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NMRK, Newmark Group Inc.
Newmark is a leading commercial real estate advisor and service provider to large institutional investors, global corporations, and other owners and occupiers.
We offer a diverse array of integrated services and products designed to meet the full needs of our clients.
For the year ended December 31, 2025, we generated revenues of approximately $3.3 billion, primarily from commissions on leasing and capital markets transactions, mortgage origination and loan servicing fees, property and facility management fees, and consulting and technology user fees.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~39 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Leasing and Other Commissions (30%) and Management Services (29%), with 2 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 10% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The operating margin has swung widely — from 5.1% to 43% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 5 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Leasing and Other Commissions at 30%.
- Leasing and Other Commissions30%$1.0B
- Management Services29%$954M
- Investment sales17%$559M
- Mortgage brokerage and debt placement8%$254M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $1.3B | $1.6B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $1.9B | $2.9B | $2.7B | $2.5B | $2.7B | $3.3B | $3.6B | RevenueRevenue |
| $168M | $144M | $107M | $117M | $109M | $978M | $113M | $62M | $85M | $126M | $148M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $72M | $96M | $98M | $131M | $141M | $122M | $166M | $166M | $174M | $181M | $185M | Depreciation & amortizationD&A |
| ($644M) | $854M | ($332M) | $987M | ($778M) | ($49M) | $1.2B | ($266M) | ($10M) | $172M | $846M | Cash from operationsOp. cash |
| — | $102M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| — | 12% | — | 0% | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0% | Dividend / operating cashPayout |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($34M) | $379K | $8M | ($57M) | ($4M) | $453M | $309M | ($50M) | ($33M) | ($198M) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $636M | ($798M) | $339M | ($896M) | $818M | ($396M) | ($1.5B) | $261M | $90M | ($45M) | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| ($43M) | $56M | $14M | $34M | $37M | $8M | $46M | ($54M) | $46M | ($71M) | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| — | $2.3B | $3.5B | $3.2B | $4.0B | $5.2B | $3.9B | $4.5B | $4.7B | $5.0B | $5.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | 30% | 16% | 18% | 17% | 10% | 14% | 12% | 14% | 13% | 17% | Debt / assetsDebt/assets |
| — | $671M | $538M | $589M | $680M | $545M | $548M | $547M | $671M | $672M | $867M | Total debtDebt |
| — | $492M | $367M | $389M | $456M | ($171M) | $314M | $382M | $473M | $443M | $608M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | $2.0B | $2.4B | $2.2B | $3.0B | $3.5B | $2.4B | $2.9B | $3.2B | $3.3B | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| $0 | $21M | $26M | $22M | $20M | $21M | $17M | $16M | $14M | $12M | — | Redeemable interestsRedeemable |
| — | ($38M) | $489M | $341M | $266M | $386M | $344M | $326M | $319M | $278M | — | Noncontrolling interestsNCI |
| $984M | $260M | $568M | $600M | $655M | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.4B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| — | 138M | 164M | 185M | 180M | 196M | 245M | 176M | 178M | 253M | 254M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| — | $0.74 | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | $1.88 | $3.46 | $3.24 | $3.65 | $6.53 | $4.82 | $7.10 | $6.78 | $5.77 | $5.66 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.43 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +1.5%/yr (8-yr) | +4.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −25.7%/yr (8-yr) | — |
| EPS | −8.8%/yr (8-yr) | −3.9%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −2.1%/yr (8-yr) | +1.2%/yr |
| Book value / share | +15.0%/yr (8-yr) | +9.6%/yr |
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $443M · 1.9× operating profitModest net debtCash $229M − debt $672M
What this means
Netting $229M of cash and short-term investments against $672M of debt leaves $443M owed, about 1.9× a year's operating profit (2.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 5%–62%; 9% latest = NOPAT $171M ÷ invested capital $1.9BIndustry peers: median -14%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Positive this year, negative across the cyclelatest $143M = operating cash $172M − maintenance capex $29M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -2%)Industry peers: median 5%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a -2% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $172M ÷ net income $126M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $127M ÷ Owner Earnings $143M — this fiscal year
What this means
Of $143M Owner Earnings, $127M (89%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $127M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does. This year's proportion is 89%; across the record (2016–2025) it is 137%, the capital-allocation section below.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.16×HarvestingCapex $29M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $181M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
The promise and the pay packet
- Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 0.0%Stock pay, share count unreadStock compensation $0 (fiscal 2025), 0.0% of revenue · repurchases $127M · the share count is not comparable across these years (a split or a first listing sits in the record), so the drift is withheld
What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $3.3B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.05×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $672M vs $98M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −35%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.51/share (latest year $0.70), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.09/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 9 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 14% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 14% early to 6% lately, median 10% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −6%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Owner earnings growth −5%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 5% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2023 · 5.1% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$260M
- Other current assets$1.8B
- Other current liabilities$1.9B
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.2B, of which the leases are 44%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Mr. H. Lutnick | $4.1M | $4.1M | ($797M) |
| 2021 | Mr. H. Lutnick | $35.0M | $35.1M | ($68M) |
| 2022 | Mr. H. Lutnick | $20.0M | $20.3M | $1.1B |
| 2023 | Mr. H. Lutnick | $20.0M | $20.2M | ($321M) |
| 2024 | Mr. H. Lutnick | $20.0M | $20.1M | ($41M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio117:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Real Estate Development & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BEKEKE Holdings Inc | $14.0B | 24% | 0.4% | 2% | 9% |
| COMPCompass Inc. | $7.0B | — | -7.3% | -95% | -1% |
| VACMarriott Vacations Worldwide Corporation | $5.0B | — | 10.4% | 6% | 6% |
| AGNTAGNT Inc. | $4.8B | 8% | -0.4% | -14% | 5% |
| OPENOpendoor Technologies Inc | $4.4B | 8% | -6.4% | -20% | -1% |
| NMRKNewmark Group Inc. | $3.3B | — | 10.4% | 14% | -2% |
| REAXThe Real Brokerage Inc. | $2.0B | 9% | -4.5% | -223% | 3% |
| MMIMarcus & Millichap Inc. | $755M | 38%3y | 11.3% | 24% | 6% |
| Group median | — | — | -0.0% | -6% | 4% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Newmark Group Inc. has delivered.
—
9.0% = the 4.65% 10-year Treasury (Aug 19, 2026) + 4.35 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.65%, as of Aug 19, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $798M on 181M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $608M. The if-converted diluted count is 254M, 41% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($48M) runs well above depreciation ($185M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $817M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← NMIH its page in the Manual NN →
Industry order: ← MMI the Real Estate Development & Services chapter OPEN →