Owner Scorecard


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MSGE, Madison Square Garden Entertainment Corp.

Casinos & Gaming capital-intensive Cyclical

Revenue is Ticketing and venue license fee revenues (53%), Sponsorship and Signage, Suite and Advertising Commission Revenues (29%) and Food, Beverage and Merchandise Revenues (17%).

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
MSGE · Madison Square Garden Entertainment Corp.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$1.1B
+12.5% YoY · 79% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.1B 5-yr avg $865M
Operating margin 13.3% 5-yr avg 10.1%
ROIC 27% 5-yr avg 16%

Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~37 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 12% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −413% and 13% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 3 of 6 years). Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Ticketing and venue license fee revenues at 53%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Ticketing and venue license fee revenues53%$453M
  • Sponsorship and Signage, Suite And Advertising Commission Revenues29%$253M
  • Food, Beverage And Merchandise Revenues17%$151M
  • Other1%$6M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2021–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$57M$582M$780M$959M$943M$1.1B$1.1BRevenueRevenue
238%29%23%22%23%24%24%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($237M)($6M)$105M$112M$122M$142M$142MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−412.8%−1.0%13.5%11.7%13.0%13.3%13.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$52M$66M$107MPretax incomePretax
($219M)($133M)$77M$144M$37M$66M$66MNet incomeNet inc.
2%43%38%38%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($148M)$95M$136M$111M$115M$351M$351MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$72M$70M$60M$54M$58M$56M$56MDepreciation & amortizationD&A
($42M)$120M($33M)($118M)($8M)$197M$197MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$0$0$25M$51M$40M$25MBuybacksBuybacks
($10M)$45M$30M($62M)($24M)($30M)Investing cash flowInv. cash
$473M($396M)($144M)($100M)($82M)($71M)Financing cash flowFin. cash
$315M($255M)$22M($51M)$10M$251MChange in cashΔ cash
-104%-1%21%20%13%27%27%ROICROIC
-44%145%145%Return on equityROE
−44%145%145%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$318M$58M$76M$33M$43M$294M$294MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$103M$64M$77M$67M$88M$88MReceivablesReceiv.
$3M$3M$4M$4M$4M$4MInventoryInvent.
$11M$16M$27M$12M$27M$27MAccounts payablePayables
$94M$51M$55M$58M$65M$65MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$341M$295M$219M$237M$522M$522MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$545M$541M$506M$502M$748M$748MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.6×0.5×0.4×0.5×0.7×0.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$696M$629M$634M$621M$592MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$69M$69M$69M$69M$69M$69MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.5B$1.4B$1.6B$1.7B$1.9B$1.9BTotal assetsAssets
$664M$646M$615M$599M$571M$571MTotal debtDebt
$606M$570M$582M$556M$277M$277MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-7.0×-0.1×2.0×1.9×2.4×3.5×3.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.5B$1.5B$1.6B$1.7B$1.9BTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$499M($1M)($69M)($23M)($13M)$46M$46MShareholders’ equityEquity
70.7%6.8%4.1%3.2%2.9%3.1%3.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
51.8M51.8M52.3M48.6M48.3M48.0M48.0MShares out (diluted)Shares
$1.11$11.24$14.92$19.74$19.51$22.10$22.10Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-4.22$-2.58$1.47$2.97$0.77$1.38$1.38EPS (diluted)EPS
$9.63$-0.03$-1.33$-0.48$-0.28$0.95$0.95Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
5-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+81.9%/yr+81.9%/yr
Book value / share−37.0%/yr−37.0%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2022FY2026
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $142M ÷ interest expense $40M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $277M · 2.0× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $294M − debt $571M
    What this means

    Netting $294M of cash and short-term investments against $571M of debt leaves $277M owed, about 2.0× a year's operating profit (4.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    6-yr median, range -104%–27%; 27% latest = NOPAT $88M ÷ invested capital $323M
    Industry peers: median 1%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 27% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $351M ÷ net income $66M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting?
    Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 3.1%
    The count is genuinely shrinking
    Stock compensation $32M (fiscal 2026), 3.1% of revenue · repurchases $25M · diluted shares -8.2% since 2023
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.70×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $571M vs ($226M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (6-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record
    Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.74/share (latest year $1.39), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.96/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2021–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 6
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 5 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −133% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −133% early to 13% lately, median 12% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2021 · −412.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −1.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$522M
  • Cash & short-term investments$294M
  • Receivables$88M
  • Inventory$4M
  • Other current assets$137M
Current liabilities$748M
  • Debt due within a year$30M
  • Accounts payable$27M
  • Other current liabilities$691M
Current ratio0.70×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.69×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.39×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($226M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$30M due · $294M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Jun 30, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+2.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.5× → 0.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($23M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.2B$605M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.2B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$285Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'27$48M
'28$63M
'29$56M
'30$63M
'31$64M
later$780M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$48Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$1.1Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$605Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$571M
Lease obligations (present value)$605M
Total fixed claims on the business$1.2B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.2B, of which the leases are 51%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Jun 30, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Net income
2023Mr. Dolan$9.3M$10.6M$77M
2024Mr. Dolan$10.2M$10.9M$144M
2025Mr. Dolan$14.2M$16.5M$37M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3.9%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio567:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$32M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2026, 3.1% of revenue, equal to 22.9% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Casinos & Gaming

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
SGHCSuper Group (SGHC) Limited$2.0B67%12.6%69%14%
STUBStubHub Holdings Inc.$1.7B7.8%-35%2y15%
PRKSUnited Parks & Resorts Inc.$1.7B18.6%16%10%
MSGSMadison Square Garden Sports Corp.$1.2B-0.6%-2%9%
RSIRush Street Interactive Inc.$1.1B32%-19.3%-1%
MSGEMadison Square Garden Entertainment Corp.$1.1B12.3%16%
GENIGenius Sports Limited$669M22%-22.6%-27%3%
PRSUPursuit Attractions and Hospitality Inc.$452M91%6.3%4%4%
Group median7.1%4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Madison Square Garden Entertainment Corp. is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

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The assumptions

Revenue, delivered15%/yr’21→’26

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Madison Square Garden Entertainment Corp. (MSGE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MSGE, data as of 2026-08-17.

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