Owner Scorecard


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C, Citigroup Inc.

Banks financial

Citigroup is a global bank. It takes deposits and makes loans, issues credit cards to consumers, and serves corporations, governments and institutions with lending, payments, trading and the plumbing that moves money across borders. It earns the spread between what it pays for funds and what it collects on loans and securities, plus fees for handling transactions and arranging deals.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
C · Citigroup Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$85.2B
+5.6% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $91.4B 5-yr avg $78.2B
Return on equity 8% 5-yr avg 7%
Return on tangible equity 9% 5-yr avg 8%
Efficiency ratio 62% 5-yr avg 68%
Equity / assets 7.3% 5-yr avg 8.5%

Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~37 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
A bank is a borrowed-money business: it runs on far more debt than equity, so the things that decide the outcome are the cost and stickiness of its funding, the discipline of its underwriting, and the trust of regulators and depositors. The tests a value investor watches are whether deposits are cheap and loyal enough to be a real franchise rather than rented money, whether the cross-border transaction network is genuinely hard to copy, and whether the loan book is priced so a bad credit cycle does not erase years of profit. The bad case is the one that recurs in banking — a funding scare or a wave of loan losses, amplified by leverage, that takes back more than the good years paid out. The record below holds the spread, the returns on capital, and the cushion.
Is it a good business?
Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 7%, above 12% in only 0 of 10 years). It runs at a 62% efficiency ratio, about average. The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 regions, the largest North America at 52%.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • North America52%$44.0B
  • International50%$42.3B
  • United Kingdom9%$7.6B
  • Corporate/Other-1%($1.1B)

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$70.8B$72.4B$72.9B$75.1B$75.5B$71.9B$75.3B$78.1B$80.7B$85.2B$91.4BRevenueRevenue
$58.0B$61.6B$70.8B$76.5B$58.1B$50.5B$74.4B$133.3B$143.7B$142.9BInterest incomeInt. inc.
$12.5B$16.5B$24.3B$28.4B$13.3B$8.0B$25.7B$78.4B$89.6B$83.1BInterest expenseInt. exp.
$45.5B$45.1B$46.6B$48.1B$44.8B$42.5B$48.7B$54.9B$54.1B$59.8B$63.5BNet interest incomeNet int.
$25.3B$27.4B$26.3B$26.9B$30.8B$29.4B$26.7B$23.2B$26.6B$25.4B$27.9BNoninterest incomeFee inc.
$7.0B$7.5B$7.6B$8.2B$15.9B($3.1B)$4.7B$7.8B$9.7B$9.5B$9.7BCredit-loss provisionProvision
$21.5B$22.8B$23.4B$23.9B$13.6B$27.5B$18.8B$12.9B$17.0B$19.8BPretax incomePretax
$14.9B($6.8B)$18.0B$19.4B$11.0B$22.0B$14.8B$9.2B$12.7B$14.3B$17.8BNet incomeNet inc.
30%23%19%19%20%19%27%25%27%26%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
0.8%-0.4%0.9%1.0%0.5%1.0%0.6%0.4%0.5%0.5%0.6%Return on assetsROA
7%-3%9%10%6%11%7%4%6%7%8%Return on equityROE
6%−5%7%7%3%8%5%2%4%4%6%Retained to equityRetained/eq
8%-4%11%12%6%12%8%5%7%8%9%Return on tangible equityROTCE
60%58%57%57%59%67%68%72%66%65%62%Efficiency ratioEffic.
$2.3B$3.8B$5.0B$5.4B$5.4B$5.2B$5.0B$5.2B$5.2B$5.4B$5.4BDividends paidDiv. paid
$9.3B$14.5B$14.4B$17.6B$2.9B$7.6B$3.3B$2.0B$2.5B$13.3BBuybacksBuybacks
($54.1B)($38.8B)($73.1B)($23.4B)($92.4B)($110.7B)($79.5B)($8.5B)$86.3B($108.3B)Investing cash flowInv. cash
$28.3B$66.9B$44.5B$42.9B$233.6B$17.3B$137.8B$687M($38.3B)$238.0BFinancing cash flowFin. cash
($493M)$693M($773M)($908M)($2.0B)($1.2B)($3.4B)$95M($12.7B)$10.9BExchange-rate effectFX
$27.4B$20.0B$7.6B$5.8B$115.7B($47.6B)$80.0B($81.1B)$15.6B$73.0BChange in cashΔ cash
Balance sheet
$624.4B$667.0B$684.2B$699.5B$675.9B$667.8B$657.2B$689.4B$694.5B$752.2BLoans held for investmentLoans
$12.4B$12.3B$12.8B$25.0B$16.5B$17.0B$18.1B$18.6B$19.2BCredit-loss allowanceAllowance
$1.79T$1.84T$1.92T$1.95T$2.26T$2.29T$2.42T$2.41T$2.35T$2.66T$2.89TTotal assetsAssets
$929.4B$959.8B$1.01T$1.07T$1.28T$1.32T$1.37T$1.31T$1.28T$1.40T$1.49TDepositsDeposits
$21.7B$22.3B$22.0B$22.1B$22.2B$21.3B$19.7B$20.1B$19.3B$19.1B$19.0BGoodwillGoodwill
$1.57T$1.64T$1.72T$1.76T$2.06T$2.09T$2.21T$2.21T$2.14T$2.44TTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$1.0B$932M$854M$704M$758M$700M$649M$798M$768M$1.5BNoncontrolling interestsNCI
$225.1B$200.7B$196.2B$193.2B$199.4B$202.0B$201.2B$205.5B$208.6B$212.3B$212.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
2.89B2.70B2.49B2.27B2.10B2.05B1.96B1.96B1.94B1.87B1.74BShares out (diluted)Shares
$5.16$-2.52$7.23$8.56$5.26$10.71$7.56$4.72$6.54$7.64$10.28EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.79$1.41$2.01$2.40$2.55$2.54$2.55$2.66$2.68$2.87$3.13Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$77.94$74.39$78.65$85.31$95.02$98.55$102.42$105.05$107.52$113.34$122.16Book value / shareBVPS
$68.67$64.23$67.72$73.41$82.20$85.97$90.14$92.51$95.25$100.85$108.32Tangible book / shareTBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.1%/yr+4.8%/yr
EPS+4.4%/yr+7.7%/yr
Dividends / share+15.4%/yr+2.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+15.5%/yr+16.2%/yr
Book value / share+4.2%/yr+3.6%/yr
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Below the cost of equity
    Net income $14.3B ÷ equity $212.3B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Modest
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $19.1B − intangibles $4.3B)
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • Efficient (<65%)
    Noninterest expense $55.1B ÷ (net interest income + fees)
    Industry peers: median 64%
    What this means

    The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 8.0%
    Modest
    Equity $212.3B ÷ assets $2.66T
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Mostly deposit-funded
    Deposits $1.40T ÷ assets $2.66T
    What this means

    Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

  • Credit cost (provision / NII) 16%
    Moderate
    Provision for credit losses $9.5B ÷ net interest income $59.8B
    What this means

    What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.

The franchise and the credit cycle

  • Rate-sensitive funding
    Noninterest-bearing deposits $208.7B ÷ deposits $1.40T · pays 3.08% on the interest-bearing rest (avg of year-ends)
    What this means

    The share of deposits the bank pays nothing for — checking accounts that stay through rate cycles. This is the deposit moat in one number: a high share means cheap, sticky raw material for lending; a low share means the funding reprices with every rate move. Buffett's Wells letter is built on exactly this economics.

  • Elevated losses
    Charge-offs net of recoveries $9.1B ÷ loans $723.4B (avg of year-ends) · worst year on record 1.30% · allowance held at 2.56% of loans
    What this means

    Loans actually written off, net of what was later recovered — the realized truth the provisions were guessing at. Graham's rule applies doubly here: the worst year in the record, not the average, is the read, because a loan book's sins are committed in the good years and confessed in the bad ones.

  • Manageable
    Pre-tax, as filed for FY2025: HTM at cost $189.8B − fair value $179.5B = $10.3B, against tangible common equity $168.9B · widest on record FY2022: $25.2B (59% accreted back since)
    What this means

    Bonds held to maturity are carried at cost, so rate rises open a gap that only shows in this disclosure. Stated equity already carries every available-for-sale mark through accumulated other comprehensive income; the held-to-maturity book's gap sits outside equity, which is why it is read here. The figure is pre-tax as the filer states it — the true after-tax dent depends on a deferred-tax position the record does not carry. The gap never hits earnings if the bank can hold on, which is precisely why the reader checks whether it could be forced to sell: the 2023 bank failures were this number meeting deposit flight. The record carries no stated uninsured figure for this filer; its franchise leg: noninterest-bearing deposits, 15% of the base.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$20.5M$22.5M$43.0B
2021$14.1M$19.9M$43.0B
2022$22.1M$16.0M$20.8B
2023$25.5M$20.7M($78.0B)
2024$31.1M$36.9M($24.0B)
2025$95.8M$144.8M($72.0B)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio1,309:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

Peers, Banks

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDROEmedian over the recordROTCEmedian over the recordEfficiencymedian over the recordNII / assetsmedian over the recordNoninterest-bearing sharelatest FY
JPMJPMorgan Chase & Co.$182.4B13%16%57%2.0%24%
BACBank of America Corp.$113.1B10%13%64%1.8%26%
CCitigroup Inc.$85.2B7%8%62%2.3%15%
WFCWells Fargo & Co.$83.7B11%13%67%2.5%26%
COFCapital One Financial Corporation$53.4B8%12%54%6.0%6%
MUFGMitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc.$43.8B6%7%71%0.7%
USBU.S. Bancorp$28.7B12%17%59%2.5%16%
MFGMizuho Financial Group, Inc.$28.4B5%5%75%0.5%
Group median9%12%63%2.2%20%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Citigroup Inc.’s record justifies.

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The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered4%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity8%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $188.0B on 1677M shares, a 8% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Citigroup Inc. (C), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/C, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← BZH its page in the Manual CABO →

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