RSI, Rush Street Interactive Inc.

Will it survive?

• Can it pay its interest? —
  No meaningful interest burden
  Little or no interest expense reported
  What this means

  Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

• How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$342M
  Net cash, debt-free
  Cash $336M + ST investments $6M − debt $0
  What this means

  Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $342M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

• How long is cash tied up? -15d
  Negative, funded by others
  DSO 5 + DIO 0 − DPO 20 days
  What this means

  Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

• Return on invested capital —
  Not enough data
  Industry peers: median 6%
  What this means

  The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

• Owner-earnings margin 14%
  Positive this year, negative across the cycle
  latest $164M = operating cash $165M − maintenance capex $767K (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (7-yr median -1%)
  Industry peers: median 12%
  What this means

  What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a -1% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $26M of SBC) leaves $138M.

• Are earnings backed by cash? 4.95×
  Cash-backed
  Cash from ops $165M ÷ net income $33M
  What this means

  How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

• Where do the earnings go? 5%
  Reinvests most of it
  Dividends + buybacks $8M ÷ Owner Earnings $164M — this fiscal year
  What this means

  Of $164M Owner Earnings, $8M (5%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $8M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($26M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does. This year's proportion is 5%; across the record (2019–2025) it is 7%, the capital-allocation section below.

• Investing or harvesting? 0.02×
  Harvesting
  Capex $767K ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $40M
  What this means

  Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

• Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 2.3%
  Stock pay, share count unread
  Stock compensation $26M (fiscal 2025), 2.3% of revenue · repurchases $8M · the share count is not comparable across these years (a split or a first listing sits in the record), so the drift is withheld
  What this means

  Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

• Adequate size Near
  Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.1B
  What this means

  Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

• Strong liquidity Near
  Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.93×
  What this means

  Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

• Earnings stability Miss
  A profit every year (7-yr record) · 4 loss years
  What this means

  Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

• Dividend record —
  Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
  What this means

  An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

• Earnings growth —
  Earnings +33% over the record · —
  What this means

  Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

• Moderate price —
  P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
  What this means

  Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.05/share (latest year $0.31), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.38/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

• Profitable years 3 of 7
  What this means

  Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

• Operating margin −34% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)
  What this means

  Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −34% early to 1% lately, median −19% — pricing power intact or improving.

• Owner earnings growth +69%/yr
  What this means

  Owner earnings grew about 69% a year over the record.

• Worst year 2020 · −47.9% op. margin
  What this means

  Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

• How management talks about it Promotional
  What this means

  The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.