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CASH, Pathward Financial Inc.
Revenue is Consumer (63%), Commercial (33%) and Corporate Services/Other (4%).
As a nationwide provider of payments and commercial finance products, the Company has offices across the country.
The Company's purpose of powering financial inclusion means individuals and businesses deserve access to financial solutions.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 11/28 · the annual report (10-K) for the fiscal year ended late September · due within 60 days of period end · has filed ~56 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has hovered around the cost of equity (median 14%, above 12% in 6 of 10 years). It runs at a 66% efficiency ratio, about average. A bank that earns above its cost of equity through the cycle compounds book value; whether this one did it by underwriting discipline or by reaching for risk is what the 10-K, and the worst years in the record, will tell you.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Consumer is 63% of revenue, with Commercial the other meaningful segment at 33%.
- Consumer63%$527M
- Commercial33%$276M
- Corporate Services/Other4%$36M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $178M | $265M | $315M | $487M | $499M | $550M | $618M | $728M | $797M | $840M | $826M | RevenueRevenue |
| $81M | $108M | $159M | $326M | $293M | $286M | $329M | $422M | $519M | $523M | — | Interest incomeInt. inc. |
| $4M | $15M | $28M | $62M | $34M | $7M | $5M | $11M | $21M | $12M | — | Interest expenseInt. exp. |
| $77M | $93M | $131M | $264M | $259M | $279M | $325M | $411M | $498M | $512M | $485M | Net interest incomeNet int. |
| $101M | $172M | $185M | $223M | $240M | $271M | $294M | $317M | $300M | $328M | $340M | Noninterest incomeFee inc. |
| ($5M) | $11M | $29M | $56M | $65M | $50M | $29M | $109M | $58M | $57M | $71M | Credit-loss provisionProvision |
| $39M | $55M | $57M | $98M | $115M | $156M | $180M | $155M | $219M | $223M | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| $33M | $45M | $52M | $97M | $105M | $142M | $151M | $143M | $183M | $186M | $176M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 14% | 19% | 9% | -3% | 5% | 7% | 15% | 6% | 16% | 16% | 16% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| 0.8% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 1.6% | 1.7% | 2.1% | 2.2% | 1.9% | 2.4% | 2.6% | 2.4% | Return on assetsROA |
| 10% | 10% | 7% | 12% | 12% | 16% | 24% | 23% | 22% | 22% | 21% | Return on equityROE |
| 9% | 9% | 6% | 11% | 12% | 16% | 23% | 22% | 22% | 21% | 20% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| 12% | 16% | 14% | 20% | 21% | 27% | 51% | 50% | 37% | 34% | 32% | Return on tangible equityROTCE |
| 76% | 75% | 72% | 68% | 64% | 62% | 62% | 64% | 65% | 67% | 66% | Efficiency ratioEffic. |
| $4M | $5M | $6M | $8M | $7M | $6M | $6M | $5M | $5M | $5M | $4M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ($738M) | ($700M) | ($390M) | ($339M) | ($206M) | ($1.1B) | ($332M) | ($946M) | ($263M) | $26M | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $1.4B | $1.1B | ($916M) | $175M | $40M | $423M | $118M | $605M | ($443M) | ($513M) | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| $0 | $0 | $3K | ($122K) | ($101K) | $476K | ($2M) | $331K | $81K | ($1M) | — | Exchange-rate effectFX |
| $746M | $494M | ($1.2B) | $27M | $301M | ($113M) | $74M | ($12M) | ($217M) | ($38M) | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $925M | $1.3B | $2.9B | $3.7B | $3.3B | $3.6B | $3.5B | $4.4B | $4.1B | $4.7B | — | Loans held for investmentLoans |
| $6M | $8M | $13M | $29M | $56M | $68M | $46M | $50M | $45M | $53M | — | Credit-loss allowanceAllowance |
| $4.0B | $5.2B | $5.8B | $6.2B | $6.1B | $6.7B | $6.7B | $7.5B | $7.5B | $7.2B | $7.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| $2.4B | $3.2B | $4.4B | $4.3B | $5.0B | $5.5B | $5.9B | $6.6B | $5.9B | $5.9B | $6.0B | DepositsDeposits |
| $37M | $99M | $303M | $310M | $310M | $310M | $310M | $310M | $310M | $298M | $298M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $3.7B | $4.8B | $5.1B | $5.3B | $5.2B | $5.8B | $6.1B | $6.9B | $6.7B | $6.3B | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| — | $0 | $4M | $4M | $4M | $1M | ($30K) | ($1M) | ($277K) | ($591K) | — | Noncontrolling interestsNCI |
| $335M | $434M | $744M | $840M | $844M | $871M | $633M | $619M | $822M | $858M | $851M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 25.4M | 27.9M | 30.9M | 38.0M | 34.8M | 31.8M | 29.2M | 26.9M | 25.2M | 23.5M | 21.8M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.31 | $1.61 | $1.67 | $2.55 | $3.01 | $4.46 | $5.17 | $5.32 | $7.27 | $7.90 | $8.08 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.17 | $0.17 | $0.19 | $0.20 | $0.20 | $0.20 | $0.20 | $0.20 | $0.20 | $0.20 | $0.20 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $13.17 | $15.57 | $24.12 | $22.12 | $24.22 | $27.42 | $21.66 | $23.00 | $32.64 | $36.48 | $39.08 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| $10.58 | $10.16 | $12.00 | $12.58 | $14.14 | $16.63 | $10.20 | $10.74 | $19.70 | $23.28 | $24.93 | Tangible book / shareTBVPS |
Share counts before 2017 are restated ×3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +19.8%/yr | +20.0%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +23.4%/yr | +7.4%/yr |
| EPS | +22.1%/yr | +21.3%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +1.6%/yr | −0.5%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +6.8%/yr | +7.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +12.0%/yr | +8.5%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Net interest income+2.8%
“Net Interest Income Net interest income for fiscal 2025 was $511.8 million, an increase of 3%, from $497.8 million for the same period of the prior year. The increase was mainly attributable to an improved earning asset mix.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“We have identified a material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting, and our management has concluded that our disclosure controls and procedures were not effective as of September 30, 2025.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 22%Very high (≥17%)Net income $186M ÷ equity $858MIndustry peers: median 9%
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- Very high (≥18%)Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $298M − intangibles $13M)Industry peers: median 12%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Efficiency ratio 67%AverageNoninterest expense $560M ÷ (net interest income + fees)Industry peers: median 60%
What this means
The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 12.0%Well capitalizedEquity $858M ÷ assets $7.2B
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 82%Deposit-fundedDeposits $5.9B ÷ assets $7.2B
What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 11%ModerateProvision for credit losses $57M ÷ net interest income $512M
What this means
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
The franchise and the credit cycle
- Not enough data
What this means
The deposit mix isn't cleanly tagged in the filings' structured data; the funding read above carries what is.
- Net charge-offs 1.72%Heavy lossesCharge-offs net of recoveries $75M ÷ loans $4.4B (avg of year-ends) · worst year on record 2.04% · allowance held at 1.14% of loans
What this means
Loans actually written off, net of what was later recovered — the realized truth the provisions were guessing at. Graham's rule applies doubly here: the worst year in the record, not the average, is the read, because a loan book's sins are committed in the good years and confessed in the bad ones.
- Marks are smallPre-tax, as filed for FY2025: HTM at cost $29M − fair value $26M = $4M, against tangible common equity $548M · widest on record FY2023: $5M (29% accreted back since)
What this means
Bonds held to maturity are carried at cost, so rate rises open a gap that only shows in this disclosure. Stated equity already carries every available-for-sale mark through accumulated other comprehensive income; the held-to-maturity book's gap sits outside equity, which is why it is read here. The figure is pre-tax as the filer states it — the true after-tax dent depends on a deferred-tax position the record does not carry. The gap never hits earnings if the bank can hold on, which is precisely why the reader checks whether it could be forced to sell: the 2023 bank failures were this number meeting deposit flight.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Bradley C. Hanson | $5.0M | $7.4M | $569M |
| 2022 | Brett L. Pharr | $3.8M | $2.8M | $282M |
| 2023 | Brett L. Pharr | $3.9M | $5.1M | $319M |
| 2024 | Brett L. Pharr | $4.3M | $7.1M | $479M |
| 2025 | Brett L. Pharr | $4.6M | $6.6M | $439M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership1.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio41:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$10M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 1.1% of revenue, equal to 4.1% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Credit & receivables, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Banks
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | ROEmedian over the record | ROTCEmedian over the record | Efficiencymedian over the record | NII / assetsmedian over the record | Noninterest-bearing sharelatest FY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WSBCWesBanco Inc. | $981M | 6% | 11% | 60% | 2.8% | 25% |
| FFBCFirst Financial Bancorp. | $899M | 9% | 16% | 60% | 3.2% | 21% |
| CASHPathward Financial Inc. | $840M | 14% | 24% | 66% | 4.3% | — |
| CBUCommunity Financial System Inc. | $818M | 9% | 18% | 63% | 2.9% | 26% |
| TRMKTrustmark Corporation | $800M | 9% | 12% | 71% | 3.0% | 20% |
| WAFDWafd, Inc. | $725M | 9% | 10% | 53% | 2.8% | — |
| TBBKThe Bancorp Inc | $704M | 18% | 18% | 53% | 3.1% | — |
| NBTBNBT Bancorp Inc. | $697M | 9% | 12% | 61% | 3.0% | 28% |
| Group median | — | 9% | 14% | 61% | 3.0% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookA bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Pathward Financial Inc.’s record justifies.
Tangible book / share, delivered9%/yr’20→’25
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $543M on 21M shares, a 24% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Manual order: ← CART its page in the Manual CASS →
Industry order: ← CARE the Banks chapter CATY →