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ESGR, Enstar Group

Insurance — Property & Casualty diversified Cyclical

A diversified business; where the profit really comes from, and whether it is earned or bought, is what the segment detail settles.

By investing the consideration received from our (re)insurance solutions, we generate investment returns that we use to settle the liabilities acquired, fund future transactions, meet our financing and operating obligations and return value to shareholders.

Latest annual: FY2024 10-K

ESGR · Enstar Group

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2024

$1.2B

−16.4% YoY · −11% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.2B 5-yr avg $1.0B

Operating margin 56.6% 5-yr avg 70.3%

ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 10%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 53% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The operating margin has swung widely — from −21% to 80% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2015–2024

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2015’15	2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	TTMTTMMar 2025
											Income statement
$904M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$619M	$2.2B	$2.7B	$789M	($1.1B)	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.2B	RevenueRevenue
43%	37%	40%	56%	19%	19%	47%	−31%	26%	32%	34%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$252M	$320M	$333M	($128M)	$1.0B	$1.8B	$634M	($793M)	$958M	$727M	$654M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
27.9%	28.2%	30.3%	−20.7%	45.8%	69.2%	80.4%	75.2%	66.5%	60.3%	56.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$225M	$327M	$314M	($217M)	$933M	$1.7B	$580M	($957M)	$968M	$643M	—	Pretax incomePretax
$220M	$265M	$311M	($150M)	$938M	$1.8B	$538M	($870M)	$1.1B	$576M	$507M	Net incomeNet inc.
6%	11%	-2%	—	1%	1%	5%	—	—	10%	10%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
($265M)	($203M)	($343M)	($160M)	$1.8B	$2.8B	$3.8B	$257M	$523M	$483M	$794M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$41M	$35M	$36M	$32M	$35M	$59M	$74M	$47M	$7M	$11M	$8M	Depreciation & amortizationD&A
($526M)	($502M)	($691M)	($42M)	$791M	$968M	$3.2B	$1.1B	($602M)	($82M)	$295M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$0	$18M	$4M	$245M	$0	$0	$206M	$0	$0	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	$0	$0	$26M	$942M	$163M	$531M	$0	—	BuybacksBuybacks
$20M	$157M	$293M	($826M)	($2.0B)	($2.3B)	($2.6B)	($919M)	($148M)	$286M	—	Investing cash flowInv. cash
$129M	$83M	($65M)	$753M	$294M	$118M	($737M)	($116M)	($861M)	($42M)	—	Financing cash flowFin. cash
($19M)	($14M)	$10M	$3M	$0	($6M)	$4M	$16M	($14M)	($3M)	—	Exchange-rate effectFX
($134M)	$23M	($106M)	($230M)	$73M	$541M	$495M	($762M)	($500M)	$724M	—	Change in cashΔ cash
10%	11%	12%	-2%	18%	25%	9%	-10%	14%	10%	8%	ROICROIC
9%	9%	10%	-4%	19%	26%	9%	-17%	20%	9%	8%	Return on equityROE
9%	9%	10%	−4%	19%	26%	9%	−17%	20%	9%	8%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$795M	$955M	$955M	$536M	$624M	$901M	$1.6B	$822M	$564M	$1.1B	$1.2B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$73M	$73M	$73M	$110M	$110M	$63M	$63M	—	—	—	—	GoodwillGoodwill
$11.8B	$12.9B	$13.6B	$16.6B	$19.8B	$21.6B	$24.7B	$22.2B	$20.9B	$20.4B	$20.3B	Total assetsAssets
$600M	$674M	$647M	$862M	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.9B	Total debtDebt
($195M)	($281M)	($308M)	$326M	$567M	$472M	$45M	$1.0B	$1.3B	$735M	$778M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
13.0×	15.5×	11.9×	-5.0×	18.9×	31.2×	9.2×	-8.9×	10.6×	8.2×	7.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$8.8B	$9.6B	$10.0B	$12.2B	$14.5B	$14.6B	$17.9B	$16.8B	$15.3B	$14.3B	—	Total liabilitiesTotal liab.
$418M	$455M	$480M	$459M	$439M	$365M	$179M	$168M	$0	—	—	Redeemable interestsRedeemable
$4M	$9M	$9M	$12M	$14M	$14M	$230M	$186M	$113M	$6M	—	Noncontrolling interestsNCI
$2.5B	$2.8B	$3.1B	$3.9B	$4.8B	$6.7B	$6.3B	$5.0B	$5.5B	$6.1B	$6.2B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
—	—	—	—	—	$8M	—	—	—	$63M	$63M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
19.4M	19.4M	19.5M	20.9M	21.8M	21.8M	20.1M	17.3M	15.8M	15.0M	15.1M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$46.60	$58.43	$56.38	$29.62	$100.57	$121.92	$39.20	$-60.84	$91.19	$80.11	$76.81	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$11.35	$13.62	$15.95	$-7.19	$43.08	$80.62	$26.73	$-50.22	$70.75	$38.30	$33.69	EPS (diluted)EPS
$129.68	$144.10	$160.63	$186.66	$222.37	$305.89	$314.15	$287.13	$350.26	$404.96	$412.40	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+6.2%/yr	−4.4%/yr
EPS	+14.5%/yr	−2.3%/yr
Book value / share	+13.5%/yr	+12.7%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2024

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 8.2×

Comfortable

Operating income $727M ÷ interest expense $89M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $735M · 1.0× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $1.1B − debt $1.8B

What this means
Netting $1.1B of cash and short-term investments against $1.8B of debt leaves $735M owed, about 1.0× a year's operating profit (2.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 11%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median, range -10%–25%; 10% latest = NOPAT $656M ÷ invested capital $6.8B

Industry peers: median 14%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Are earnings backed by cash? 0.84×

Mostly cash-backed

Cash from ops $483M ÷ net income $576M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity —

Current ratio ≥ 2× · —

What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record —

Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.
Earnings growth Near

Earnings +33% over the record · +3%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $18.42/share (latest year $38.63), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $408.51/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2015–2024

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 8 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 29% → 67% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 29% early to 67% lately, median 46% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 1%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Worst year 2018 · −20.7% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −2.8%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Net income
2020	Dominic Silvester	$23.5M	$27.7M	$1.8B
2021	Dominic Silvester	$5.2M	$14.7M	$538M
2022	Dominic Silvester	$20.9M	$7.3M	($870M)
2023	Dominic Silvester	$7.5M	$25.2M	$1.1B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2024 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio62:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2024 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

Peers, Insurance — Property & Casualty

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

Company	Revenuelatest FY, USD	Gross marginmedian over the record	Op. marginmedian over the record	ROICmedian over the record	Owner earn. marginmedian over the record
BRK-ABerkshire Hathaway Inc.	$371.4B	—	11.6%	—	10%
FNFFidelity National Fin	$14.4B	—	14.2%	17%	—
FAFFirst American Fin	$7.5B	—	9.6%	14%	11%
STCStewart Information Services Corporation	$2.9B	—	5.2%	9%	5%
ESGREnstar Group	$1.2B	—	53.1%	11%	—
PRCHPorch Group Inc.	$482M	69%	-44.2%	-26%	-7%
ITICInvestors Title Company	$273M	—	18.0%	15%	12%
Group median	—	—	11.6%	12%	—

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enstar Group is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered−17%/yr’19→’24

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today—

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh ESGR against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Enstar Group (ESGR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ESGR, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← ESE its page in the Manual ESI →

Industry order: ← EIG the Insurance — Property & Casualty chapter ESNT →