CNNE, Cannae Holdings Inc.

Will it survive?

• Can it pay its interest? -10.1×
  Does not cover its interest
  Operating income ($120M) ÷ interest expense $12M
  What this means

  A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

• How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$111M
  Net cash
  Cash $182M − debt $71M
  What this means

  Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $111M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

• How long is cash tied up? —
  Not enough data
  What this means

  The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

• Return on invested capital -5%
  Below average through the cycle
  10-yr median, range -11%–-0%; -10% latest = NOPAT ($94M) ÷ invested capital $913M
  Industry peers: median -6%
  What this means

  The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

• Owner-earnings margin -14%
  Consumes cash through the cycle
  10-yr median margin, range -33%–1%; latest ($29M) = operating cash ($18M) − maintenance capex $10M
  What this means

  What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -7% of revenue this year, a -14% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $19M of SBC) leaves ($47M).

• Are earnings backed by cash? ($18M)
  Loss, and burning cash
  Net income ($513M) · cash from operations ($18M)
  What this means

  The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

• Where do the earnings go? —
  No surplus to allocate
  What this means

  The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

• Investing or harvesting? 0.87×
  Maintaining
  Capex $10M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $12M
  What this means

  Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

• Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 4.4%
  The count is genuinely shrinking
  Stock compensation $19M (fiscal 2025), 4.4% of revenue · repurchases $320M · diluted shares -30.8% since 2022
  What this means

  Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

• Adequate size Miss
  Revenue ≥ $2B · $424M
  What this means

  Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

• Strong liquidity Pass
  Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.07×
  What this means

  Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

• Conservative debt Pass
  Debt ≤ working capital · $71M vs $139M WC
  What this means

  Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

• Earnings stability Miss
  A profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years
  What this means

  Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

• Dividend record Miss
  Uninterrupted dividends · 2 of 10 yrs
  What this means

  An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

• Earnings growth Miss
  Earnings +33% over the record · −1012%
  What this means

  At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

• Moderate price —
  P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
  What this means

  Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-8.69/share (latest year $-11.83), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $23.60/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

• Profitable years 4 of 10
  What this means

  Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

• Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
  What this means

  A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

• Operating margin −7% → −24% (3-yr avg ends)
  What this means

  Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −7% early to −24% lately, median −21% — competition or costs are biting in.

• Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −4%
  What this means

  Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

• Worst year 2020 · −32.2% op. margin
  What this means

  Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

• Share count −2.4%/yr
  What this means

  The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

• Dividend record rising
  What this means

  Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.