Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← INMD Manual INVZ → ← ING Banks ISTR →

INTR, Inter & Co. Inc. Class A

Banks financial

A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.

Latest annual: FY2024 20-F · figures as filed, in BRL
INTR · Inter & Co. Inc. Class A
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2024
R$3.6B
+20.7% YoY · 41% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · FY2024, with 5-yr average
Revenue R$3.6B 5-yr avg R$2.2B
Return on equity 10% 5-yr avg 2%
Return on tangible equity 10% 5-yr avg 2%
Efficiency ratio 49% 5-yr avg 65%
Equity / assets 11.6% 5-yr avg 12.6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 1%, above 12% in only 0 of 6 years). The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Adequate
    Net income R$907M ÷ equity R$8.9B
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Modest
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill R$0 − intangibles R$0)
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • Cost-income, not comparable to the US grades
    Noninterest expense R$1.8B ÷ (net interest income + fees)
    Industry peers: median 33%
    What this means

    The share of revenue eaten by running costs. A 20-F/IFRS filer structures its income statement differently from a US bank, so this figure is not comparable to the US thresholds and is shown without a lean/bloated grade — read it against the bank's own history, not across the pool.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 11.6%
    Well capitalized
    Equity R$8.9B ÷ assets R$76.5B
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Mostly deposit-funded
    Deposits R$42.8B ÷ assets R$76.5B
    What this means

    Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

  • Credit cost (provision / NII) -113%
    Net reserve release
    Provision for credit losses (R$2.1B) ÷ net interest income R$1.8B
    What this means

    What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.

The franchise and the credit cycle

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The deposit mix isn't cleanly tagged in the filings' structured data; the funding read above carries what is.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    Not derivable from the filings' structured data — some filers carry recoveries only on segment axes, and a gross figure dressed as net would be a wrong number.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Peers, Banks

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDROEmedian over the recordROTCEmedian over the recordEfficiencymedian over the recordNII / assetsmedian over the record
BBVABanco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A.$40.2B10%11%38%2.3%
SMFGSUMITOMO MITSUI FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.$26.1B5%6%0.7%
BSBRBanco Santander Brasil SA$16.0B12%29%27%4.8%
BSACBanco Santander - Chile ADS$3.4B16%17%2.8%
ESQEsquire Financial Holdings Inc.$147M13%13%54%4.2%
INTRInter & Co. Inc. Class Aas filed: R$3.6B1%1%61%2.4%
IFSIntercorp Financial Services Inc.as filed: PEN 4.5B16%16%25%3y4.7%
INGING Group N.V.as filed: €13.7B10%10%1.2%
Group median11%12%38%2.6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Inter & Co. Inc. Class A reports in BRL, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that BRL, ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share in BRL. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio and the exchange rate, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Inter & Co. Inc. Class A’s record justifies.

R$
The assumptions

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity1%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’22–’24)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book R$8.9B on 436M shares, a 1% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Inter & Co. Inc. Class A (INTR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/INTR, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← INMD its page in the Manual INVZ →

Industry order: ← ING the Banks chapter ISTR →