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INV, Innventure Inc.
Revenue is Product revenue (76%) and Management Fees (24%).
We have launched four such companies since inception: PureCycle Technologies, Inc.
Through a shared services model, we provide direct operational support to the Innventure Companies, including accounting, finance, legal, human resources and IT support.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 11/13 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 45 days of period end · has filed ~45 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A property business, read on funds from operations and net asset value rather than reported earnings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn.
- What moves the needle
- Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings, and a property downturn meets a balance sheet built on leverage. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Product revenue is 76% of revenue, with Management Fees the other meaningful line at 24%.
- Product revenue76%$2M
- Management Fees24%$499K
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
Revenue up 100.2% year over year
figures computed from the filing's XBRL
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -45.4×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($465M) ÷ interest expense $10M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cashCash $60M − debt $14M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $47M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 194 + DIO 31 − DPO 49 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT ($367M) ÷ invested capital $157M (debt + equity − cash)Industry peers: median -5%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Owner-earnings margin -3993%Consumes cashOwner earnings ($82M) = operating cash ($81M) − maintenance capex $1MIndustry peers: median 3%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -3993% of revenue this year. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $28M of SBC) leaves ($110M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($81M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($293M) · cash from operations ($81M)
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.06×HarvestingCapex $1M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $23M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
The promise and the pay packet
- Growth is being boughtSelling and marketing $10M ÷ revenue $2M
What this means
Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.
- Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 1355.6%Stock pay, share count unreadStock compensation $28M (fiscal 2025), 1355.6% of revenue · no repurchases
What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $2M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.09×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $14M vs $7M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.92/share (latest year $-3.47), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.41/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$42M
- Receivables$2M
- Inventory$3M
- Other current assets$25M
- Accounts payable$2M
- Other current liabilities$58M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 2-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$347M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Beside that spending sits $22M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2023 (tagged in 2 of those years; 1 year untagged) — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time. The cash figure above counts only cash consideration: goodwill of $323M against it says much of the buying was paid for in stock, which never passes through the cash-flow statement.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 2-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership14.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$28M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 1355.6% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, Financial Conglomerates
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEPIcahn Enterprises L.P. | $9.7B | — | -5.4% | -6% | 3% |
| CODICompass Diversified Holdings | $1.9B | 37% | 2.3% | 2% | 4% |
| CNNECannae Holdings Inc. | $424M | 15% | -19.4% | -5% | -14% |
| INVInnventure Inc. | $2M | — | — | -241%1y | — |
| Group median | — | — | — | -5% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFInnventure Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← INTU its page in the Manual INVA →
Industry order: ← IEP the Financial Conglomerates chapter IX →