($286M)($378M)($265M)($81M)($46M)($50M)$23M($15M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
n/m−42.3%−85.8%−85.5%−128.2%−125.0%−27.6%−23.8%−31.5%9.9%−6.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
($136M)($74M)($172M)($286M)($385M)($282M)($94M)($52M)($69M)($4M)Pretax incomePretax
($136M)($74M)($144M)($280M)($385M)($282M)($94M)($52M)($69M)($5M)($30M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$58M($56M)($97M)($257M)($110M)($253M)($73M)($23M)($41M)$68M$42MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$296K$617K$899K$2M$2M$2M$2MDepreciation & amortizationD&A
$188M$8M$26M$8M$248M$4M$2M$19M$21M$62M$58MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$3M$2M$2M$7M$317K$59K$114K$0$33K$291K$1MCapexCapex
173.4%0.9%0.8%2.0%0.1%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.1%0.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$58M($57M)($98M)($260M)($111M)($253M)($73M)($23M)($41M)$68M$40MOwner earningsOwner earn.
n/m−31.3%−47.4%−77.5%−37.6%−119.5%−25.1%−12.0%−25.4%28.7%18.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$55M($58M)($99M)($264M)($111M)($253M)($73M)($23M)($41M)$68M$40MFree cash flowFCF
n/m−31.9%−47.7%−78.8%−37.6%−119.5%−25.1%−12.0%−25.4%28.7%18.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$13M($177M)$37M$211M($40M)$40M($114K)$0($33K)($8M)Investing cash flowInv. cash
$67M$116M$97M$89M$232M$134M$15M($25M)$50M$73MFinancing cash flowFin. cash
$138M($117M)$36M$43M$81M($79M)($59M)($49M)$9M$133MChange in cashΔ cash
-116%-26%-70%-266%-961%ROICROIC
-199%-60%-23%-71%-157%-381%-1802%-16%-119%Return on equityROE
−199%−60%−23%−71%−157%−381%n/m−16%−119%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$260M$318M$105M$147M$229M$150M$90M$43M$52M$185M$156MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$34M$34M$17M$39M$27M$52M$40M$39M$34M$47M$54MReceivablesReceiv.
$114M$116M$61M$37M$22M$16M$16M$16M$13MInventoryInvent.
$2M$7M$43M$39M$41M$34M$18M$15M$15M$21M$9MAccounts payablePayables
$32M$27M$88M$116M$47M$55M$44M$40M$35M$41M$57MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$296M$358M$468M$310M$371M$271M$185M$118M$114M$253M$230MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$114M$141M$266M$208M$187M$261M$130M$100M$81M$163M$161MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.6×2.5×1.8×1.5×2.0×1.0×1.4×1.2×1.4×1.6×1.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$3M$4M$8M$10M$9M$7M$5M$4M$2M$1MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$55M$55M$55M$59M$59M$59M$59M$59M$59MGoodwillGoodwill
$300M$364M$997M$771M$644M$529M$356M$242M$221M$377M$350MTotal assetsAssets
$15M$76M$96M$98M$66M$35M$39M$48M$50MTotal debtDebt
($90M)($72M)($132M)($52M)($24M)($8M)($13M)($137M)($106M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$232M$242M$361M$376M$397M$455M$351M$272M$270M$344MTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$68M$123M$636M$393M$244M$74M$5M($31M)($49M)$33M$25MShareholders’ equityEquity
379.5%4.9%9.2%3.6%8.3%10.7%6.1%4.8%4.9%4.8%6.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
75.4M87.0M116M118M138M166M183M187M211M257M268MShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.02$2.08$1.79$2.83$2.13$1.28$1.60$1.04$0.76$0.92$0.82Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.80$-0.85$-1.24$-2.36$-2.78$-1.70$-0.52$-0.28$-0.33$-0.02$-0.11EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.76$-0.65$-0.85$-2.19$-0.80$-1.52$-0.40$-0.12$-0.19$0.26$0.15Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.73$-0.66$-0.85$-2.23$-0.80$-1.52$-0.40$-0.12$-0.19$0.26$0.15Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.04$0.02$0.01$0.06$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.90$1.41$5.48$3.32$1.76$0.45$0.03$-0.16$-0.23$0.13$0.09Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2019 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+52.7%/yr−15.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share−11.2%/yr
Capital spending / share−31.8%/yr−13.1%/yr
Book value / share−19.6%/yr−40.9%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $5M loss into $68M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($5M)($69M)($52M)($94M)($282M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$2M+$2M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$11M+$8M+$9M+$18M+$23M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$62M+$21M+$19M+$2M+$4M
Cash from operations$68M($41M)($23M)($73M)($253M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$291K−$33K−$114K−$59K
Owner earnings$68M($41M)($23M)($73M)($253M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue29%-25%-12%-25%-120%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $11M), owner earnings is nearer $56M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

In dashed depreciation years the filer's own depreciation concepts changed scope and do not reconcile with the adjacent years; the add-back is withheld rather than guessed, and its amount remains inside "Working capital & other."

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash
    Cash $185M − debt $48M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $137M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 73 + DIO 144 − DPO 196 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Not meaningful here
    Invested capital ($104M) = debt $48M + equity $33M − cash
    Industry peers: median -37%
    What this means

    Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.

  • Positive this year, negative across the cycle
    latest $68M = operating cash $68M − maintenance capex $291K (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (9-yr median -31%)
    Industry peers: median -64%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 29% of revenue this year, a -31% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $11M of SBC) leaves $56M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($5M) · cash from operations $68M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting?
    Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 4.8%
    The count is rising
    Stock compensation $11M (fiscal 2025), 4.8% of revenue · no repurchases · diluted shares +40.7% since 2022
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $236M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.55×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $48M vs $90M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 10 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record
    Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.15/share (latest year $-0.02), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.12/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 0 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 10 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −3006% → −15% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −3006% early to −15% lately, median −85% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +47%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 47% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · −8889.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$230M
  • Cash & short-term investments$156M
  • Receivables$54M
  • Inventory$13M
  • Other current assets$7M
Current liabilities$161M
  • Debt due within a year$25M
  • Accounts payable$9M
  • Other current liabilities$127M
Current ratio1.43×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.35×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.97×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$69Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$25M due · $156M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Jun 30, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−21.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 1.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($34M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($95M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$55M$5M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$6Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021John P. Butler$3.1M$2.4M($253M)
2022John P. Butler$3.1M$708k($73M)
2023John P. Butler$2.8M$4.5M($23M)
2024John P. Butler$4.3M$5.6M($41M)
2025John P. Butler$5.7M$4.2M$68M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4.3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$11M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 4.8% of revenue, equal to 48.0% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers, Pharmaceuticals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
ARVNArvinas Inc.$263M-305.8%-37%-105%
SDGRSchrodinger Inc.$256M57%-80.8%-38%-53%
RCUSArcus Biosciences Inc.$247M-204.5%-55%-132%
AKBAAkebia Therapeutics Inc.$236M62%-42.3%-116%-31%
ANABAnaptysBio Inc.$235M-60.9%-25%-64%
PBYIPuma Biotechnology Inc$228M76%5.5%-59%8%
IDYAIDEAYA Biosciences Inc.$219M-179.9%-22%-175%
VNDAVanda Pharmaceuticals Inc.$216M-2.4%-0%9%
Group median62%-70.8%-38%-59%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Akebia Therapeutics Inc. has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $40M on 277M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-07-31; net cash $106M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1M) runs well above depreciation (—), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $41M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Akebia Therapeutics Inc. (AKBA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AKBA, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← AKAM its page in the Manual AKR →

Industry order: ← AGIO the Pharmaceuticals chapter ALKS →