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APPS, Digital Turbine Inc.
Digital Turbine, Inc., through its subsidiaries, is a leading independent mobile growth platform that levels up the landscape for advertisers, publishers, carriers, and device original equipment manufacturers.
Digital Turbine Inc. offers end-to-end products and solutions leveraging proprietary technology to all participants in the mobile application ecosystem, enabling brand discovery and advertising, user acquisition and engagement, and operational efficiency for advertisers.
ODS is comprised of the following product and service groups: Application Media represents the portion of the ODS business platform that delivers apps to end users through partnerships with wireless carriers and OEMs .
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report Est. 11/2–11/6 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~36 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 51% and operating margin about 4.7% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −69% to 19% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −43 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −2%, above 15% in 1 of 8 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $40M | $75M | $104M | $139M | $314M | $748M | $666M | $544M | $491M | $565M | $600M | RevenueRevenue |
| ($24M) | ($53M) | ($6M) | $14M | $55M | $36M | $17M | ($420M) | ($92M) | ($38M) | ($35M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $3M | $3M | $3M | $2M | $7M | $57M | $81M | $84M | $83M | $71M | $65M | Depreciation & amortizationD&A |
| ($7M) | $7M | $1M | $31M | $63M | $85M | $113M | $29M | $12M | $42M | $51M | Cash from operationsOp. cash |
| ($596K) | ($2M) | ($2M) | ($47M) | ($38M) | ($172M) | ($35M) | ($44M) | ($27M) | ($31M) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $3M | $2M | ($916K) | $26M | ($15M) | $185M | ($128M) | ($29M) | $23M | ($11M) | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| ($119K) | ($4K) | ($31K) | ($235K) | ($312K) | ($2M) | ($2M) | $3M | ($1M) | ($2M) | — | Exchange-rate effectFX |
| ($5M) | $7M | ($2M) | $11M | $9M | $96M | ($52M) | ($42M) | $6M | ($2M) | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $108M | $87M | $83M | $184M | $260M | $1.5B | $1.3B | $866M | $813M | $842M | $843M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | 10% | — | 37% | 32% | 44% | 50% | 43% | 42% | Debt / assetsDebt/assets |
| $10M | $4M | $0 | $19M | $15M | $533M | $411M | $383M | $409M | $361M | $353M | Total debtDebt |
| $4M | ($9M) | ($11M) | ($3M) | ($16M) | $407M | $335M | $351M | $369M | $323M | $310M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | $2M | $1M | $107K | $1M | — | — | — | — | — | $1M | Interest expenseInt. exp. |
| — | -2.8× | 3.1× | 123.5× | 56.8× | — | — | — | — | — | 59.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $46M | $59M | $47M | $107M | $115M | $942M | $659M | $652M | $659M | $641M | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| — | — | — | — | $0 | $2M | $2M | — | — | — | — | Noncontrolling interestsNCI |
| $62M | $28M | $36M | $77M | $145M | $515M | $605M | $214M | $154M | $192M | $191M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 66.5M | 70.3M | 77.4M | 89.6M | 96.2M | 103M | 102M | 101M | 104M | 113M | 121M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.93 | $0.39 | $0.47 | $0.86 | $1.51 | $5.01 | $5.94 | $2.12 | $1.48 | $1.70 | $1.58 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +26.5%/yr | +8.9%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | +50.8%/yr (2-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | — | +6.2%/yr (2-yr) |
| Book value / share | +6.9%/yr | +2.4%/yr |
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $323M · 9.5× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $38M − debt $361M
What this means
Netting $38M of cash and short-term investments against $361M of debt leaves $323M owed, about 9.5× a year's operating profit (10.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 162 + DIO 0 − DPO 199 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle8-yr median, range -52%–46%; 5% latest = NOPAT $27M ÷ invested capital $515MIndustry peers: median -2%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Positive this year, negative across the cyclelatest $11M = operating cash $42M − maintenance capex $31M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (4-yr median -1%)Industry peers: median 13%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a -1% median across 4 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $16M of SBC) leaves ($5M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($38M) · cash from operations $42M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.43×HarvestingCapex $31M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $71M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
The promise and the pay packet
- Sells itselfSelling and marketing $58M ÷ revenue $565M
What this means
Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.
- Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 2.9%The count is risingStock compensation $16M (fiscal 2026), 2.9% of revenue · no repurchases · diluted shares +10.9% since 2023
What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $565M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.16×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $361M vs $44M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record —Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.52/share (latest year $-0.31), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.59/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −16% → −25% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
The recent-years average (−25%) sits below the early years (−16%), but the latest year (6%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 3% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −20%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2024 · −68.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +6.1%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$43M
- Receivables$263M
- Other current assets$27M
- Debt due within a year$9M
- Accounts payable$151M
- Other current liabilities$116M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$337M written down across 1 year (2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Beside that spending sits $299M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2011 (tagged in 15 of those years; 1 year untagged) — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Mr. Stone | $7.7M | −$6.4M | — |
| 2023 | Mr. Stone | $8.2M | −$4.4M | — |
| 2024 | Mr. Stone | $7.9M | −$2.2M | $4M |
| 2025 | Mr. Stone | $2.5M | $3.0M | ($16M) |
| 2026 | Mr. Stone | $4.8M | $2.8M | $11M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$16M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2026, 2.9% of revenue, equal to 48.0% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DLBDolby Laboratories | $1.3B | 88% | 20.0% | 12% | 26% |
| IDCCInterDigital Inc. | $834M | — | 36.6% | 22% | 45% |
| APPSDigital Turbine Inc. | $565M | 51% | 4.7% | -2% | -1%4y |
| DAVEDave Inc. | $554M | — | -4.2% | -12% | 13% |
| CANCanaan Inc. | $530M | -12% | -38.9% | -57% | -31% |
| FUFUBitFuFu Inc. | $478M | 9% | 5.7% | 21% | -26% |
| MSTRStrategy Inc Common Stock Class A | $477M | 80% | -2.8% | -2% | 10% |
| ACTGAcacia Research Corporation | $285M | 27% | -26.9% | -12% | 14% |
| Group median | — | 39% | 0.9% | -2% | 12% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Digital Turbine Inc. has delivered.
—
9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $21M on 121M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-07-31; net debt $310M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← APPN its page in the Manual APT →
Industry order: ← APOS the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter ARBK →