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DLB, Dolby Laboratories
We derive the majority of our revenue from licensing audio and video technology to electronics manufacturers, and a lesser portion of our revenue by offering premium audio and video technologies to cinema exhibitors.
Dolby is synonymous with high-quality entertainment from a consumer perspective and has become critical to makers of consumer electronic devices as our technology is an important component in the creation and delivery of audio and video content.
While some of our technology represents relatively elemental functions like audio signal compression that enable playback, we also offer technology that is innovating in emerging categories including spatial audio and high contrast video.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 11/24 · the annual report (10-K) for the fiscal year ended late September · due within 60 days of period end · has filed ~53 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 88% and operating margin about 20% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. Stock-based pay runs about 7.5% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). By owner earnings: roughly 26% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →63% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- International63%$852M
- United States37%$497M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| $186M | $206M | $42M | $255M | $231M | $310M | $184M | $201M | $262M | $255M | $226M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $85M | $84M | $81M | $85M | $91M | $96M | $88M | $83M | $76M | $88M | $93M | Depreciation & amortizationD&A |
| $360M | $378M | $352M | $328M | $344M | $448M | $319M | $367M | $327M | $472M | $438M | Cash from operationsOp. cash |
| $48M | $57M | $66M | $77M | $89M | $89M | $100M | $103M | $115M | $127M | $134M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| 13% | 15% | 19% | 24% | 26% | 20% | 31% | 28% | 35% | 27% | 31% | Dividend / operating cashPayout |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($282M) | ($158M) | $78M | ($56M) | $134M | ($45M) | ($296M) | $54M | ($286M) | ($11M) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| ($92M) | ($107M) | ($134M) | ($385M) | ($208M) | ($253M) | ($611M) | ($237M) | ($288M) | ($247M) | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| ($1M) | $2M | ($6M) | ($6M) | $4M | $3M | ($17M) | $5M | $7M | $1M | — | Exchange-rate effectFX |
| ($16M) | — | $291M | ($120M) | $274M | $153M | ($605M) | $190M | ($240M) | $216M | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $2.3B | $2.5B | $2.9B | $2.8B | $2.9B | $3.1B | $2.7B | $3.0B | $3.1B | $3.2B | $3.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| $125K | $127K | $198K | $170K | $186K | $479K | $394K | — | — | — | $300K | Interest expenseInt. exp. |
| 1854.4× | 1945.9× | 926.8× | 1512.2× | 1176.0× | 719.0× | 524.4× | — | — | — | 797.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $331M | $390M | $495M | $509M | $479M | $501M | $439M | $608M | $623M | $596M | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| $8M | $7M | $7M | $6M | $6M | $6M | $5M | $17M | $10M | $9M | — | Noncontrolling interestsNCI |
| $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $2.6B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.6B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 102M | 103M | 107M | 105M | 103M | 105M | 102M | 97.7M | 97.3M | 97.5M | 95.9M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.47 | $0.55 | $0.62 | $0.74 | $0.86 | $0.85 | $0.98 | $1.06 | $1.18 | $1.30 | $1.40 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $19.24 | $20.69 | $22.10 | $22.06 | $23.63 | $24.83 | $22.03 | $24.10 | $25.45 | $26.90 | $26.95 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +3.7%/yr | +4.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +6.5%/yr | +10.7%/yr |
| EPS | +4.1%/yr | +3.1%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +11.9%/yr | +8.6%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −10.2%/yr | −10.4%/yr |
| Book value / share | +3.8%/yr | +2.6%/yr |
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cashCash $702M + ST investments $703K − debt $6M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $697M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 90 + DIO 69 − DPO 41 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 6%–22%; 12% latest = NOPAT $224M ÷ invested capital $1.9BIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 19%–32%; latest $436M = operating cash $472M − maintenance capex $36MIndustry peers: median 15%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 32% of revenue this year, a 26% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $129M of SBC) leaves $307M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $472M ÷ net income $255M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $252M ÷ Owner Earnings $436M — this fiscal year
What this means
Of $436M Owner Earnings, $252M (58%) went back to shareholders, $127M dividends, $125M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($129M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does. This year's proportion is 58%; across the record (2016–2025) it is 96%, the capital-allocation section below.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.41×HarvestingCapex $36M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $88M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
The promise and the pay packet
- Modest selling costSelling and marketing $361M ÷ revenue $1.3B
What this means
Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.
- Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 9.5%The count is edging downStock compensation $129M (fiscal 2025), 9.5% of revenue · repurchases $125M · diluted shares -4.4% since 2022
What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.
Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.3B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 3.17×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $6M vs $950M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +65%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.52/share (latest year $2.69), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $27.61/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Operating margin 21% → 19% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
The recent-years average (19%) sits below the early years (21%), but the latest year (20%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 20% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Owner earnings growth +4%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2022 · 16.5% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −0.5%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Jun 26, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$670M
- Receivables$285M
- Inventory$31M
- Other current assets$340M
- Accounts payable$12M
- Other current liabilities$404M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Beside that spending sits $400M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2011 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Kevin Yeaman | $9.6M | $23.6M | $393M |
| 2022 | Kevin Yeaman | $9.4M | $28k | $271M |
| 2023 | Kevin Yeaman | $9.5M | $13.7M | $337M |
| 2024 | Kevin Yeaman | $9.7M | $5.9M | $297M |
| 2025 | Kevin Yeaman | $10.2M | $8.7M | $436M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership3.7%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$129M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 9.5% of revenue, equal to 48.5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LXLexinFintech Holdings Ltd. | $1.9B | 68% | 10.8% | 45% | 15% |
| DLBDolby Laboratories | $1.3B | 88% | 20.0% | 12% | 26% |
| PGYPagaya Technologies Ltd. | $1.3B | 42% | -1.2% | 4% | 3% |
| WDWalker & Dunlop | $1.2B | — | 29.4% | 14% | 57% |
| XYFX Financial | $1.1B | 60% | 29.2% | 25% | 18% |
| IDCCInterDigital Inc. | $834M | — | 36.6% | 22% | 45% |
| APPSDigital Turbine Inc. | $565M | 51% | 4.7% | -2% | -1%4y |
| ACTGAcacia Research Corporation | $285M | 27% | -26.9% | -12% | 14% |
| Group median | — | 56% | 15.4% | 13% | 16% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Dolby Laboratories has delivered.
Dolby Laboratories’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Dolby Laboratories earns about $344M on its 25.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 32.3% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $393M on 95M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $670M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($45M) runs well above depreciation ($93M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $401M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
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