Owner Scorecard


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INSM, Insmed Incorporated

Pharmaceuticals consumer brand UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

We are a people-first global biopharmaceutical company striving to deliver first- and best-in-class therapies to transform the lives of patients facing serious diseases.

To complement our internal research and development, we also actively evaluate in-licensing and acquisition opportunities for commercial products, product candidates and technologies.

Our two commercial products, ARIKAYCE and BRINSUPRI , are both part of the Respiratory therapeutic area.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
INSM · Insmed Incorporated
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$606M
+66.7% YoY · 30% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.1B 5-yr avg $342M
Gross margin 83% 5-yr avg 78%
Operating margin −73.9% 5-yr avg −213.0%
ROIC −88% 5-yr avg −150%
Owner-earnings margin −71% 5-yr avg −179%
Free cash flow margin −71% 5-yr avg −180%

Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~37 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is ARIKAYCE (72%) and BRINSUPRI (28%).
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −199% through the cycle on a 77% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Inventory runs near 27% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −138%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

ARIKAYCE is 72% of revenue, with BRINSUPRI the other meaningful line at 28%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • ARIKAYCE72%$434M
  • BRINSUPRI28%$173M
By geographyUnited States75%International25%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$0$0$10M$136M$164M$188M$245M$305M$364M$606M$1.1BRevenueRevenue
$7M$112M$125M$144M$190M$240M$278M$483M$949MGross profitGross prof.
75%82%76%77%78%79%76%80%83%Gross marginGross mgn
n/m154%124%124%108%113%127%116%79%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
n/m97%110%145%162%187%165%127%76%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($173M)($189M)($307M)($235M)($265M)($375M)($457M)($710M)($878M)($1.2B)($841M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
n/m−172.4%−161.3%−199.0%−186.4%−232.5%−241.5%−205.6%−73.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
($176M)($193M)($324M)($254M)($293M)($436M)($480M)($747M)($910M)($1.3B)Pretax incomePretax
($176M)($193M)($324M)($254M)($294M)($435M)($482M)($750M)($914M)($1.3B)($875M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($147M)($160M)($258M)($251M)($219M)($363M)($400M)($536M)($684M)($935M)($779M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$2M$3M$4M$5M$9M$9M$5M$6MDepreciation & amortizationD&A
$9M$12M$36M($28M)$29M$16M$18M$133M$133M$189M($61M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$4M$3M$13M$42M$6M$7M$10M$13M$22M$33M$29MCapexCapex
133.1%31.0%3.8%3.9%4.0%4.4%6.0%5.4%2.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($149M)($163M)($262M)($256M)($226M)($371M)($406M)($542M)($706M)($968M)($808M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
n/m−187.5%−137.2%−196.6%−165.4%−177.5%−194.1%−159.6%−71.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($151M)($163M)($271M)($293M)($226M)($371M)($410M)($550M)($706M)($968M)($808M)Free cash flowFCF
n/m−214.6%−137.2%−196.6%−167.2%−180.1%−194.1%−159.6%−71.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$7M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
($4M)($3M)($15M)($42M)($7M)($64M)($35M)($224M)($583M)($65M)Investing cash flowInv. cash
$31M$381M$387M$285M$271M$613M$793M$168M$1.3B$954MFinancing cash flowFin. cash
($50K)$103K($45K)($4K)$494K($933K)($996K)($250K)($1M)$931KExchange-rate effectFX
($120M)$219M$114M($8M)$45M$184M$357M($592M)$73M($45M)Change in cashΔ cash
-292%-421%-149%-83%-108%-114%-260%-164%-83%-128%-88%ROICROIC
-114%-53%-156%-97%-107%-106%-548%-320%-173%-116%Return on equityROE
−114%−53%−156%−97%−107%−106%−548%−320%−173%−116%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$163M$381M$495M$487M$533M$767M$1.1B$780M$1.4B$1.4B$1.2BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$0$6M$19M$17M$24M$30M$41M$52M$141M$215MReceivablesReceiv.
$0$7M$28M$50M$67M$70M$83M$99M$132M$142MInventoryInvent.
$10M$15M$18M$13M$43M$36M$50M$65M$73M$80M$75MAccounts payablePayables
($15M)($5M)$34M$23M$56M$49M$59M$78M$193M$283MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$168M$389M$519M$555M$623M$837M$1.3B$929M$1.6B$1.8B$1.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$28M$45M$80M$85M$119M$135M$190M$226M$298M$469M$439MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
6.0×8.7×6.5×6.5×5.2×6.2×6.7×4.1×5.5×3.8×3.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$10M$12M$23M$60M$54M$53M$56M$65M$80M$103MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$0$136M$136M$136M$136M$136M$136MGoodwillGoodwill
$238M$462M$605M$742M$796M$1.2B$1.7B$1.3B$2.0B$2.3B$2.1BTotal assetsAssets
$55M$56M$450M$450M$450M$567M$1.1B$1.2B$1.1B$541M$544MTotal debtDebt
($108M)($326M)($45M)($37M)($83M)($200M)($23M)$375M($330M)($889M)($617M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-49.6×-31.9×-12.1×-8.5×-9.0×-9.3×-17.3×-8.7×-10.3×-14.9×-10.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$83M$101M$396M$481M$520M$833M$1.6B$1.7B$1.7B$1.5BTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$154M$361M$208M$262M$276M$410M$88M($332M)$285M$739M$757MShareholders’ equityEquity
266.8%19.8%22.0%24.4%23.5%24.5%26.6%25.2%13.8%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
61.9M66.6M76.9M84.6M97.6M112M123M140M164M199M216MShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.00$0.00$0.13$1.61$1.68$1.68$1.99$2.17$2.22$3.05$5.26Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.85$-2.89$-4.22$-3.01$-3.01$-3.88$-3.91$-5.34$-5.57$-6.42$-4.04EPS (diluted)EPS
$-2.41$-2.44$-3.40$-3.03$-2.31$-3.31$-3.30$-3.86$-4.30$-4.86$-3.73Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-2.44$-2.44$-3.53$-3.46$-2.31$-3.31$-3.33$-3.91$-4.30$-4.86$-3.73Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.07$0.05$0.17$0.50$0.06$0.07$0.08$0.09$0.13$0.16$0.13Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.50$5.42$2.71$3.09$2.83$3.66$0.71$-2.36$1.74$3.71$3.50Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+12.6%/yr
Capital spending / share+10.3%/yr+20.7%/yr
Book value / share+4.5%/yr+5.6%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $1.3B loss into ($968M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($1.3B)($914M)($750M)($482M)($435M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$6M+$5M+$9M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$153M+$97M+$75M+$58M+$46M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$189M+$133M+$133M+$18M+$16M
Cash from operations($935M)($684M)($536M)($400M)($363M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$33M−$22M−$6M−$5M−$7M
Owner earnings($968M)($706M)($542M)($406M)($371M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$8M−$5M
Free cash flow($968M)($706M)($550M)($410M)($371M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-160%-194%-178%-165%-197%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $153M), owner earnings is nearer ($1.1B).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

In dashed depreciation years the filer's own depreciation concepts changed scope and do not reconcile with the adjacent years; the add-back is withheld rather than guessed, and its amount remains inside "Working capital & other."

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($1.2B) ÷ interest expense $84M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net cash
    Cash $510M + ST investments $920M − debt $541M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $889M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 85 + DIO 392 − DPO 237 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -421%–-83%; -128% latest = NOPAT ($985M) ÷ invested capital $769M
    Industry peers: median -16%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -128% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    7-yr median margin, range -197%–-137%; latest ($958M) = operating cash ($935M) − maintenance capex $23M
    Industry peers: median -13%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -158% of revenue this year, a -178% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $153M of SBC) leaves ($1.1B).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($1.3B) · cash from operations ($935M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting?
    Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 25.2%
    The count is rising
    Stock compensation $153M (fiscal 2025), 25.2% of revenue · no repurchases · diluted shares +61.8% since 2022
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $606M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.83×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $541M vs $1.3B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 10 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record
    Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-4.49/share (latest year $-5.85), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.38/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 0 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 10 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −1153% → −227% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −1153% early to −227% lately, median −206% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC
    What this means

    The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.

  • Worst year 2018 · −3124.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.6B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.2B
  • Receivables$215M
  • Inventory$142M
  • Other current assets$116M
Current liabilities$439M
  • Accounts payable$75M
  • Other current liabilities$364M
Current ratio3.72×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio3.40×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio2.64×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.2Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway1.4 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+296.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters6.4× → 3.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$528Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$289MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$557M$14M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Lewis$7.3M$2.8M($371M)
2022Mr. Lewis$7.8M$4.3M($406M)
2023Mr. Lewis$10.4M$17.7M($542M)
2024Mr. Lewis$10.9M$51.9M($706M)
2025Mr. Lewis$14.5M$127.9M($968M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$153M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 25.2% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$842M · 74% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “Our three largest customers as of December 31, 2025 accounted for 74% and 85% of our total gross product revenue for the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024, respectively.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Pharmaceuticals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
AMPHAmphastar Pharmaceuticals Inc.$720M43%11.0%9%15%
RAREUltragenyx$673M98%1y-126.5%-92%-105%
AXSMAxsome Therapeutics Inc.$638M90%1y-79.2%-4778%1y-44%
TGTXTG Therapeutics Inc.$616M88%4y12.7%3y-572%-12%3y
OPKOPKO Health Inc.$607M34%-18.8%-8%-13%
INSMInsmed Incorporated$606M77%-199.0%-138%-178%
CPRXCatalyst Pharmaceuticals Inc.$589M86%37.2%48%38%
HCMHUTCHMED (China) Limited$549M35%-32.7%-23%-16%
Group median81%-25.7%-57%-14%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Insmed Incorporated is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

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The assumptions

Revenue, delivered28%/yr’20→’25

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−71%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Insmed Incorporated (INSM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/INSM, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← INR its page in the Manual INSP →

Industry order: ← INDV the Pharmaceuticals chapter INVA →