RBRK, Rubrik Inc.

Will it survive?

• Can it pay its interest? —
  Interest expense not tagged in the data
  What this means

  No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

• How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $751M
  Net debt against an operating loss
  Cash $380M − debt $1.1B
  What this means

  Netting $380M of cash and short-term investments against $1.1B of debt leaves $751M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

• How long is cash tied up? 58d
  Tight
  DSO 71 + DIO 8 − DPO 21 days
  What this means

  Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

• Return on invested capital -118%
  Below average
  NOPAT ($273M) ÷ invested capital $231M (debt + equity − cash)
  Industry peers: median -1%
  What this means

  The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

• Owner-earnings margin 1%
  Thin through the cycle
  4-yr median margin, range -3%–19%; latest $253M = operating cash $283M − maintenance capex $30M
  Industry peers: median 17%
  What this means

  What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 4 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $329M of SBC) leaves ($76M).

• Are earnings backed by cash? $283M
  Loss, but cash-generative
  Net income ($349M) · cash from operations $283M
  What this means

  The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

• Where do the earnings go? —
  Not enough data
  What this means

  The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

• Investing or harvesting? 0.80×
  Harvesting
  Capex $30M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $37M
  What this means

  Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

• How much of next year is already sold? 97%
  Next year is essentially contracted
  Contracted and not yet earned $2.4B, of which the filing expects 53% within twelve months = $1.3B against revenue of $1.3B
  Retention and the customer ladder, in the filing’s words

  dollar-based net retention rate120%

  “A further indication of our ability to expand revenue from existing customers is through our average subscription dollar-based net retention rate which was over 120% as of January 31, 2026.”

  ✓ the figure is the sentence’s own characters

  Customers from $100,0002,805

  “We had 2,805 customers with $100,000 or more in Subscription ARR as of January 31, 2026, increasing from 2,246 as of January 31, 2025.”

  What this means

  Remaining performance obligations are revenue the customer has committed to and the company has not yet earned — the nearest thing a software business has to an insurer's float. The headline total is a duration figure and can mislead badly on its own, because a contract signed for seven years counts the same as one signed for one. What matters is the part the filing itself expects to recognise within twelve months, shown here against a year of revenue. Where a company does not tag that band, both figures are withheld rather than shown half-told.

• What does winning a customer cost? 58%
  Growth is being bought
  Selling and marketing $769M ÷ revenue $1.3B
  What this means

  Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.

• Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 25.0%
  Stock pay, share count unread
  Stock compensation $329M (fiscal 2026), 25.0% of revenue · no repurchases · the share count is not comparable across these years (a split or a first listing sits in the record), so the drift is withheld
  What this means

  Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

• Adequate size Near
  Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.3B
  What this means

  Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

• Strong liquidity Near
  Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.69×
  What this means

  Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

• Conservative debt Near
  Debt ≤ working capital · $1.1B vs $910M WC
  What this means

  Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

• Moderate price —
  P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
  What this means

  Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.04/share (latest year $-1.71), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-2.55/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2023–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

• Profitable years 0 of 4
  What this means

  Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

• Operating margin −46% → −77% (2-yr avg ends)
  What this means

  The recent-years average (−77%) sits below the early years (−46%), but the latest year (−26%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is −49% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.

• Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
  What this means

  The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

• Worst year 2025 · −127.9% op. margin
  What this means

  Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.