WFC, Wells Fargo & Co.

The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.

A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.

The share of deposits the bank pays nothing for — checking accounts that stay through rate cycles. This is the deposit moat in one number: a high share means cheap, sticky raw material for lending; a low share means the funding reprices with every rate move. Buffett's Wells letter is built on exactly this economics.

Loans actually written off, net of recoveries. The rate against the loan book is the comparable figure, and it is withheld here because the loan base itself is not cleanly tagged — a rate on a guessed denominator would be a wrong number. Read the dollar trend against the bank's own history.

Bonds held to maturity are carried at cost, so rate rises open a gap that only shows in this disclosure. Stated equity already carries every available-for-sale mark through accumulated other comprehensive income; the held-to-maturity book's gap sits outside equity, which is why it is read here. The figure is pre-tax as the filer states it — the true after-tax dent depends on a deferred-tax position the record does not carry. The gap never hits earnings if the bank can hold on, which is precisely why the reader checks whether it could be forced to sell: the 2023 bank failures were this number meeting deposit flight. The record carries no stated uninsured figure for this filer; its franchise leg: noninterest-bearing deposits, 26% of the base. Measured across every US bank on the record today: 2 carry a mark above 30% of tangible-basis equity, 5 state an uninsured share above 40%, and none carries both — the configuration that failed in 2023.