Owner Scorecard


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TBLA, Taboola.com Ltd.

Taboola is a technology company that helps businesses grow by placing ads on publisher sites, mobile apps, and devices, which we collectively refer to as digital properties.

We empower businesses to grow through performance advertising technology that goes beyond search and social and delivers measurable outcomes at scale.

Taboola began operations in 2007 and our technology provides significant value to both digital property partners and Advertisers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
TBLA · Taboola.com Ltd.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.9B
+8.3% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.0B 5-yr avg $1.6B
Gross margin 30% 5-yr avg 31%
Operating margin 6.5% 5-yr avg −0.5%
ROIC 12% 5-yr avg −1%
Owner-earnings margin 12% 5-yr avg 5%
Free cash flow margin 10% 5-yr avg 5%

Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~37 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 30% and operating margin about 0.3% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −24 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −2%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2020–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$1.2B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4B$1.8B$1.9B$2.0BRevenueRevenue
$319M$441M$464M$426M$534M$570M$584MGross profitGross prof.
27%32%33%30%30%30%30%Gross marginGross mgn
16%24%25%25%21%20%19%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
8%9%9%9%8%8%8%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$26M($13M)($14M)($64M)$26M$44M$127MOperating incomeOp. inc.
2.2%−1.0%−1.0%−4.4%1.5%2.3%6.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$23M($2M)($4M)($77M)$14M$33MPretax incomePretax
$8M($25M)($12M)($82M)($4M)$42M$119MNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$139M$64M$53M$84M$184M$208M$253MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$31M$30M$28M$33M$37M$29M$12MDepreciation & amortizationD&A
$71M($70M)($37M)$69M$84M$73M$62MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$18M$39M$35M$32M$35M$45M$52MCapexCapex
1.5%2.8%2.5%2.2%2.0%2.3%2.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$121M$33M$26M$52M$149M$179M$241MOwner earningsOwner earn.
10.2%2.4%1.8%3.6%8.4%9.4%12.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$121M$24M$19M$52M$149M$163M$201MFree cash flowFCF
10.2%1.8%1.3%3.6%8.4%8.5%10.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$202K$583M$8M$0$719K$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$56M$74M$255MBuybacksBuybacks
$11M($620M)($140M)$60M($30M)($41M)Investing cash flowInv. cash
$3M$631M($63M)($135M)($100M)($277M)Financing cash flowFin. cash
$3M$2M($4M)$816K($4M)$4MExchange-rate effectFX
$156M$77M($153M)$10M$50M($106M)Change in cashΔ cash
-2%-2%-6%1%4%12%ROICROIC
18%-3%-1%-8%-0%5%13%Return on equityROE
18%−3%−1%−8%−0%5%13%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$243M$319M$263M$182M$230M$121M$133MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$245M$257M$306M$370M$360M$317MReceivablesReceiv.
$260M$248M$282M$309M$331M$276MAccounts payablePayables
($15M)$9M$24M$61M$29M$41MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$629M$594M$559M$656M$558M$519MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$401M$368M$424M$486M$521M$469MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×1.6×1.3×1.4×1.1×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$63M$73M$72M$69M$95MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$19M$550M$556M$556M$556M$556M$556MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.6B$1.5B$1.7B$1.7B$1.6B$1.5BTotal assetsAssets
$51M$5M$14M$116M$102M$102MTotal debtDebt
($268M)($258M)($168M)($114M)($19M)($31M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$47M$768M$835M$1.1B$1.1B$907M$938MShareholders’ equityEquity
2.4%9.3%5.3%4.5%3.8%3.3%3.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
40.3M143M254M296M290.51BShares out (diluted)Shares
$29.48$9.65$5.51$4.87$0.01Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.21$-0.17$-0.05$-0.28$0.00EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.01$0.23$0.10$0.18$0.00Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.01$0.17$0.07$0.18$0.00Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.44$0.27$0.14$0.11$0.00Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.16$5.37$3.28$3.58$0.00Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×3.54 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.78 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×982.53 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
5-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−45.1%/yr (3-yr)−45.1%/yr (3-yr)
Owner earnings / share−61.1%/yr (3-yr)−61.1%/yr (3-yr)
Capital spending / share−37.3%/yr (3-yr)−37.3%/yr (3-yr)
Book value / share+45.7%/yr (3-yr)+45.7%/yr (3-yr)

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2020FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $179M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $29M it takes just to hold its position. It put $16M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $163M.

Reported net income$42M
Owner earnings$179M · 9% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$42M($4M)($82M)($12M)($25M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$29M+$37M+$33M+$28M+$30M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$64M+$67M+$64M+$75M+$128M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$73M+$84M+$69M−$37M−$70M
Cash from operations$208M$184M$84M$53M$64M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$29M−$35M−$32M−$28M−$30M
Owner earnings$179M$149M$52M$26M$33M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$16M−$7M−$9M
Free cash flow$163M$149M$52M$19M$24M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue9%8%4%2%2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $29M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $16M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $64M), owner earnings is nearer $115M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash
    Cash $121M − debt $102M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $19M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 69 + DIO 0 − DPO 90 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    5-yr median, range -6%–4%; 4% latest = NOPAT $35M ÷ invested capital $889M
    Industry peers: median -13%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    6-yr median margin, range 2%–10%; latest $179M = operating cash $208M − maintenance capex $29M
    Industry peers: median 17%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 6 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $64M of SBC) leaves $115M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $208M ÷ net income $42M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $255M ÷ Owner Earnings $179M — this fiscal year
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $179M of Owner Earnings, $255M (143%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $255M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $64M stock comp, the real buyback was about $191M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands. This year's proportion is 143%; across the record (2020–2025) it is 69%, the capital-allocation section below.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.54×
    Expanding
    Capex $45M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $29M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Sells itself
    Selling and marketing $275M ÷ revenue $1.9B
    What this means

    Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 3.3%
    Stock pay, share count unread
    Stock compensation $64M (fiscal 2025), 3.3% of revenue · repurchases $255M · the share count is not comparable across these years (a split or a first listing sits in the record), so the drift is withheld
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.07×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $102M vs $37M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (6-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record
    Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.00/share (latest year $0.00), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.00/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2020–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 2 of 6
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 0% → −0% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 0% early, −0% lately, median −1%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 1%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +16%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 16% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · −4.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$519M
  • Cash & short-term investments$133M
  • Receivables$317M
  • Other current assets$69M
Current liabilities$469M
  • Accounts payable$276M
  • Other current liabilities$193M
Current ratio1.11×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.11×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.28×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$50Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+2.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$379Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$157M$85M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$10Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2020–2025

Over the record, the business generated $733M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$204M · 28%
  • Buybacks$384M · 52%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$145M · 20%
  • Returned to owners$384M

    69% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $384M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $384M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count720151.6%

    The diluted count rose from 40M to 290505M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$570M35% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity61%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$592Mover 6 years since fiscal 2020 buying other businesses, against $204M of capital spent building over the 6-year record

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Beside that spending sits $265M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2020 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Adam Singolda$18.3M$19.0M$33M
2022Adam Singolda$802k−$10.6M$26M
2023Adam Singolda$6.2M$9.4M$52M
2024Adam Singolda$10.5M$7.6M$149M
2025Adam Singolda$8.1M$11.2M$179M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership20.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$64M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 3.3% of revenue, equal to 145.1% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Advertising & Marketing

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
APPAppLovin$5.5B70%19.6%10%17%
TTDThe Trade Desk Inc.$2.9B79%17.4%22%28%
TBLATaboola.com Ltd.$1.9B30%0.3%-2%6%
UUnity Software$1.8B76%-36.8%-15%-6%
ZETAZeta Global Holdings Corp.$1.3B62%-6.8%-82%10%
DVDoubleVerify$748M83%12.5%7%18%
MGNIMagnite Inc.$714M62%-18.6%-13%18%
EVEREverQuote Inc.$693M94%-3.7%-34%1%
Group median73%-1.7%-7%13%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Taboola.com Ltd. has delivered.

Taboola.com Ltd.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Taboola.com Ltd. earns about $115M on its 6.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+53%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’25+16%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $201M on 280185M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $31M. The if-converted diluted count is 290505M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($52M) runs well above depreciation ($12M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $224M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Taboola.com Ltd. (TBLA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TBLA, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← TBBK its page in the Manual TBPH →

Industry order: ← STGW the Advertising & Marketing chapter TJGC →