Owner Scorecard


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HBI, Hanesbrands

Specialty Retail retail Cyclical

Hanesbrands is a socially responsible global leader in everyday iconic apparel with a mission to create a more comfortable world for everybody.

We own a portfolio of some of the world's most recognized apparel brands in the core basic and innerwear apparel categories including Hanes, Bonds , Bali, Maidenform, Playtex, Bras N Things, Berlei, Wonderbra, Zorba, JMS/Just My Size and Comfortwash .

Our brands have been trusted by consumers for generations as our products are in nine out of 10 U.S. households and we are the No. 1 seller of innerwear.

Latest annual: FY2024 10-K
HBI · Hanesbrands
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2024
$3.5B
−3.6% YoY · −11% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.5B 5-yr avg $4.8B
Gross margin 42% 5-yr avg 35%
Operating margin 13.1% 5-yr avg 6.4%
Owner-earnings margin −0% 5-yr avg 5%
Free cash flow margin −0% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 38% and operating margin about 11% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 0.7% to 13% — on a steadier 38% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 29% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 3 of 5 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Americas is 78% of revenue, so this is largely a single-region business.

Revenue by geography, FY2024
  • Americas78%$2.7B
  • Asia Pacific19%$667M
  • Other3%$92M
  • Europe0%$6M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2024

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’24TTMTTMSep 2025
Income statement
$6.0B$6.5B$6.8B$6.4B$6.1B$6.8B$3.9B$3.6B$3.5B$3.5BRevenueRevenue
$2.3B$2.5B$2.7B$2.4B$1.6B$2.7B$1.3B$1.3B$1.4B$1.5BGross profitGross prof.
38%38%39%38%26%39%35%35%39%42%Gross marginGross mgn
25%27%26%25%25%27%28%28%33%29%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%0%0%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$790M$736M$865M$851M$43M$798M$267M$266M$186M$462MOperating incomeOp. inc.
13.1%11.4%12.7%13.2%0.7%11.7%6.9%7.3%5.3%13.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
$571M$529M$644M$644M($142M)$581M$127M$14M($57M)Pretax incomePretax
$539M$74M$540M$601M($76M)$77M($127M)($18M)($320M)$330MNet incomeNet inc.
6%16%11%10%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$606M$656M$643M$803M$448M$623M($359M)$562M$264M$23MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$103M$122M$132M$115M$115M$110M$79M$80M$79MDepreciation & amortizationD&A
($69M)$436M($49M)$78M$390M$419M($334M)$479M$480M($333M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$83M$87M$86M$101M$54M$69M$112M$44M$38M$31MCapexCapex
1.4%1.3%1.3%1.6%0.9%1.0%2.9%1.2%1.1%0.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$522M$569M$557M$702M$395M$554M($471M)$518M$226M($8M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
8.7%8.8%8.2%10.9%6.4%8.1%−12.2%14.2%6.5%−0.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$522M$569M$557M$702M$395M$554M($471M)$518M$226M($8M)Free cash flowFCF
8.7%8.8%8.2%10.9%6.4%8.1%−12.2%14.2%6.5%−0.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$964M$62M$335M$25M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$167M$220M$216M$217M$210M$209M$209M$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$380M$400M$0$0$200M$0$25M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
($967M)($105M)($419M)($110M)($41M)($52M)($216M)($23M)$813MInvesting cash flowInv. cash
$511M($586M)($200M)($824M)$142M($888M)$296M($580M)($1.0B)Financing cash flowFin. cash
($9M)($4M)$10M$4M$31M($33M)($43M)$9M($21M)Exchange-rate effectFX
$141M($39M)$34M($126M)$581M($350M)($322M)($33M)$10MChange in cashΔ cash
17%9%16%18%3%ROICROIC
48%12%62%49%-32%-4%-942%74%Return on equityROE
33%−24%37%31%−84%−4%−942%74%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$460M$422M$433M$329M$901M$536M$196M$185M$215M$218MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$837M$903M$871M$815M$768M$894M$721M$424M$376M$455MReceivablesReceiv.
$1.8B$1.9B$2.1B$1.9B$1.4B$1.6B$2.0B$956M$871M$991MInventoryInvent.
$762M$868M$1.0B$959M$892M$1.2B$917M$539M$593M$572MAccounts payablePayables
$1.9B$1.9B$1.9B$1.8B$1.2B$1.3B$1.8B$841M$654M$874MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$3.3B$3.4B$3.5B$3.2B$3.4B$3.5B$3.1B$2.3B$1.7B$1.9BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.6B$1.8B$2.0B$1.8B$2.1B$2.3B$1.8B$1.4B$1.2B$1.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.0×1.9×1.7×1.8×1.6×1.5×1.7×1.6×1.4×1.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$692M$624M$608M$516M$478M$441M$375M$353M$188MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.1B$1.2B$1.1B$659M$659M$638M$650MGoodwillGoodwill
$6.9B$6.9B$7.2B$7.4B$7.7B$7.1B$6.5B$5.6B$3.8B$4.3BTotal assetsAssets
$3.7B$4.0B$4.0B$3.4B$4.0B$3.4B$3.9B$3.3B$2.3B$2.3BTotal debtDebt
$3.2B$3.5B$3.5B$3.0B$3.1B$2.8B$3.7B$3.1B$2.1B$2.1BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
5.2×4.2×4.4×4.8×0.3×4.9×2.0×1.2×0.9×2.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$5.7B$6.2B$6.4B$6.1B$6.9B$6.4B$6.1B$5.2B$3.8BTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$1.1B$601M$872M$1.2B$398M$419M$34M$446MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%0.4%0.3%0.1%0.3%0.2%0.6%0.6%0.7%0.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$25M$163M$77M$77MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
385M369M365M366M353M352M350M351M352M357MShares out (diluted)Shares
$15.68$17.52$18.67$17.58$17.37$19.32$11.04$10.37$9.96$9.90Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.40$0.20$1.48$1.64$-0.21$0.22$-0.36$-0.05$-0.91$0.92EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.36$1.54$1.53$1.92$1.12$1.57$-1.35$1.47$0.64$-0.02Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.36$1.54$1.53$1.92$1.12$1.57$-1.35$1.47$0.64$-0.02Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.44$0.60$0.59$0.59$0.60$0.59$0.60$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.22$0.24$0.24$0.28$0.15$0.20$0.32$0.13$0.11$0.09Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.91$1.63$2.39$3.38$1.14$1.19$0.10$1.25Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−5.5%/yr−10.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share−8.9%/yr−19.7%/yr
Capital spending / share−8.4%/yr−17.2%/yr
Book value / share−34.7%/yr−50.9%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue-3.6%
    “Net Sales Net sales decreased 4% during 2024 compared to prior year primarily due to the divestiture of the U.S.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business turned a $320M loss into $226M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021FY2020
Reported net income($320M)($18M)($127M)$77M($76M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$79M+$80M+$79M+$110M+$115M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$26M+$21M+$23M+$17M+$19M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$480M+$479M−$334M+$419M+$390M
Cash from operations$264M$562M($359M)$623M$448M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$38M−$44M−$112M−$69M−$54M
Owner earnings$226M$518M($471M)$554M$395M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue6%14%-12%8%6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $26M), owner earnings is nearer $201M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income $186M ÷ interest expense $196M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.1B · 11.1× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $215M − debt $2.3B
    What this means

    Netting $215M of cash and short-term investments against $2.3B of debt leaves $2.1B owed, about 11.1× a year's operating profit (12.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 39 + DIO 148 − DPO 101 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    5-yr median, range 3%–18%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range -12%–14%; latest $226M = operating cash $264M − maintenance capex $38M
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $26M of SBC) leaves $201M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($320M) · cash from operations $264M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $226M — this fiscal year
    What this means

    Of $226M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does. This year's proportion is 0%; across the record (2016–2024) it is 69%, the capital-allocation section below.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.48×
    Harvesting
    Capex $38M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $79M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 0.7%
    The count is flat
    Stock compensation $26M (fiscal 2024), 0.7% of revenue · no repurchases · diluted shares +0.0% since 2021
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.37×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.3B vs $467M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 7 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −140%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.44/share (latest year $-0.91), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.10/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2024

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 5 of 9
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 12% early to 7% lately, median 11% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −5%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 5% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 0.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.1%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Sep 27, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.9B
  • Cash & short-term investments$218M
  • Receivables$455M
  • Inventory$991M
  • Other current assets$216M
Current liabilities$1.2B
  • Debt due within a year$135M
  • Accounts payable$572M
  • Other current liabilities$537M
Current ratio1.51×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.71×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.17×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$635Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$135M due · $218M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Sep 27, 2025 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−1.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.6× → 1.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($1.1B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.7B$323M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2024

Over the record, the business generated $4.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a deleverager, a meaningful share of cash went to paying down debt.

  • Reinvested$675M · 16%
  • Dividends$1.4B · 34%
  • Buybacks$1.0B · 24%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.1B · 26%
  • Returned to owners$2.5B

    69% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.4B as dividends and $1.0B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $1.3B and cash and short-term investments fell $243M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $1.0B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−7.2%

    The diluted count fell from 385M to 357M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 7 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.5B40% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$2.7Bover 13 years since fiscal 2008 buying other businesses, against $675M of capital spent building over the 9-year record

$265M written down across 3 years (2020, 2021, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 19% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Beside that spending sits $220M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2008 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2020Stephen Bratspies$4.8M$3.6M$395M
2020Stephen Bratspies$9.5M$6.3M$395M
2021Stephen Bratspies$11.0M$15.4M$554M
2022Stephen Bratspies$9.2M−$2.0M($471M)
2023Stephen Bratspies$9.8M$5.4M$518M
2024Stephen Bratspies$12.9M$21.2M$226M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio1,893:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$26M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2024, 0.7% of revenue, equal to 13.9% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2024

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Credit & receivables as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Specialty Retail

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
AEOAmerican Eagle$5.5B37%6.7%21%5%
ANFAbercrombie & Fitch$5.3B60%3.5%13%6%
HBIHanesbrands$3.5B38%11.4%16%8%
DBIDesigner Brands Inc.$2.9B31%3.0%10%3%
GCOGenesco Inc.$2.4B48%3.6%6%4%
BOOTBoot Barn Holdings$2.3B35%10.8%17%4%
ZUMZZumiez$929M34%5.0%9%5%
CTRNCiti Trends Inc.$820M2.9%9%2%
Group median37%4.3%12%4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Hanesbrands has delivered.

Hanesbrands’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Hanesbrands earns about $287M on its 8.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.71% 10-year Treasury (Aug 18, 2026) + 4.29 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’24−6%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’24−5%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’22–’24)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.71%, as of Aug 18, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($8M) on 354M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2025-10-31; net debt $2.1B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Hanesbrands (HBI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HBI, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← HBCP its page in the Manual HBT →

Industry order: ← GME the Specialty Retail chapter HD →