Owner Scorecard


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GLAS, Glass House Brands Inc.

Pharmaceuticals consumer brand UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

A pharmaceutical business, where patents grant a temporary monopoly the pipeline must keep refilling.

Latest annual: FY2025 40-F
GLAS · Glass House Brands Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$182M
−9.4% YoY · 30% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $182M 5-yr avg $138M
Gross margin 42% 5-yr avg 38%
Operating margin −9.1% 5-yr avg −32.1%
ROIC −9% 5-yr avg −13%
Owner-earnings margin −2% 5-yr avg −17%
Free cash flow margin −9% 5-yr avg −55%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −22% through the cycle on a 41% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −12%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2020–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$48M$63M$85M$161M$201M$182M$182MRevenueRevenue
$19M$16M$21M$81M$97M$77M$77MGross profitGross prof.
39%25%24%50%48%42%42%Gross marginGross mgn
($6M)($36M)($56M)($50M)$6M($17M)($17M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−12.4%−57.2%−66.4%−30.8%2.9%−9.1%−9.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
($17M)($43M)($33M)($98M)$721K($29M)($29M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($8M)($20M)($41M)$23M$28M$11M$11MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$2M$5M$11M$14M$14M$15M$15MDepreciationDeprec.
$7M$18M($19M)$108M$13M$25M$25MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$4M$108M$28M$12M$10M$27M$27MCapexCapex
8.0%171.7%32.7%7.7%5.1%14.9%14.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($10M)($25M)($52M)$11M$18M($4M)($4M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
−20.9%−39.4%−61.4%6.8%9.0%−2.0%−2.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($12M)($129M)($69M)$11M$18M($16M)($16M)Free cash flowFCF
−23.9%−203.8%−80.8%6.8%9.0%−8.6%−8.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
-11%-13%-19%-25%2%-9%-9%ROICROIC
-63%-24%-20%-109%1%-39%-39%Return on equityROE
−63%−24%−20%−109%1%−39%−39%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$5M$2M$5M$4M$5M$4M$4MReceivablesReceiv.
$7M$7M$11M$9M$14M$26M$26MInventoryInvent.
$3M$4M$6M$6M$9M$14M$14MAccounts payablePayables
$9M$5M$10M$7M$11M$17M$17MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$18M$69M$39M$49M$66M$68M$68MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$20M$55M$54M$87M$66M$38M$38MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×1.2×0.7×0.6×1.0×1.8×1.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$27M$196M$216M$216M$212M$229M$229MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$5M$5M$38M$0$0$0GoodwillGoodwill
$70M$288M$351M$304M$311M$319M$319MTotal assetsAssets
$16M$45M$63M$64M$58M$69M$69MTotal debtDebt
$16M$45M$63M$64M$58M$69M$69MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-2.8×-13.2×-7.4×-5.0×0.6×-2.3×-1.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$26M$182M$169M$90M$116M$74M$74MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
21.3M40.3M64.2M72.0M75.2M81.9M81.9MShares out (diluted)Shares
$2.27$1.57$1.32$2.23$2.67$2.22$2.22Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.78$-1.07$-0.51$-1.36$0.01$-0.35$-0.35EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.47$-0.62$-0.81$0.15$0.24$-0.04$-0.04Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.54$-3.20$-1.07$0.15$0.24$-0.19$-0.19Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.18$2.69$0.43$0.17$0.14$0.33$0.33Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.24$4.52$2.63$1.25$1.55$0.90$0.90Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.89 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.59 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
5-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−0.4%/yr−0.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+12.9%/yr+12.9%/yr
Book value / share−6.1%/yr−6.1%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2023FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($4M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $15M it takes just to hold its position. It put $12M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($16M).

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($29M)$721K($98M)($33M)($43M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$15M+$14M+$14M+$11M+$5M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$25M+$13M+$108M−$19M+$18M
Cash from operations$11M$28M$23M($41M)($20M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$15M−$10M−$12M−$11M−$5M
Owner earnings($4M)$18M$11M($52M)($25M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$12M−$16M−$104M
Free cash flow($16M)$18M$11M($69M)($129M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-2%9%7%-61%-39%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $15M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $12M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 40-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($17M) ÷ interest expense $10M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $0 − debt $69M
    What this means

    Netting $0 of cash and short-term investments against $69M of debt leaves $69M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 9 + DIO 91 − DPO 48 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    6-yr median, range -25%–2%; -9% latest = NOPAT ($13M) ÷ invested capital $143M
    Industry peers: median -23%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran -9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    6-yr median margin, range -61%–9%; latest ($4M) = operating cash $11M − maintenance capex $15M
    Industry peers: median -84%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -2% of revenue this year, a -11% median across 6 years. It chose to put $12M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($16M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($29M) · cash from operations $11M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.81×
    Expanding
    Capex $27M ÷ depreciation $15M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $182M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.78×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $69M vs $30M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (6-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record
    Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.51/share (latest year $-0.35), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.90/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2020–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 1 of 6
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −45% → −12% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −45% early to −12% lately, median −31% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2022 · −66.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$68M
  • Receivables$4M
  • Inventory$26M
  • Other current assets$37M
Current liabilities$38M
  • Debt due within a year$37K
  • Accounts payable$14M
  • Other current liabilities$24M
Current ratio1.78×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.09×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.00×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$30Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$37K due · $0 cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$62Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($76M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$70M$1M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Pharmaceuticals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
ACBAurora Cannabis Inc.$248M-115.3%-7%-84%
RYTMRhythm Pharmaceuticals Inc.$190M90%-221.1%4y-67%-132%4y
MRVIMaravai LifeSciences Holdings Inc.$186M53%16.8%-32%21%
STOKStoke Therapeutics Inc.$184M-277.3%-79%-238%
GLASGlass House Brands Inc.$182M41%-21.6%-12%-11%
KMDAKamada Ltd.$180M36%9.8%11%9%
CYRXCryoPort Inc.$176M46%-44.0%-14%-17%
CRONCronos Group Inc. Common Share$147M-7%-168.7%-23%-107%
Group median43%-79.7%-19%-50%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Glass House Brands Inc. reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Glass House Brands Inc. has delivered.

Glass House Brands Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.65% 10-year Treasury (Aug 19, 2026) + 4.35 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.65%, as of Aug 19, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($16M) on 82M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $69M. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($27M) runs well above depreciation ($15M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($4M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Glass House Brands Inc. (GLAS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GLAS, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← GILT its page in the Manual GLBE →

Industry order: ← FBIOP the Pharmaceuticals chapter GRFS →