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DV, DoubleVerify
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The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~38 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 46% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 7 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 83% and operating margin about 13% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 8.0% to 21% — on a steadier 83% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Stock-based pay runs about 9.4% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 7%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 18% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $183M | $244M | $333M | $452M | $573M | $657M | $748M | $769M | RevenueRevenue |
| $158M | $208M | $278M | $375M | $466M | $540M | $615M | $634M | Gross profitGross prof. |
| 86% | 85% | 84% | 83% | 81% | 82% | 82% | 82% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 36% | 47% | 48% | 41% | 37% | 40% | 40% | 39% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 17% | 19% | 19% | 21% | 22% | 23% | 24% | 23% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $39M | $21M | $27M | $59M | $86M | $82M | $79M | $98M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 21.4% | 8.8% | 8.0% | 13.0% | 15.0% | 12.5% | 10.6% | 12.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $35M | $17M | $26M | $59M | $96M | $89M | $83M | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| $23M | $20M | $29M | $43M | $71M | $56M | $51M | $59M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 34% | — | — | 27% | 25% | 37% | 39% | 37% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| $29M | $21M | $83M | $95M | $120M | $160M | $211M | $204M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $22M | $25M | $30M | $34M | $41M | $45M | $57M | $61M | Depreciation & amortizationD&A |
| ($16M) | ($30M) | $1M | ($25M) | ($52M) | ($32M) | ($272K) | ($19M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $6M | $10M | $9M | $40M | $17M | $27M | $39M | $44M | CapexCapex |
| 3.3% | 4.0% | 2.8% | 8.8% | 3.0% | 4.1% | 5.1% | 5.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $23M | $11M | $73M | $55M | $103M | $133M | $173M | $161M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 12.9% | 4.7% | 22.0% | 12.1% | 17.9% | 20.2% | 23.1% | 20.9% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $23M | $11M | $73M | $55M | $103M | $133M | $173M | $161M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 12.9% | 4.7% | 22.0% | 12.1% | 17.9% | 20.2% | 23.1% | 20.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $57M | — | $149M | — | $67M | — | $83M | $83M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | $2M | $10M | $5M | $128M | $132M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| ($63M) | ($10M) | ($159M) | ($40M) | ($84M) | ($45M) | ($105M) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $15M | $10M | $264M | ($8M) | $6M | ($129M) | ($144M) | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| $23K | $203K | ($200K) | ($784K) | $338K | ($2M) | $4M | — | Exchange-rate effectFX |
| ($19M) | $22M | $188M | $46M | $42M | ($17M) | ($34M) | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| 8% | 5% | 5% | 7% | 8% | 7% | 6% | 7% | ROICROIC |
| 7% | 5% | 4% | 5% | 7% | 5% | 4% | 5% | Return on equityROE |
| 7% | 5% | 4% | 5% | 7% | 5% | 4% | 5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $11M | $33M | $222M | $268M | $310M | $311M | $259M | $210M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $95M | $123M | $167M | $207M | $226M | $221M | $215M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $3M | $4M | $7M | $13M | $12M | $15M | $13M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $91M | $119M | $160M | $194M | $215M | $206M | $202M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $142M | $368M | $445M | $533M | $559M | $519M | $471M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $34M | $57M | $69M | $84M | $103M | $122M | $105M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 4.2× | 6.4× | 6.5× | 6.4× | 5.4× | 4.3× | 4.5× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $18M | $18M | $47M | $58M | $70M | $103M | — | Net PP&ENet PP&E |
| — | $227M | $351M | $343M | $436M | $428M | $516M | $512M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $511M | $892M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| 7.5× | 4.3× | 22.8× | 65.2× | 80.4× | 73.7× | 45.7× | 55.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| — | $95M | $93M | $160M | $169M | $193M | $223M | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| $318M | $417M | $799M | $877M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | 2.5% | 6.6% | 9.4% | 10.3% | 13.8% | 13.9% | 13.4% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 143M | 145M | 160M | 171M | 173M | 175M | 167M | 161M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.28 | $1.68 | $2.08 | $2.65 | $3.30 | $3.75 | $4.49 | $4.78 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.16 | $0.14 | $0.18 | $0.25 | $0.41 | $0.32 | $0.30 | $0.37 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.16 | $0.08 | $0.46 | $0.32 | $0.59 | $0.76 | $1.04 | $1.00 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.16 | $0.08 | $0.46 | $0.32 | $0.59 | $0.76 | $1.04 | $1.00 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.04 | $0.07 | $0.06 | $0.23 | $0.10 | $0.16 | $0.23 | $0.27 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $2.22 | $2.87 | $4.99 | $5.14 | $6.19 | $6.19 | $6.79 | $6.80 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +23.3%/yr | +21.8%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +35.9%/yr | +67.4%/yr |
| EPS | +10.9%/yr | +16.7%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +33.1%/yr | +28.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +20.4%/yr | +18.8%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue+13.9%
“Sales, Marketing and Customer Support Expenses Sales, marketing and customer support expenses increased by $23.3 million, or 14%, from $167.5 million in the year ended December 31, 2024 to $190.8 million in the year ended December 31, 2025. The increase was due primarily to an increase in personnel costs, including stock-based compensation and sales commissions, of $18.4 million, an increase in third party professional fees to support marketing and sales activities of $1.6 million, and an increase in marketing activities, including adv…”
✓ figure matches the filed record
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $51M of profit into $173M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $51M | $56M | $71M | $43M | $29M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$57M | +$45M | +$41M | +$34M | +$30M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$104M | +$91M | +$59M | +$42M | +$22M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$272K | −$32M | −$52M | −$25M | +$1M |
| Cash from operations | $211M | $160M | $120M | $95M | $83M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$39M | −$27M | −$17M | −$40M | −$9M |
| Owner earnings | $173M | $133M | $103M | $55M | $73M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 23% | 20% | 18% | 12% | 22% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $104M), owner earnings is nearer $68M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 45.7×ComfortableOperating income $79M ÷ interest expense $2M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash $259M − debt $22M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $237M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 108 + DIO 0 − DPO 40 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range 5%–8%; 5% latest = NOPAT $48M ÷ invested capital $894MIndustry peers: median -8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle7-yr median margin, range 5%–23%; latest $173M = operating cash $211M − maintenance capex $39MIndustry peers: median 13%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 23% of revenue this year, a 18% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $104M of SBC) leaves $68M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $211M ÷ net income $51M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $132M ÷ Owner Earnings $173M — this fiscal year
What this means
Of $173M Owner Earnings, $132M (77%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $132M buybacks. Net of $104M stock comp, the real buyback was about $28M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does. This year's proportion is 77%; across the record (2019–2025) it is 48%, the capital-allocation section below.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.68×HarvestingCapex $39M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $57M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
The promise and the pay packet
- Modest selling costSelling and marketing $191M ÷ revenue $748M
What this means
Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.
- Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 13.9%The count is edging downStock compensation $104M (fiscal 2025), 13.9% of revenue · repurchases $132M · diluted shares -2.4% since 2022
What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $748M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 4.27×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $22M vs $398M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (7-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record —Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +144%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.38/share (latest year $0.33), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.30/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 7
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Operating margin 13% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 13% early, 13% lately, median 13%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +43%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 43% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2021 · 8.0% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +2.6%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$210M
- Receivables$215M
- Other current assets$46M
- Accounts payable$13M
- Other current liabilities$92M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated $719M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$148M · 21%
- Buybacks$277M · 39%
- Retained (debt / cash)$294M · 41%
- Returned to owners$277M
48% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $277M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $199M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $277M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count12.5%
The diluted count rose from 143M to 161M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Beside that spending sits $166M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2019 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mark Zagorski | $7.4M | $46.7M | $73M |
| 2022 | Mark Zagorski | $8.6M | −$8.8M | $55M |
| 2023 | Mark Zagorski | $10.8M | $30.9M | $103M |
| 2024 | Mark Zagorski | $1.1M | −$17.9M | $133M |
| 2025 | Mark Zagorski | $11.8M | $6.9M | $173M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$104M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 13.9% of revenue, equal to 131.6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Advertising & Marketing
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TBLATaboola.com Ltd. | $1.9B | 30% | 0.3% | -2% | 6% |
| ZETAZeta Global Holdings Corp. | $1.3B | 62% | -6.8% | -82% | 10% |
| DVDoubleVerify | $748M | 83% | 12.5% | 7% | 18% |
| MGNIMagnite Inc. | $714M | 62% | -18.6% | -13% | 18% |
| EVEREverQuote Inc. | $693M | 94% | -3.7% | -34% | 1% |
| NEXNNexxen International Ltd. | $365M | 81% | 8.9% | 6% | 23% |
| DSPViant Technology Inc. | $344M | 46% | 1.2% | -8% | 13% |
| PUBMPubMatic Inc. | $283M | 68% | 7.5% | 8% | 25% |
| Group median | — | 65% | 0.7% | -5% | 15% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what DoubleVerify has delivered.
DoubleVerify’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, DoubleVerify earns about $134M on its 17.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 23.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $161M on 155M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-07-29; net cash $210M. The if-converted diluted count is 161M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($44M) runs well above depreciation ($61M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $166M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← DUOT its page in the Manual DVA →
Industry order: ← DSP the Advertising & Marketing chapter EVER →